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The dominant immanental character of nineteenth century theology
was directly related to the epistemological problem in modern thought,
which had reached a climax with Kant's bifurcation of knowledge into noumen-
al and phenomenal elements and his consequent restriction of metaphysics.
The developmental philosophy of history, advanced by Lessing and Herder, and
the Romanticist individuality and wholeness of outlook, were further con¬
tributory influences upon the pattern of the theology of the period.
Schleiermacher's theology of experience embodied the Romanticist
outlook in making a state of feeling, orientated upon the universe, norm¬
ative for religious truth. Having rejected metaphysics, he confined all
determinate knowledge of God and of His relation to the world, to a des¬
cription of states of religious consciousness.
In German idealist philosophy, Romanticism found a variant expression
as an organon of reflective awareness. Hegel made God the final term of a
system of rational harmony in which the Idea triumphs over all antitheses
of experiential reality. His system coulci be characterized as a 'panen-
theism', in which God is not simply identified with the world, but is made
the Absolute? under which the world is organically subsumed.
Baur used the Hegelian dialectic to remove the transcendent uniqueness
of Christian history, regarding the latter as the necessary evolution of the
Absolute. In Strauss, the same pattern of thought, coupled with a radical
Biblical criticism, reduced Gospol history to universal religious truth,
immanent to the religious consciousness. Biedermann did not effectively
fulfil his aim of uniting the philosophy of the Absolute with an independent,
objective world of reality.
In British theology, Coleridge introduced an idealist impulse, in
terms of which an idea, or spiritual truth, was conceived to be more
important than Biblical history or the historic dogma. Toward the end of
the century, neo-Hegelianism developed a more absolute idealist system
which made God the end term of a process of development, a. view which
. accorded well with contemporary, optimistic and evolutionary thought.
The historica.l positivism of Ritschl eliminated metaphysical or tran¬
scendental knowledge of God. Doctrinal knowledge concerning God was made
subject to the judgment of its worth for the individual. His method
promoted an approach to the study of religious history whereby universal
religious values were gleaned from the various historical manifestations
of religion. In the thought of Troeltsch, God is little more than a
principle of purposive development within the flow of historical process.
The present reaction to nineteenth century immanentism was prefigured
within that century itself, in Kierkegaard's rejection of a theory of
knowledge and his insistence upon the absolute disjunction between the
human and the Divine, a chasm which can be bridged only by the paradoxical
action of Divine grace and the leap of human faith. Martin KShler challenged
syncretic historicisn^ in the centrality which he accorded to Christology
and in his belief that Biblical history is qualified by suprahistorical
factors distinguishing it from general history.
In these protests we have the essential elements of contemporary
revived transcendentalism, and Biblically-centred theology. We may
properly conclude that, in Biblical faith, a view of God's sovereign
holiness is found united with a belief in the immediacy of His presence
in revelation and providential action.
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The present work shares in the limitations of any
specialized approach to the study of a period in
theology. It cannot presume to keep clearly in view,
and to balance carefully, the many facets of thought
which characterize an era. I believe, however, that
the theme of this work provides a fundamental approach
to the study of theology, and particularly to the
theology of the past century. The doctrines of God,
creation, providence, man, revelation, Christology,
are all crucially related to the concept of immanence.
In order to guard against superficiality,
investigation has been limited to a few representative
positions. Large areas of theological reflection have
been left untouched, e.g., the Termittlungstheologle
and the Oxford Movement. It has been assumed that
the ftheology of immanence• in the nineteenth century
represents the source from which the leading theolog¬




The method followed in this work has been to
allow exposition to speak for itself, with a minimum
of criticism. For the greater part, the principal
works of the German theologians have been read in the
original text, and, often at the expense of an incon¬
venient style, citations have been drawn from the text
which was actually used in the course of research.
I wish to record sincere thanks to my Faculty
supervisors, the Very Rev. Principal John Baillie and
the Rev. A.M. Fairweather, for their courtesy in
directing my course of study; also to Professor Karl
Barth of Basel for according me a personal discussion
of his views upon the subject of this thesis. I wish
further to express my gratitude to the Scholarships
Committee of the University of Edinburgh for material
assistance, and the Senatus for granting a leave-of-
absence, which permitted me to undertake a period of
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In the cours8 of this work it will be shown that
the concept of Divine immanence played a deeply significant
role in the development of nineteenth century theology. The
concept, however, was not clearly defined and discussed under
chapter and heading by each of the representative theologians
and religious philosophers whom we shall consider in the
following pages, It was, rather, an underlying motif which
broadly influenced the theological thinking of the period.
No preliminary definition of the concept of Divine
immanence therefore can serve to guide our study throughout.
Instead, we must endeavour to learn how the various thinkers
under consideration formulated the problem of the relations
of God to the world, of the Divine to the human; and only in
conclusion may we seek to make an independent evaluation of
the problem as it applies to the entire period.
In order to orientate our study, a cursory review
of the history of the problem of immanence in modern thought
is indicated. It was the rise of the epistemological contro¬
versy in the realm of philosophical and scientific thought
which precipitated the widespread attempt on the part of
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nineteenth century theologians to bridge the gap between the
human and the Divine. It was deemed necessary to work out a
modus Vivendi between philosophy and theology in which a
common theory of knowledge would apply to both studies. From
the period of the rise of modern philosophy, when philosophy
came to be a separate enquiry from theology, no serious attempt
had been made to effect a reconciliation between the two, until
the Enlightenment. It was not until the nineteenth century,
however, that the dominant movements in theology began to
grapple directly with the problems posed by modern thought.
For the theme of our study, it is highly relevant to
mention, at the outset, the Italian Renaissance philosopher,
Giordano Bruno. It was Bruno who first disturbed the view of
the transcendence of God held by Catholic orthodoxy, wherein
God was conceived to exist outside the periphery of the universe,
in terms of a spatial metaphor. Bruno not only accepted the
new Copernican revolution concerning the organization of the
physical universe, but he regarded the universe as being in¬
finite in extension as well, and left no'place' for the divine
habitation. He revived the Stoic pantheistic conception of
God. God is the Whole, impregnating every part of reality.
He constitutes the inner harmony which unites all things. Jn
this view of Bruno, there was no absolute relation of 'over'
and 'under' which the old world-view had taken for granted.
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Henceforward, simplicity of conception was no longer possible
in describing the relation of God to the world.
It was the philosophical method and system of
Descartes (1596-1650), however, which provided the creative
impulse to modern thought. His subjective rationalism and
idealist tendencies held a dominant position in philosophy
down to the German idealism of the nineteenth century.
Descartes held that truth consists of clear and distinct ideas.
The most distinct of all ideas, the idea of myself as a think¬
ing thing, is the proof of my own existence. The 'idea', then,
is to be equated with existence.
This root assumption was the basis for his revival
of the Anselmian ontological argument for the existence of
God. The idea which man has of Deity, together with the idea
of His perfection, is sufficient ground for positing the
existence of such a Deity. He says,
Since whatever in the end be the cause of my existence,
it must of necessity be admitted that it is likewise a
thinking being, and that it possesses in itself the.
idea and all the perfections I attribute to deity.
Man possesses in himself the perception of the infinite, and
of a being more perfect than himself; otherwise, how could he
be conscious of himself as a deficient being who has doubts
and desires? 2 The idea of God is therefore innate. This
1. Descartes, Meditations, p. 50.
2» Ibid« P. 46. ,
c*t
authority of thought so to posit the existence of God implies
that for Descartes God is immanent within the thought which
affirms His existence.
In the Cartesian philosophy God is the only substance
which exists in and for itself. The created world is continu¬
ally dependent upon God. "The action by which he now sustains
it is the same with that by which he originally created it,"1
Thought and Extension, mind and body, are mutually exclusive
and can be brought together only by an arbitrary intervention
of God. Matter is in itself dead and moves mechanically,
according to the original laws of motion given to it by God.
Mind knows the external world by means of Divinely given
intuitions, A knowledge of God is therefore necessary and
p
prior to scientific knowledge of the world. God is the one
substance behind all, who reconciles the duality of created
substance by His 'occasional1 interventions. This occasion¬
al! st doctrine of the Divine action in the world was taken up
and pushed to an extreme by Malebranche, who made God the
immediate cause of every isolated change which takes place in
the universe.
It was Spinoza, the central thinker of the seventeenth
century, who took the further step to pantheism by making God
1. Descartes, Discourse on Method, p. 87
2. Meditations, p.70
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not only sole cause of all that happens but sole substance as
well. Thought and extension are not created substances, as
in the thought of Descartes. They are attributes of the one
substance, God, Who exists in and for Himself. God is infinite
substance, and His attributes are expressed in an infinite
number of modes or particulars 'which appear in the physical
universe. He is co-extensive with nature. "God is the immanent
and not the transitive cause of all things." 1 There is no
place for chance events or for the arbitrary action of God:
In nature there is nothing contingent, but all things
are determined from the necessity of the divine nature
to exist and act in a certain manner. 2
This necessity is a demonstrable mathematical
necessity which rules out the possibility of human freedom:
We do everything by the will of God alone, and....we
are partakers of the divine nature in proportion as
our actions become more and more perfect and we more
and more understand God. 3
All of our ideas necessarily involve the eternal and infinite
essence of God; and only as our ideas are related to Him are
they true.
This strongly idealistic tendency in Spinoza fails,
/ v v'
however, to completely resolve the Cartesian dualism. Mind
for Spinoza is not reducible to matter. Matter* on the other
1. Spinoza, Ethics, p. 22
2. Ibid, p. 29
3. IbTd. p. 102
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hand, is still the substantial in material phenomena, which
persiststhrough all change and can neither arise nor cease to
be. Mind and matter are therefore parallel attributes
existing side by side and are reconciled only by the fact that
they inhere within the one infinite substance, God. The
differentia which he admits within his one substance virtually
re-establish the Cartesian dualism. God is defined as nature
in its active aspect, the natura naturans: and He is not to be
simply equated with the totality of phenomena. On the other
hand, the modes of particular phenomena, into which substance
differentiates are nature in its passive aspect, the natura
naturata. In spite of the fact that there is no 'substantial*
separation between God as active, and God in His passive
attributes, Spinoza has here introduced a distinction of'worth*
£
within nature. Likewise his ethics presuppose a dualism of
value, if not an ontological dualism. He believes that man
must rise above all 'finite' passions by means of a knowledge
of mathematical necessity, by an intellectual love of God.
Spinoza has not really shown how the modes of God
arise and how they are related, in any organic sense as Hegel
1. Hdffding, A History of Modern Philosophy. I,p. 312
2» QP.eit. I, p. 314 "With Spinoza, the concepts,
Substance, God, and Nature are ooestensive, yet in the term
•"God' he introduces an estimation of worth... .logically....
instead of having several fundamental concepts in his system,
he ought to have had only one, i,.e., substance."
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was to attempt later. He has not shown a basis for value
distinctions within the one substance. His unitary substance,
which subsumes all attributes, remains abstract, and a
•practical' dualism still exists.
Leibnitz, the German Enlightenment thinker, endeavour¬
ed to resolve the problem of dualism, not by a monism, but by
an infinite plurality of substances, in each of which all
oppositions are reconciled. The indivisible substances, or
monads, each have an original property of acting conferred
upon them by God Who created them and maintains them in being.
Together, the monads constitute the •republic• of the universe.
There is unity and agreement in the whole because there is
perfection in the units. Eaoh monad reflects the perfections
of the entire universe, although in varying degrees of distinct¬
ness and from varying points of view. Rational soul or spirit,
however, contains something more than the other monads. It is
also an "image of the Divinity." 1
Leibnitz insisted upon the intelligibility and con¬
tinuity of all existence. This was his contribution to the
2
development of German idealism. Monads move and relate to
1. Leibnitz, Philosophical Works, ed. $y Duncan, p.215
2. Hirsch, Geschichte der'neuern pr°ovistqnt&sohe
Theologie. II, p.9 "Leibniz ist der Begrttnder der deutschen
idealistichen Weltansicht, welche im Unterschied vom antiken
Idealismus die mechanistisch-kausale NaturerklSrung als ein
Moment der Wahrheit in sich befasst."
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one another, not by external influence or by action upon one
another, but by a pre-established harmony bestowed upon them
by God at the creation of the world. Their action is immanent.
In this best possible of worlds they work together teleologic-
ally toward the realization of the City of God. This is
Leibnitz* answer to the mechanism and occasionalism of Descartes
and Malebranche. He does not, however, remove the 'distinction*
between soul and matter; they exist together as parallels, but
always pre-determined in their reciprocal action. *
He has avoided an ontological dualism within the
. world of existence by removing God from providential particip¬
ation in the world's affairs. God is separate from the world,
as original primitive substance, as the Creator of the world
and its harmonious working:
God alone is substance really separated from matter,
since he is actus purus, endowed with no passive power,
which, wherever it is, constitutes matter.2
Leibnitz does not rule out the possibility that God may give a
new direction to nature, but this He does by supernatural
power rather than through immanental means. Leibnitz leaves
room for Divine revelation when he says that
In good philosophy, and sound theology, we ought to
distinguish between what is explicable by the natures
and powers of ereatares, and what is explicable onlyby
Powers of the infinite substance." 5
1. Leibnitz, op. pit, p. 142
2. Ibid, p. 192"
3. Ibid, p. 283
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The practical import of his system, none the less, was to
leave God out of the world in its present existence, and to
confer upon thought an independent rational harmony in terms
of the mind's innate ideas.
The pre-established harmony of Leibnitz and the
rationalist emphasis of his system had a counterpart in English
Deism during the first generation of the eighteenth century.
Sninent among the Deists were Toland, Collins,Tindal and Chubb.
They were directly influenced by Herbert of Cherbury, who, a
century earlier, had developed a general science of natural
religion, and also by John Locke, the English Enlightenment
thinker, who had sought to prove 'the reasonableness of
Christianity'. The Deists endeavoured to show that nature,
from its creation by God, was endowed with immanent laws where¬
by it continues to exist. The mind of man has an endowment of
natural reason which is adequate to his needs. There is con¬
sequently no need for a Divine interposition into the operations
of nature in the form of miracle, nor for a divinely-bestowed
revelation to man. Reason provides us with a perfect natural
revelation, to which no external revelation can add or take
away. "Reason is the only foundation of all certitude." *
Locke had said, with the scholastics, that the
Christian revelation is above reason but is not contrary to it.
1. Toland, Christianity Not Mysterious, p. 8
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Toland went further and affirmed that there Is nothing above
reason in Christianity. The so-called Christian ♦revelation'
is not required by rational people but is merely an aid to
assist ordinary mortals. If what God said to man did not agree
with their common notions, then He would have no point of
contact in speaking to them. 1
Tindal regarded natural and revealed religion as but
the internal and the external revelation, respectively, of the
one identical unchangeable will of God. The Christian religion,
or 'the republication of the religion of nature', has been in
existence since the creation, at which time God gave mankind
the means to know it. We are not guided in life by any
contingent providential direction:
'Tis impossible to have gules laid down by any external
Revelation for every particular case; and therefore, there
must be some standing rule, discoverable by the Light of
Nature, to direct us in all such cases." 2
3
All of God's laws are"built on the eternal Reason of things."
The Deists were not seeking to interpret nature apart from the
God who created it, but rather, they removed contingency and
novelty from His action in order that nature might be pliant to
the eternal laws of reason. They had no concept of development.
1. Ibid, p. 128
2. Tindal, Christianity as Old as the Creation, p. 15
3. Ibid. p,~TI5
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The confidence of German Rationalism and English
Deism in the Divine sanction of the human reason was dealt a
severe blow by the sceptical issue of the empirical philosophy
in the thought of David Hume. Locke, the founder of the
empirical tradition, had repudiated innate ideas, and the
possibility of a substance-philosophy. He made substance the
unknowable substrate of the impressions mediated by our senses.
Sense impressions are the source of our ideas. Berkeley had
denied the reality of substance altogether, and with it, inert
matter. Nature is composed solely of perceptions and spirits
who perceive. The regularity of nature is guaranteed by God,
the author of the perceived ideas. Berkeley treated the
material world as
a system of signs, vfaich have no existence save as inter¬
mittent experience in the minds of individual knowers and
as a eontinuous,divine purpose of acting according to
certain rules.
It was his religious and idealistic presuppositions which
preserved Berkeley himself from scepticism.
Hume, however, did away with substance, causation,
and the identity of the self; all were for him ideal ab¬
stractions. Consciousness is left with only sense experience
1. Pringle-Pattison, The Idea of God, p. 183
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and the habitual associations of the ideas delivered by the
senses. The idea of causation is merely that habit of mind
whereby we associate together certain observed constancies in
the relation between events and their antecedents. There is
no possible experience which could give rise to a conception
of God as cause of the existence of the world.
The fact that there is evidence of cause and of
design in the series of events which make up our world of
experience is no reason for lumping the series together into
a whole and insisting that it requires an intelligent cause.1
Man has no divinely-sanctioned faculty of reason which can be
legislative for the nature of existence. We have only isolated
ideas which are too confused and elusive to be reckoned as
having a place in a supreme intelligence. He denies the ability
of the human consciousness to make speculations into the nature
of God. He says conclusively,
Our ideas reach no farther than our experience: we have
no experience of divine attributes and operations: I
need not conclude my syllogism. 2
All the traditional enquiries concerning God, His nature and
activity, fall away under the sceptical conclusions of Hume.
Imtaanuel Kant was profoundly dissatisfied with the
development of the epistemological problem in both rationalism
1. Hume, Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, p. 40.
"From observing the growth of a hair, can we learn anything
concerning the generation of a man?"
2. Ibid, p. 30
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and empiricism. In both traditions the cleft between subject
and object in the process of knowledge had resulted in untenable
conclusions. The Leibnitz-Wolffian rationalism had resorted to
a pre-established harmony to assure to the mind the certainty
of the objects which reason takes within its province. In
empirical thought, Hume's scepticism had not only rendered
metaphysics impossible but had denied to the knower all real
knowledge. Kant inverted the traditional interest of philosophy
in determining the proper 'objects' of thought, to undertake a
thoroughgoing critique of the conditions underlying the
possibility of thought itself. His avowed intention, at the
outset of the first Critique, was to discover if metaphysical
knowledge (synthetic judgments a priori) is possible.
With his deduction, a priori, of the subjective forms
of sensation and the categories of the understanding, he attempt¬
ed to show that the mind is not passive in experience. Indeed
it is possible to form valid a priori concepts which will be
applicable to experience, as mathematical science witnesses.
It must be remembered, however, that the validity of a priori
or analytical knowledge depends upon the fact that it is
amenable to a possible intuitive sense experience. "Knowledge
arises independently of particular experience but is valid only
14
for experience. * Subject and object are irrevocably bound
together in the process of knowledge. The 'I think' must
accompany every judgment about experience.
Sense experience, therefore, as received through the
forms of sensation and interpreted through the concepts of the
understanding, yields real knowledge; but it is a knowledge
only of phenomena. There remain the noumena, or things-in-
themselves, which underly sense experience, but can never be
received in a sense experience. The sphere of the noumena or
transcendent objects, includes the major concepts with which
traditional metaphysics has been concerned: the soul, God, and
freedom. On these issues Kant remains, theoretically in the
same scepticism as Hume:
The outcome of the Critical enquiry is to establish the
legitimacy of immanent metaphysicsgand the impossibility
of all transcendent speculation."
To be distinguished from 'transcendent' is Kant's
use of the term 'transcendental', When the latter adjective
is used with reference to experience, it refers to no
transcendent element which is constitutively present in the
knowing process, but it describes only the bare formal
'conditions' which make experience and knowledge possible.
1. K. Smith, A Commentary to Kant's Critique of
Pure Reason, p. 14.
2. Ibid, p. 26,7.
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A farther use of the term applies to the Ideas of Reason, or
pure objects of the understanding, which have a Regulative'
value for the understanding.
Kant rejects the teleological, cosmological, and
ontological arguments for the existence of God. The teleo¬
logical and cosmological arguments, when applied to the world
as a whole, are too large for our concepts, which must be
valid for a possible experience. They therefore fall within
the same category as the ontologieal argument. In each of the
three arguments an idea, lying outside of experience, is
assumed to represent existence. Kant dismissed the ontologioal
argument with his celebrated illustration of the one hundred
thalers: the thought of having one hundred thalers in my pocket
is quite different from having them there in reality.
Reason, none the less, aspires beyond experiential
concepts to pure or transcendental Ideas, which it finds to be
of regulative value in the organization of experience as a
whole. The employment of pure reason has for its object the
transcendental physiology of nature (i.e.. nature taken as a
whole and beyond a possible experience), and the relation of
nature as a whole to a being above nature. * The transcendental
Idea of God is the highest ideal of reason and is required to
bring cohesion to the entire series of experience. If the Ideas
1. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, p. 662
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of pure reason are permitted to "become constitutive, however,
they represent transcendent objects whioh cannot possibly
enter into experience, and so involve the understanding in
hopeless antinomies. For every transcendental concept there
are opposing experiential concepts which present themselves
to the understanding to negate the former. We must not, there¬
fore, ascribe existence, or reality, to the transcendental
concepts.
Kant's careful distinction between phenomena and
noumena and between real knowledge and transcendental Ideas,
distinguishes his thought from subsequent idealism. He did
not share with the idealist the assumption that knowledge of
the self is more certain and more honourable than knowledge
of nature. It is true that he believed the continuity of
experience requires the postulation of an *original unity of
apperception', but it remains a transcendental postulate and
not an immediate subjective intuition. The self-consciousness
is not completely analysable for Kant, Idealism did, however,
receive a tremendous stimulus from Kant, in view of the organic
role which he ascribed to the subjective consciousness in the
process of knowledge. In Kant's thought,
Nature consists for us of nothing but appearance,
existing only in the mode in which they are experienced,
17
and therefore as necessarily conforming to the conditions
under which experience is alone possible. 1
The step from this position to that of idealism was easily
taken by certain of Kant's disciples.
If the theoretical approach had removed the transcend¬
ent objects of speculative and religious interest, Kant restored
this kingdom in his practical philosophy. He gave to the latter
an independent validity apart from theoretical philosophy. Out
of the practical interests of ethics he 'removed reason to make
room for faith.' Arguing from the immanent moral sense, he
reinstates belief in the existence of God, freedom, and immort¬
ality, the three postulates which he believes are necessary to
assure the possibility of moral action and its fulfilment In
the summum bonum. (The concept of God, reached in this manner,
may, of course, be subjected to the safeguards of a theoretical
criticism). Because the belief In the existence of God has
been derived through the moral faculty rather than through the
theoretical understanding, the belief cannot be theoretically
affirmed, but must be expressed in the form of a personal moral
3
conviction. This dependence of belief in God upon a moral
1. K. Smith, op. cit., p. 259
2. Kant, op oit.. p. 530
3. Ibid, p. 550. "My conviction is not logical, but
moral certainty; and since it rests on subjective grounds (of
the moral sentiment), I must not even say, 'It is morally
oertain that there is a God, etc.* but 'I am morally certain,
etc. *.**
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basis virtually makes the moral order itself the ultimate
reality for Kant. 1
Kant defines religion as "the recognition of all
duties as divine commands." 2 The divine commands, however,
do not come to man ab extra. The reason co-operates with the
moral consciousness in determining the unconditional laws for
oonduct:
Only through reason can thought add revelation to the
concept of a religion, since this very concept, as though
deduced from an obligation to the will of a moral legis¬
lator, is a pure concept of reason. 3
A revealed faith and statutory laws preceding the experience
of religion would make religion a pseudo-servioe. The sole
function of revelation is to make more comprehensible the
commanding role which reason plays in a natural religion. The
thought of a Divine incarnation is treated only in a problem¬
atical, hypothetical way. "The archetype of such a person is
to be sought nowhere but in our own reason." 4
The ability of the reason to prescribe the divine
commands does not amount to a constitutive indwelling of the
Divine within man. 5 Kant does not wholly deny the idea of a
1. Oman, The Natural and the Supernatural, p. 28.
2. Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone.
p. 142.
3. Ibid, p. 144.
4. Ibid, p. 57.
5* Ibid, (intr.) p. lxvii, "(Kant) had always looked
upon the idea of divine immanence with profound distrust
(Continued on page 19).
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'supernatural accession' to aid our deficient moral capacity
but he believes that such an accession is a transcendent
concept and very hazardous. It is difficult to reconcile with
moral responsibility;
That which is to be accredited to us as morally good conduct
must take place not through foreign influence but solely
through the best possible use of our own powers. 1
To the end, Kant maintained immanent rational safeguards to rule
out the acceptance of transcendent objects of knowledge.
Kant's philosophy aroused not only a positive reaotion
in the idealists, but also a strong negative reaction. The
latter come chiefly from the Romanticists who insisted upon the
immediacy and intuitiveness of knowledge. One significant
figure who stood very much alone in his reaction against Kant
was J. G. Hamann.
Hamann would go so far with the Romantioists as to
say that reason must not be opposed to the senses and that
nature must be regarded as one whole. Nature, however, can not
yield an adequate account of God. Hamann made a sharp separation
between nature and grace. True and adequate knowledge must come
( 5. cont'd) He was so anxious to maintain that the moral law
is man's own law that he could not seriously entertain the
idea of its being, in its very essence the voice of God." Cf.
Pringle Pattison, op. oit.. p. 37, "The immanence of God was
an idea foreign to Kant's whole way of thinking."
1. Ibid, p. 179.
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to us through revelation. We find God when we find ourselves
in God. Because truth is wholly subjective, it cannot be
taught or demonstrated to the reason but must be individually
perceived by faith as it is mediated to us in Scripture. The
verification of the words of Soripture lies in the fact that
in its light we are able for the first time to discern the acts
of God in nature and in history. Hamann's position was one of
epistemological sceptioism. His thought represented the first
great attempt to make use of scepticism as a companion to faith,
in opposition to the growing critical tendencies of philosophy."1"
It was an attempt that was to be taken up later by Kierkegaard,
While Kant's epistemology and ethics signalized the
high point of the Enlightenment, a contemporary movement played
a no less significant role in contributing to the intellectual
atmosphere in which nineteenth century theology became acclim¬
atized, It was the rise of a developmental philosophy of
history. The modern view of history owes much to the name of
Lessing, a slightly younger contemporary of Kant.
Lessing's characteristic theme was that "That which
2
Education is to the Individual, Revelation is to the Race."
Revelation is a historical process of human development.
History is not a mere register of events, but a dynamic movement
1. Hirsch, op. oit., IV, p. 180.
2. Lessing, The Education of the Human Race, p. 1.
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in which, human fortunes are moulded. The goal of the process
is the perfection of mankind, Man must rise out of the
restrictions and habits of tradition to attain to an ideal
Humanitat. There should be a progress in man's spiritual
capacities commensurate with the development in science.
Leasing's religion is a faith in the evolutionary trend of the
immanent forces of fate toward the realization of his ideal
for man. 1
He traces progressive development in the Jewish-
Christian tradition. The Old Testament served as a primer for
faith at an early stage of Israel's development. Eventually,
the Old Testament conceptions of reward and punishment were no
longer needed as guides to moral conduct. With the coming of
Christ, mankind was given a second primer: although the era
of Christ is not to be considered as the last stage of religious
instruction. This religious process in the history of a people
possesses no revelatory values which the human reason could not
attain by itself, but a knowledge of this objective religious
history may speed up and universalize the realization of
religious and ethical truths. Revelation, understood in this
sense, is never ceasing, Lessing himself, if given the choice
1. Hirsch, op, oit. IV, p. 131. "Glaube an den ewigen
iiber die Erde hinausweisenden Sinn des (ieschehens als eines
Vervollkommungsprozesses. Das 1st Lessings Religion, und das
ist sie ganz....Seine Vorsehung ist eigentlich eine unerbittlich
alles in allem wirkende Schieksalsgewalt."
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between possessing pure truth and the search after it, would
choose the search. Religion should never permit itself to
become congealed within a set tradition. Religion existed
prior to the Bible and does not receive its authentication from
the latter. 2
The historical developmental method which reached a
climax in the religionsgeschichtliche school in the nineteenth
3
century, received a further advance in the writings of Herder.
He belonged more strictly to the theological world than Leasing,
whose chief fame was literary. Herder's Ideen paved the way for
later philosophies of history. Like Leasing he believed that
the search for truth is more delightful than the possession of
it. It was his fundamental thesis that "Mankind is forever
changing, always manifesting itself differently, gaining fresh
A
strength and losing it as well." Throughout this continuum
of history he saw the action of an omnipotent and omniscient
Providence. He sought to discover a religio-historical and
1. Lesslng, Theologisohe Streitschriften. p. 19.
2* Ibid. P. 121. "Die Religion ist nieht wahr, weil die
Evangelisten und Apostel sie lehrten; sondern sie lehrten sie,
weil sie wahr Ist. "-j>\^ pro-v % vv<>.wv; sc ~~r(oq*n. ia.
3. Barth, Die Geschichte der protestant ische Tfaeologie.,
p. 282. "Ohne Herder keine Erlanger und keine religions-
geschichtliche Sohule. Ohne Herder auch kein Troeltsch."
4. Gillies, Herder, p. 64.
5. Hirsch, op. oit.. p. 227. "Zwei stichworte wird er
nicht mftde zu wiederholen: Offenbarung ist gottliche Erziehung
der Menschheit, und: Offenbarung geschieht durch Geschichte.'
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religio-psychological meaning in past history. For the future,
he held Lessing's Humanit&ts ideal. In the interests of ful¬
filling this ideal, man needs an enrichment of taste,perception,
and the sense of beauty. The highest blossoming of the human
soul takes place in religious experience. In his ideal for
humanity we can trace Herder's strong romanticist impulse.
Eis view of nature was essentially pantheistic. The
world is the living garment or symbol of God, and creation is
the internal self-impartation of God. Nature and reason are
gifts of God along with grace and revelation and it is false
to make an artificial distinction between these two types of
our endowment. He asks, "Kann der Sine Geber wohl in seinen
besten Geschenken gegen sich selbst straiten?" * He speaks of
the Bible as a 'human' book. God is represented as being
contemporaneous to man and cooperative with him through a most
intimate involvement in every sphere of human life:
Gott muss den Menschen als gegenwartig, als mitwirkend
in ihr Leben, auoh in die kleinsten GmstSnde desselben
mit seinen Absichten verfloohten, dargestellt werden;
sonst bleiben die schSnsten Lehren von Allgemein her,
entfernt, todt und ode. 2
God is that deeper creative unity subsuming both nature and




mind, of Whom we can become aware only in feeling.
Herder's romanticism, directly influenced Goethe in
his youth, and the latter became the most outstanding literary
representative of the romanticist movement. Goethe moved
beyond what he considered to be the narrow confines of confess¬
ional Christianity, but his thought exercised a widespread
influence upon theology. Goethe's conception of nature was
essentially the Spinozistic pantheism, with the distinction
that, for Goethe, the actualizing of the Divine in nature
possesses a developmental history. * He had a dynamic rather
than a mechanistic conception of world development. The World-
Spirit is continually unfolding itself in an infinite variety
of life and being.
Goethe united the ideal and the real, art and nature.
It is in the cultured artistic society that the world is
finally harmonized, and nature and art become merely two differ-
£
ent expressions of the one creative power at work in the world.
With this harmonious view of nature, his concept of knowledge
is one in which the careful Kantian analysis of the knowing
process is lightly by-passed. Nature makes a 'total* impression
1. Siebeek, Goethe als Denker. p. 78. "Das Wesentliche
in der Natur ist fur Goethe im unterschied von Spinoza, dass sie
eine Entwicklungsgeschichte besitzt."
2. Ibid, p. 85. "Natur und kunst sind fur ihn im Grtinde
nur verschiedene Aeusserungen der einen und selben durch die
Welt waltenden Schopferkraft."
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upon us. The character of any object of knowledge is the
impression which it makes upon a 'giving' man, particularly on
the side of feeling. The goal of all practical and theoretical
wisdom is to enhance the worth of human life.
Within a more definitely Christian and theological
context, Romanticism found expression in the writings of Novalis
and Fr. Schlegel. The blend of poetic and philosophical world-
view which characterized the thought of both writers receives
a more orderly treatment in the writing of Schlegel. The mature
life of the latter fell within the nineteenth century, but
probably his greatest significance for theology lay in the
influence which he exerted upon the young Sehleiermacher before
the turn of the century. Sohlegel was one of the most prominent
leaders of the Romanticist School in Berlin of which
Schleiermacher became a member.
Schlegel designated his philosophy a 'philosophy of
life', which he wished to distinguish from a system of thought
concerned with isolated objects of nature or abstract theoretical
problems. He opposed his position to that of both materialism
and idealism:
Every species of infidelity is either a material deification
of nature and a worship of the sensible powers of life, or
it is an abstract deification of the absolute subjective
me." 1
1. Schlegel, The Philosophy of Life, p. 215
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He sought to map out a middle oourse which he designated
Spiritualism*. The philosophy of life,
Setting out from the soul as the beginning and first
subjeot of its speculations, contemplates the mind or
spirit as its highest and supreme object. 1
Although Schlegel made consciousness the starting point and
object of thought, he endeavoured to avoid ending up with a
rational absolute, by affirming a personalistic polarity within
the field of conscious life. God is present to the mind as "a
living spirit, a personal God." 2
Nature is not self-subsistent but exists in God. It
is to be regarded as created; otherwise, eternal matter would
be virtually a second •finite* God. "The sensible world may
2
be looked upon as a veil thrown over the spiritual world."
It is a false conception which separates the finite from the
infinite, bespeaking only a confused mind, which must be
restored to its true unity. Faith is the middle link between
science and religion; the two are one in God. "The pure and
living faith of a loving soul abiding permanently in God, is
properly the centre of the human consciousness." 4 This harmony
achieved by faith is not an all-absorption of consciousness into
the Divine; pantheism is a false extreme to be avoided equally
1. ipia. P. 61.
2. Ibid, p. 61.
3. pid. P. HQ.
4. Ibid. P« 219.
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with atheism. He prefers to say that "God must form the
key-stone in the aroh of the whole consciousness."
Schiegel's romanticist conception of the Divine is
strikingly manifest when he says that he would rather be con¬
fronted with "a Theodicee for the feelings, conceived in the
very spirit of love, than any purely rational theory." 3
Because he characterized man's wants and properties as symbolical,
he believed that religion must be clothed in symbolical rather
than rational formulations. The fanciful and indeterminate
* -«<m
character of his romanticist theology reaches a climax when he
speaks of "the symbolical significance of life and the symbol-
3
ical destiny of man in his relation to God."
1. Ibid, p. 256.
2. Ibid, p. 119.





THE THEOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE
A. Schleiermacher
Friedrich Schleiermacher (1758-1834) was the founder
of a new era In theology, and with a study of his work we may
appropriately enter the field of nineteenth century theology.
His writings represented a comprehensive attempt to reinstate
Christian theology in the respect of his cultured contemporaries
who had repudiated religious faith under the influence of
Enlightenment thought. Whether positively or negatively
disposed toward Schleiermaeher, subsequent theologians have
had to take into account the thought of this ran who has been
described as the greatest German theologian after Luther.
It is important to note some of the elements which
made up Schleiermaeher• s background. His Moravian upbringing
and his friendship with the Berlin Romanticist School contributed
to his mystical and romanticist tendencies. He had passed through
an acquaintance with the Wolffian rationalist tradition, and had
rejected the attempt of theologians such as Semler to find a
rational basis for Christian doctrines. Spinozism, with which
he became familiar through the writings of Jacobi, undoubtedly
had an influence on his world-view. The Kantian epistemology
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remained at the basis of his thought at all times, in his avoid¬
ance of speculative theories beyond the range of experience.
With his contemporary, Fiehte, whom he regarded as the greatest
of speculative philosophers, he shared an individualistic approach
to life and the conviction that an intuition of the self is the
starting-point of all our knowledge.
Schleiermacher's acceptance of Kant's epistemology did
not extend to accepting the letter's bifurcation of the world
into the realms of phenomena and noumena. He insisted upon the
fundamental identity of knowing and being, of the real and the
ideal. The real is simply limited to that which can be
experienced; there is no transcendental thing-in-itself. He
did not accept Kant's postulates of God, freedom and immortality
as the basis of moral experience, Ethics do not require any
transcendental postulates as incentives or conditions for right
conduct. The goal of ethics is self-development of the indivi¬
dual, to be achieved by moving him to a realization of the
potentialities of his own nature. God is an immediate intuition,
mediated through world-experience. Freedom is not assured to us
from beyond, but it is the realization of our potentialities for
moral advance. Immortality is that state of mind which accom¬
panies the consciousness of being at one with the Infinite in
the midst of the finite.
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Schleiermacher keeps distinct, the functions of
knowing, morality, and religion. They are each similarly
orientated upon the actual world and human experience, but they
pursue their activity along different lines. 1 The religious
function is of supreme value to man's life because it represents
the fulfilment of an absolute need. The processes of knowing
can only become complete through religion, because the latter
is a life, an experience, rather than a theory. Morality is
affected by religion to this extent, that when we have a
knowledge of the Infinite, we do everything with religion,
though never from religion. The religious consciousness is an
original possession of man, and not something imposed from
without by means of a creed. Because it is a consciousness of
the Infinite, it cannot be a determinate rational consciousness;
its seat is in feeling. The only valid intellectual formulation
of dogma must be delivered in the form of a 'description* of
the states of religious consciousness.
Schleiermacher desired to make religion a native
independent funotion of the soul, which is amenable to psycho¬
logical investigation and independent of a philosophical theory.
A study of his theology makes it clear, however, that he did not
1, In this view, he reveals himself to be bound by the
'faculty' psychology of his time.
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free himself from his basic philosophical presuppositions. A
brief survey of some of his leading philosophical conclusions
in the Piale let ik. concerning knowledge of God and of the world,
will serve as a useful basis for an understanding of his
religious views, and may indicate to what extent the philosopher
dictated to the theologian.
The category of the individual is all-important in
the epistemology of the Dialektik, as it is likewise in his
religious thought. The individual self-consciousness is the
primary locus for the identification of thought and being: "Wir
sind denkend, und denken seiend.n With Fichte he makes the
analysis of self-consciousness the basis of knowledge. Unlike
Fichte he does not discover in this analysis an account of the
nature of the Ego in itself, nor does he find the whole universe
in the Ego. The analysis yields only the highest attainable
ideas. 2 Therefore, although the Ego is the starting-point in
the knowing process, it is not the end category as well.
Complete knowledge lies beyond our grasp, and thus the reality
of the non-Ego is constantly assured.
Man, as a thinker, is an individual who belongs within
the race, and reason is alike in all men. It is the similarity
1. Sohleiermacher, Dialektik. p. 93
2. Eirsch, op. cit. IV. p. 508
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of the self-consciousness in all men which makes the communi¬
cation of ideas possible. While, therefore, it is in self-
consciousness that the identification of thought and being
takes place, he avoids absolutizing the Ego, both on the grounds
of the incompleteness of knowledge and by his recognition of
the community of individuals.
Schleiermacher is a realist. The identification of
thought and being which occurs in the Ego has an objective
basis. The identity of thought and being is the same as the
unity of the corporate and the mental. He appears to regard
perception and thinking as equivalent and reciprocal. There is
an objective correspondence between the world and the human
mind: "Die Welt driickt sich aus im Typus des menschlichen
Geistes, und dieser Typus stellt sich dar in der Welt." ^
Every false idea presupposes the true idea corresponding to
reality by whose standard the former is deemed false, i.e..
unless the false idea represents some fantastic object for which
no serious claim to objectivity is made. There is no real
antithesis between nature and spirit because we ourselves are
both. 2
1. Sehleiermaoher, op. cit. p. 126
2. Ibid, p. 212. "Wir uns selbst beides sind, nicht nur
dem Leiblichen nach Natur, sondern auch wegen der Notwendigkeit
des Systems der Begriffe und der Gesamtheit der Urteile ist une
dieses die Natur des Geistes Ebenso ist die Natur Geist in
der G®etaltung."
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Schleiermacher ruled out the possibility of any novel
or arbitrary development in nature which is not amenable to
rational judgments; and, by the same token, he denied any
supernatural ideas to the mind. Nature and mind are subject to
a rigid determinism. Nothing can take place in either the
sphere of nature or of mind to upset the correspondence between
the two. 1 The conditionedness of all things, including the
conscious I itself, became the basis for his religious
principle of absolute dependence.
Upon this epistemological basis he superimposed his
conception of God. The identity of the absolutely highest
thought and highest being is not a mere postulate, but it is
the element of certainty which accompanies every single act of
knowing:
Wir konnen sagen, dass mit unserem Bewusstsein uns
auch das Gottes gegeben ist als Bestandteil unseres
Selbstbewusstseins sowohl, als unseres aussera,^
Bewusstseins. 2
The presence of God in our consciousness is the basis of the
unity of our beings in transition from thought to acts of
willing, and also in the reverse movement from willing to
thought.
1. Dilthey, Leben Schleiermachers. I. p. 170.
"Notwendigkeit verbindet alles Geschehen im Weltall; das ist
die Grundlage der Weltanschauung Schleiermachers."
8. Schleiermacher, op. oit. p. 816.
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As the transcendental basis for the unity of thought
and willing, of the intellectual order and the world order, God
is not to be thought of as a Being outside the sphere of
possible human perception. "Das Transcendents nur der Impuls
ist zur Fortentwioklung des Bewusstseins." * Moreover, in
feeling, we possess a category of experience which yields an
immediate awareness of the basis of the unity of thought and
willing. 2 Feeling is the immediate self-consciousness, in
distinction from the reflective I, which merely expresses the
idea of the identity of the self throughout various states.
Feeling is also to be distinguished from perception, which
simply conveys to consciousness the external effects of
sensation.
We could not possess this unity of knowing and willing,
through feeling, if we ourselves in our total subjective being
were not conditioned by a unifying transcendental ground of
consciousness itself. This transcendental ground of self-
consciousness is not something separate from self-consciousness
but it is its religious aspect. Our awareness that we are
conditioned by a transcendental ground constitutes the religious
1. Ibid, p. 174.
2, Ibid, p. 217, "Im Gefiihl 1st die im Denken und
Wollen bloss vorausgesetzte absolute Einheit des Idealen und
Realen wirklich vollzogen."
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feeling. ^ In so far as we identify ourselves with the being
of things and acknowledge the conditionedness of all being,
this religious feeling is one of dependence. Religious feeling
is not a mere internal affectation but it conveys the objective
to us. The religious man knows that the unity of his self-
consciousness is the Divine within him.
It is in fact only from an awareness of the Divine
within us, and within things as they enter into our experience,
that we are able to have a knowledge of Deity. We can have no
knowledge of a being of God outside the world, or of the being
of God in Himself. rtWir haben also nur insofern ein Begriff
von ihm, als wir Gott sind, d.h. ihn in uns haben.n 2
Schleiermacher affirms that such terms for God as Absolute,
Highest Unity, or Identity of the Ideal and the Real are only
schemata; if they become constitutive, they fall into the
realm of the finite and antithetical. They become then such
concepts as the natura naturans of physical nature or the
absolute Ego of consciousness, concepts which he regards as
3
unsatisfactory.
1. Ibid, p. 218, "Diese transcendents Bestimmtheit
des Selbstbewusstseins nun 1st die religiose Seite desselben,
Oder das religiSse Gefiihl, und in diesem also ist der tran¬
scendents Grund Oder das hSchste Wesen selbst representiert.M
2. Ibid, p. 224.
3. Ibid, p. 224.
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Schleiermacher wished to avoid making God a
constitutive informing principle of the world. By refraining
from conferring any objective attributes upon God, he rep¬
resented Him simply as the presupposition or *transcendental
terminus a quo1 of thought. The idea of the 'world' is like¬
wise transcendental in that it is the infinite terminus ad
auto of knowledge. The world, however, is partially actualized;
and in the measure of its actualization, it is constitutive.
The world becomes actualized as knowledge of it advances.
Having distinguished between God and the world as
"bile terminus a quo and the terminus ad qu»m of thought,
respectively, it is false to construe either an antithesis of
God and world or an identity of the two. God is a unity with¬
out manifold, and the xvorld is a manifold without unity. God
negates all antitheses, and the world includes all antitheses.
Since, in our thought, God and world are two distinct ideas, to
make them antithetical or identical would be to go beyond the
limits of real thinking. God and world should rather be
construed as correlates. God cannot be thought without the
world nor the world without God. 1 It is through experience
of the world that we come upon the awareness of God, and without
1. Ibid, p. 227.
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the concept of God we cannot arrive at an adequate formula for
an understanding of the world. Apart from the world, God would
be the principle of non-being, and the world without God would
be accidental. *
In the Dialektik Schleiermacher attempts no further
solution of the problem of the relation of God to the world.
Dialectic, he says, is content without resolving the problem
any more fully than to show that they are related as the
terminus a quo and the terminus ad quern of knowledge. Ethical
Interest is satisfied with the simple assurance that God and
the world are, in fact, related. It is religion vrtiich seeks
to understand more intimately and fully the manner of the
relation.
In his early religious work, the Reden. he undertook
a generalapology for religion. In his maturer work, the
Glaubenslehre, he developed in detail the doctrines which con¬
stitute the deliverances of the specifically Christian religious
consciousness. In the earlier work he sounded the note of
individualism more strongly; later he placed more emphasis
upon the community in the development of Christian doctrine.
He affirmed that the religious consciousness is the
1. Ibid, p.230. "Wenn Gott ohne Welt, wird Gott
Prinzip des Nichtseins, die Welt zufallig.M
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innate possession of every man. Although it has to do with
what is universal in man, it oan only he expressed by man in
so far as he is true to his individuality. In your own person
you must embody humanity uniquely, becoming, as it were, a
compendium of humanity. The general consciousness of the race
continually perfects itself within the individual. It Is from
the primary intuition of the self that we come to a full and
true intuition of the universe. The immediate self-conscious¬
ness is therefore the locus of piety; it does not arise out of
a reflective view of the universe. Religion is sui generis.
The carefully guarded position which Schleiermacher reserved
for the religious ♦faculty* led H.R. Mackintosh to comment that,
on this view, "The pious mind as such knows nothing and does
nothing." 1
Psychologically considered, the religious faculty is
a third sense which unites internal and external sense, seeing
in them an absolute unity. This unification is the "sphere of
the individual, of what is complete In itself, of all that is
art in nature, and in the works of man." 2 The universe is
like a work of art, and religion is the artistic sense. Man's
life is a melody which he must develop by accompanying every
phase of his life with the rich variety of religion. Religion
1. Mackintosh, Types of Modern Theology, p. 48
2. Schleiermacher, Addresses on Religion, p. 137
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can raise the melody to a glorious harmony. In the strictest
sense, piety cannot be taught any more than it is possible to
teach artistic taste, but that religious capacity vdiich is
the natural endowment of all men, to varying degree, may be
developed and enriched through the ministry of individuals who
have attained a high degree of religious development.
Religious t>iety is an immediate experience of the
presence of God, as mediated through the experiential world:
Tour feeling is piety in so far as it is the result of
the operation of God in you by means of the operation
of the world upon you. i
In content, piety is an immediate feeling of the Infinite and
Eternal in the midst of our finite situation. 2 Regardless of
what particular finite study we may be engaged in, we can
easily advance from it to an intuition of the universal. 3
The content of the religious feeling is never more than a
knowledge of the manner of the operation of the universe upon
us; it is not a knowledge of the nature of the universe in
itself. Knowledge about the nature of things is far beneath
the sphere of religion. The apprehension which we gain through
1. I£id» p. 45
2. Dilthey, on. cit. p.341. "Das metaphysische
Grundverhaltnis, dessen Anschauung im Hintergrund der Reden
steht, ist die Immanenz Oder Gegenwart des Unendlichen,
Ewigen im Endlichen."
3. Schleiermacher, op. pit.. p. 86
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the operation of the universe, viz.. that God is present with
us, is far more important than any objective knowledge about
the nature of God.
The true nature of religion is neither this idea nor
any other, but immediate consciousness of the Deity
as He is found in ourselves and in the world. 1
Revelation is not information which comes to man
externally, to augment the ordinary sources of knowledge.
Revelation is every new and original communication of the
universe to man. Inspiration is a general expression for the
feeling of true morality and freedom. Every sacred writing is
a monument to the heroic time of the particular religion to
which it belongs. 2 The truths of religion are to be derived
from a)thistorical study of positive religions in their infinite
variety. Although Schleiermaoher believed that Christianity
is the supreme religion, he would not agree that religion is
exhaustively represented under any one form. It is to be
comprehended under all forms.
His religious universallsm was not a rational
universalism such as the Deists had developed. The historical
forms of religion are unique and are to be studied for their
individual values. Religion must be discovered in the
!• ifria* P. 101
2. Ibid, p. 89-91
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religions; and in all of them, we shall discover some elements
which are of the essence of true religion. There is a measure
of uniformity amid the plurality of religions. The ground for
giving a central place to some one religious element must be
an historical fact. It was this historical approach to the
positive religions which constituted Sohleiermacher's inspiration
and contribution to nineteenth century scientific research into
the history and comparison of religions. He had placed
Christianity on a common plane with other religions.
Schleiermacher judged Christianity to be the supreme
manifestation of religion. It is a monotheistic teleologloal
religion, differing from other religions in that its entire
content relates to the redemption effected in Jesus Christ.
The state of piety which is the subject for Christian dogmatics
is the soul's experience of the spiritual life within the
fellowship of the Christian Church at a given period of time.
The method of dogmatics is strictly empirical. In the
Glaubenslehre. where he systematically examines the features
of the Christian religious consciousness, we may learn what
he considers to be the distinctively Christian view of the
relation between God and the world.
The Immediate being of God in feeling is characterized
by the attitude of absolute dependence. In the Dialektik, the
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concepts of both God and the world had been formulated to serve
the epistemological requirements of the knowing self. In the
Glaubenslehre, the religious feeling of dependence tends to
make the distinction between God and the world much more acute
than in the epistemological formulation, When Schlei8rmacher
equates 'absolute dependence* and 'relation to God* he means
that God is the source of our perceptive and self-active exist¬
ence. The feeling of absolute dependence represents something
more than the mere conditionedness of our beings by the totality
of temporal being, which we share with all other finite being. i
Man differs from other finite being in that he alone possesses
what might be called an original revelation, i.e., an awareness
of his conditionedness. That awareness is his God-consoiousness.
We do not need to build up a doctrine of God as an
inference from isolated experiences; we have an immediate appre¬
hension of God in the feeling of absolute dependence. Any
separate attributes which we may ascribe to God do not represent
differentiations within God Himself, but in the manner in which
we apprehend Him. Our immediate apprehension of God is rendered
possible because there is a oneness of human reason with the
Divine mind. The faith of the Church that Christ was both human
and Divine is witness to the capability of human nature to
1. Schleiermacher, Per Christliche Glaube. I, p. 20
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assume the Divine nature. Consequently, the Divine mind is to
be interpreted as the highest development of the human mind.
There is no essential difference between the two. 1 The only
sense in which Christian truth is supra-rational consists in
the fact that it is not to be scientifically deduced nor derived
from a rational process. It rests instead upon the peculiar¬
ities of Christian experience, and its rationale consists of a
description of that experience.
In our self-consciousness we recognize our union with
the world as well as our union with God; but there is a distinc¬
tion between the two. In our consciousness of union
(Mitgesetztsein) with the world, we recognize ourselves to be
a living part of the world: this obviously does not promote a
feeling of absolute dependence. In our relation to other parts
of the world we may have a feeling of dependence in respect of
their action upon us, but we have also a feeling of freedom in
respect of our action upon them. In the feeling of absolute
dependence, however, we are conscious of a union with God in
which He appears as the absolutely undivided unity, and not as
a being who differentiates Himself into modes of active and
passive in mutual interaction with finite beings. 2 It is
1. Ibid. I, p. 82-4
2« ^bld. I, p. 169
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clear that Schleiermacher has not departed from his theoretical
view of God as the unitary terminus a quo of thought, despite
the strength of his religious feeling of dependence.
Schleiermacher insists that even while we are ex¬
periencing the clearest awareness of unhindered self-activity
the absoluteness of the feeling of dependence remains undimin¬
ished. If we were to make the mistake of referring the constant
feeling of absolute dependence to our relation to the world,
then we would, in effect, be denying the possibility of any
freedom whatsoever in our relation to the world. Nevertheless,
our immediate awareness of God in the feeling of absolute depend¬
ence, though distinguished from our feeling of belongingness to
the world, is not separate from the world. We have no pious
experience in vacuo, but always within the realm of nature. 1
From the perspective of piety, it will be recognized
that not only we ourselves, but the whole of finite being,
exists in dependence upon the infinite. The feeling of absolute
dependence excludes any concept of the genesis of the world
which gives to any part of the world an origin outside of God.
God would then be subject to the limitations of that independ¬
ently existing world reality. Any equivalence between God and
1. Ibid, I, p. 179. "Es l&sst sich aber keine
Christ11oh/ fromme Erregung denken, bei welcher wir uns
nicht zugleich als in den Naturzusammenhang fSnden."
t
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an independent reality would compromise the feeling of absolute
dependence:
Gleiohheit und Abh&ngigkeit sich gegenseitlg aufheben, und
also das Endliche, sofern es Gott gleich wMre, nicht k'onnte
schlechthin von ihm abhangig sein.
On these principles, Schleiermaoher stands for the doctrine of
creation ex nlhllo. God did not make use of independently-
existing materials in creating the world. 2 He created the
world through a free determination of His own will; and to
suggest that He could just as well not have created it, or that
He had to create it, is to deny His free-will.
Although the idea of Divine creation appears to make
God transcendent to the finite world, it must be pointed out
again that for Schleiermaoher, no definite thought of God can
arise apart from our experience of Him within the context of
finite being. 3 The sole exception to this is the bare thought
of God as causality. Within finite being, however, our definit¬
ive thoughts of God are always mediated through His providential
action in nature. His providence does not operate by special
interjection into the course of nature but it consists of the
1. Ibid. I, p. 196
2. Ibid. I, p. 198
3. Selbie, Schlelermacher. p. 88. MTo him God as tran¬
scendent is beyond knowledge, though the fact of his transcend¬
ence seems to be regarded as a legitimate inference from our
consciousness of dependence."
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constant generalized pressure of natural events. In every ex¬
perience we are aware both of our dependence upon Divine
Providence and of our complete conditionedness through natural
processes. 1 To place religious experience in the sphere of
the supernatural (in the sense of the mysterious) would evoke
a feeling of uncertainty rather than of dependence. The fact
that awe-inspiring phenomena of nature sometimes awaken
religious feeling does not imply an affinity of religion with
the mysterious. The religious response to the awesome in
nature is simply an awareness of our limitation by universal
forces of nature.
The pious feeling is most complete when we identify
ourselves with the whole world. 2 In thought we must unite
all that is individual and separate in experience into a whole
which we reckon to be completely dependent upon God. By this
identification of ourselves with the sum total of finite being,
there arises a wonderful reciprocity between subjective
religious and objective scientific knowledge. The objective
consciousness then becomes religious in every aspect, and
1. Schleiermacher, op. cit. I, p. 224. "Die Richtung
auf die Erkenntniss der Welt eben so wesentlich in der
menschlichen Seele ist als die auf das Gottesbewusstsein."
2» Ibid. I, p. 227. "Jenes GefUhl is" am vollst'dndigsten
wenn wir uns.mit der ganzen Welt identificiren."
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likewise, the religious self-consciousness has a perfect world-
consciousness at all times.
Schleiermacher maintains that it has always been
acknowledged by Christian theologians that the Divine Providence
and natural causality are not to be separated or limited by one
another. They are the same ordering of the world, regarded
from different viewpoints. He acknowledges the pantheistic
tendencies of this position, but he throws the onus of blame
upon human thought in general for its failure to construe a
universally recognized formula for the relation between God and
the world. As if dismissing the problem, he says that until
such an 'accepted' solution arises, a wavering between views
which tend to mix God and world in identity, and views which
oppose them, cannot be avoided. *
In an early section of the Glaubenslehre he had
emphasized that, in his description of the religious conscious¬
ness, he had nothing to do with pantheism because it has never
been the confession of any historical religious community. The
fluidity of his thought concerning this problem is clear,
however, when he goes on in the same reference to suggest that
even if pantheism, in its usual formula of the One and the All,
1. Ibid. I, p. 228
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were held to be the adequate description of the highest state
of piety, God and the world would still remain separate in
their functions. As individuals within the World-All, we would
still feel ourselves dependent upon the One. From a practical
viewpoint the pantheist and the monotheist have a similar sense
of devotion. To insist, moreover, upon a too-distinct and
rigid separation between the internal and external relations
of God to the world would endanger the doctrines of His
omniscience and omnipresence. ^
In his treatment of the Divine attributes
Schleiermacher draws heavily upon the one attribute of cause
to explain all others. The attribute of omnipotence expresses
the fact that the Divine causality is the same in scope as the
totality of natural causes. When he goes on to define God as
eternal, he sees no conflict in the thought that the omnipotent
action of a non-temporal Being has been equated with temporal
causation. God's action is eo-terminous with temporal action
2
because His timeless causality conditions even time itself.
In the same manner, the attribute of omnipresence does not
identify God with all spaces but expresses the fact that the
1. Ibid. II. P. 50
2» Ibid. I, p. 268. "Unter der Ewigkeit Gottes
verstehen wir die mit allem zeitlichen auch die Zeit selbst
bedingende schlechthin zeitlose UrsSchlichkeit Gottes."
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non-spatial causality of God conditions all spatial realities
and also space itself. i
In his description of God as spaceless and timeless
omnipotent causality, he shows himself to be striving after a
transcendent concept of God. But in dealing with the above
attributes he has clearly betrayed his own principle that God
can be defined only In terms of the religious experience
mediated through the experiential world. We can have no mediate
experience of either a spaceless or timeless being. Schleier-
macher himself argues in the same section of the Glaubenslehre
against transcendent attributes, when he affirms that the
being of God and the activity of God can never be separated.
God possesses no knowledge apart from his productive thought,
which is reflected in the world of His creation. 2 By this
identification of the will and action of God Sohleiermacher
rejects the Scholastic distinction between mediate and
immediate causes. 3
When Schleiermacher comes to deal with Christology
and redemption he affects a seeming break in his deterministic
doctrine that the thought and action of God are identical, and
1. Ibid. I, p. 273.
£. Ibid. I, p. 295. wGott weiss alles was ist, und alles
ist was Gott weis«, und dieses beides ist nicht zweierlei sondern
einerlei, well sein Wlssen und sein allm§chtiges Wollen eines und
dasselbe 1st."
3. Ibid. I, p. 2B5.
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His causation universal. He speaks of the coming of Christ
into the world as a Miracle', designed to restore the state
of disorder which has been created by free causes (human
beings). He stresses, however, that the free causes have not
actually altered anything in the original course of events
ordered by God. Christ is not otherwise related to the system
of nature than are the other free causes. 1 The ♦miracle' of
Christ, then, is merely the 'relatively unique' rise of a Free
Cause whose activity is redemptive in relation to the other
free causes. The redemption which Christ came to effect was
not made necessary by any rupture in the original course of
nature. Sin has no cosmic significance.
In the final analysis, the free causes have only a
chimerical, relative freedom. Free causes, along with natural
causes, are actually determined by God. 2 The difference
between God's action in free causes and His action in natural
causes lies simply in the fact that He works in every cause
in a manner appropriate to its particular method of acting.
The seeming difference in the quality of causes may be only
a difference in degree, e.g.. in the life of the individual
the antithesis between freedom and mechanism is merely a
pid. I. P. 236.
2. Ibid. I, p. 248. w0b das was unser Selbst-
bewusstsein erregt, mithin auf uns einwirkt, auf irgen^A
einen Theil des sogenannten Haturmechanismus zuruckzufuhren
ist, oder auf die Thatigkeit freier Ursachen: das eine ist
vollkommen eben so wie das andere von Gott geordnet."
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difference between the great and the small. ^ In life's
larger creative experiences we feel ourselves to be free; in
the minor details of life we are conscious of limitation.
The basis of Christ's redemptive action upon other
men is the sinless perfection of His character and His highly
developed religious consciousness. He did not come clothed in
supernatural grace and power, but in Him the Ideal Man became
historical, and completely so. The coming of Christ and His
institution of a new corporate life is a completion of the
possibilities of human nature which were latent at creation. 2
The mode of Christ's redemptive activity consists in
the power of His life to strengthen our impaired God-conscious¬
ness when \ve relate ourselves to Him in a mystical faith. Both
our sense of need and Christ's answer to that need are immanent-
ly conceived;
Die hdchste Leistung Christi darin besteht uns so zu
beseelen, dass eine immer vollkomenere Erfuliung des
gdttlichen Willens auch von uns ausgeht. 3
Sohleiermacher emphasized the human response and self-activity
in religious life, as against a passive submission to super-
naturally bestowed grace.
!• Ibid, I, p. 254,
2» Ibid. II, p. 19. "So ist...die Erscheinung Christi
selbst anzusehen als Erhaltun# namlich der von Anbeginn der
menschlichen Natur eingepflanzten und sioh fortw&hrend
entwickelnden Empfanglichkeit der raenschlichen Natur eine
solche schlechthinige Kraftigkeit des Gottesbewusstseins in
sich aufzunehmen."
3. Ibid, II. p. 135.
W %
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When Schleiermacher speaks of the anion of the human
and the Divine in Christ he does not oonoeive of Him as being
very God and true man after the language of the traditional
creeds. He protests against the idea of Christ*s nature being
split into two parts. The Divine in Christ is the active side
of His nature and the human is the passive side. ^ That which
transpires in the nature of Christ because of the singular
degree of the Divine in Him is altogether a human development
and constitutes a unity of the natural course of life.
Schleiermacher does not find adequate support in Scripture for
ascribing Divine names to Christ. The Scripture which
represents Christ as participating in creation and providence
is so expressed as to make it doubtful if it was not rather
intended to portray Him as the final cause (Bndursache) of
creation. 2
He rejects the dootrine of the Holy Spirit as the
Third Person of the Trinity. Belief in the indwelling of the
Holy Spirit often leads men to fanatiolsm and individualism,
which causes them to disregard their need of the historic
Christ and the Christian fellowship. He prefers to designate
the Holy Spirit as the common spirit (Geraelngeist) of the
1. Ibid. II, p. 70
2. Ibid. II, p. 95
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Christian community with which it strives to attain to a unity
of the whole. 1 The Holy Spirit is not a general characteristic
of human nature, but it is the peculiar property of the
Christian community, it is their distinctive spirit. The Holy
Spirit does not have a character different from men, any more
than did Christ. It is only by its affinity with our natures
that the Holy Spirit can have a real connection with our life.
The Church, so inspired by the Holy Spirit, is not a transcend¬
ental or mystical body; it is the perfect image of the
Redeemer, and each redeemed individual constitutes an actual
part of the Church.
A final estimation of Schleiermaeher's position is
rendered difficult by the fact that he endeavoured to take
both sides on the problem which we are investigating. It is
obvious that he sought to preserve a concept of the transcend¬
ence of Cod in making Him sole creative cause. In reality,
however, this concept bears a striking resemblance to Spinoza1s
natura naturans. the active side of unitary nature. God has no
constitutive reality outside the world of nature: He is a mere
thought. It is clearly not Sohlelermacher's intention to
represent God in the form of Aristotle's teleologlcal actus
purus. The religious feeling of dependence demands that God
i. ifria. II. P. 245
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be prior to the creation which is determined by Him and
dependent upon Him as efficient cause. Epistemologically,
however, Schleiermaoher will not admit the implications of
this religious demand, namely, that God must have attributes
other than those mediated through that same phenomenal world
which is dependent upon Him for its existence. God, as a bare
distinction of thought, is little different from Spinoza's
distinction of active as against passive modes of substance.
On Schleiermacher*s principles God can have no being apart
from His actuality. The causality of God is exhaustively
represented in the totality of finite being. 1 To be more
than a thought or a name He has to be known in rebus. He has
no transcendent being or attributes.
At times, Schleiermacher adopts a facile practical
attitude in which he lightly dismisses his epistemological
problems. In an early section of the Glaubenslehre he insists
that dogmatic terminology must avoid any expressions which
fail to retain a distinction between God and the world, between
good and evil, and between the spiritual and the sensual, for
these are the original presuppositions of the religious self-
oonsciousness. Without the presupposition of these distinctions,
no God-consciousness could be opposed to a world-consoiousness,
1. Ibid. I, p. £80
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nor oould we speak of the need of redemption and of its ful¬
filment. ^ On the other hand, as we noted earlier, he is
prepared to suggest that there is no serious practical
distinction between the religious consciousness of the
pantheist and that of the monotheist.
It seems patent that Schleiermacher*s Moravian
religious feeling and his Kantian epistemology were at war
with one another, and the tension left an indefiniteness on
the pages of his writings. His religious feeling sensed the
dependence of the self and the phenomenal world upon a
transcendent reality, while his epistemology excluded the
possibility of recognizing or characterizing any supernatural
elements.
In spite of the wavering in Sohleiermacher1s
Weltanschauung, the new outlook which he contributed to nine¬
teenth century theology was definitely weighted toward an
immanentist position. His work was strongly informed with
psychologism and historicism, emphases which were reflected
during the course of the century in monumental research into
the psychology and history of religions. The centre of
theological research gravitated from Scripture and Creeds to
religious experience and comparative religion.
1. 2M£» P« 151» 2-
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B. Vlnet
In the French-speaking world the thought of Alexander
Vinet (1797-1847), the Swiss theologian and literator, left an
impression similar to that of Schleiermaoher in Germany. ^
Vinet was a leading figure in the 1 awakening* movement which
stirred the Churches of Western Europe in the early nineteenth
century, a movement largely promoted by English free-ohurchmen.
Vinet, however, was a man of much more liberal views than his
associates. In common with Schleiermaeher, his thought played
a transitional role in the trend away from the old orthodoxy
to a new and liberal position in which religious experience was
regarded as of more importance than the historic dogma. Vinet
found the seat of religious authority not in Creed, Church or
Scripture, but in the moral consciousness of the individual.
Morality and religion were synonymous terms for him. 2
Vinet earned for himself the title of *the Pascal of
Protestantism* with his view that the human heart is both the
subject and the instrument of the study of religion. For Vinet
1. Lane, The Life and Writings of Alexander Vlnet.
p. ix (Intr. by F.W. Farrar) "There has always existed in the
French-speaking churches an elite who feel for Vinet much of
the enthusiasm that the Germans display with regard to
Schleiermacher. All parties claimed him for their own."
2. Chavannes. Alexandre Vinet. p. 29. "II a pris le
point d*appui de sa demonstration dans la nature morale et
religieuse de l*homme."
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religion is not metaphysics. If we indulge in pure dialectics
we end in sophistry and with the banishing of reason itself.
The intellect knows only abstractions, whereas the heart sees
beings and substances. Logic was not intended by God to govern
human life: the nobility of man consists in believing without
proof. The intellect is not to be excluded, but it is inad¬
equate to judge of matters pertaining to the moral order. "The
things of the heart are only truly understood by the heart. 1
He insisted that reason cannot create facts; it can
only receive them. Truth is given as a sovereign act of God.
In the interpretation of the given truth, the heart, although
it does not think, determines the point of view from which we
think. We do not begin to think with a bare ego, without
qualities or life. We are preoccupied thinkers. We require a
starting-point from which our system of thought may arise.
"Passion is better qualified than argument to solve great
questions." 2 Error in thinking is more often caused by a
defect in the depths of the soul than by a misuse of the
intellect.
In order to be understood, Christianity must first
be Incorporated into the life. Not speculation, but conscience
declares the reality of God's existence. From the perspective
1. Vinet, Outlines of Philosophy and Literature, p. 69.
2., Ibid, p. 89.
58
of faith, Christian doctrine becomes clear to the intellect. 1
Unlike Pascal, Vinet did not oppose faith to reason. He
believed that moral motives and content merely supply the basis
of philosophy. 2 Gn the basis of the moral and religious life,
Vinet sought to unify the whole of human experience. In
Christiantty he believed that he had found the ultimate
religion, whose phenomena penetrate more deeply into the soul
than all other elements of life. Since for Vinet, the true
religion leads to true Philosophy, Christianity is therefore
"the first and last philosophy." 3
In founding religion upon a moral basis, and ,in fact,
identifying it therewith, Yinet followed a different course
from Schleiermacher. The latter had made the religious faculty
independent of both morals and metaphysics. Vinet's positive
relation to Kant in this regard is more apparent than real.
Religious truths are not postulates arrived at discursively
to fulfil a pre-condition of moral life; but the moral sense
provides us with an immediate awareness of religious truth.
Morality is religion, and a religion which is not morality is
1. Lane, on. oit.. p. 49. "For Yinet faith becomes
reason, and reason becomes faith."
2. Yinet, op, cit.. p. 89. "Systems spring from morals,
and the direction taken by the intellect is explained by the
state of society."
3. Ibid, p. 139.
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of no value. "Religion is morality stamped with the divine
seal." 1 The just instinct of people in general demands that
a religious man will be moral and that a moral man will be
religious.
It is the moral character of religion which prevents
religious thought from becoming merged with a philosophic
monism or pantheism. Christianity escapes this danger because
it is the moral religion par excellence. The Christian feels
himself to be under obligation, and he is humbled before a
Law-Giver who is other than himself.
Vinet's elevation of conscience and morality to
become the basis of religion and, thereby, the basis of a true
philosophy, carried with it a stress on the individuality of
belief and action. Individuality, for Vinet, is to be dis¬
tinguished from individualism, which is selfishness. The term
individuality, as applied to the moral life, signifies that
only in the individual is there a conscience and only through
individual moral action can a betterment of society be effected.
Collectivism is a constant danger to mankind. 2 The Church is
a society of individual Christians, and there is no fictional
Kingdom of God which is the special sphere of the Divine
1. Vinet, op. cit.« p. 118.
2. Vinet, Melanges. p. 102. "Toutes les constitutions,
tous les systemes politiques menacent 1*individuality."
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indwelling. The university of the moral sense in mankindA .
does not imply that it is of equal value in all. Its individual
character leaves room for distinctions of worth, e.g.. as
between the godly and relatively worldly conscience. The
Christian conscience is distinct: "Christian policy ceases to
be Christian so soon as it ceases to appear strange and absurd
to one of the world." 2
If conscience is not a diffuse, generalized Divine
element in man it is, none the less, the seat of Divine immanence
in man. He describes conscience as "that mysterious and divine
element of our being, inseparable from our nature." 3 The
possession of this element colours all our thinking and
constitutes us men. Conscience has no legislative force upon
our natures if it is separated from the thought of God, for we
would then be able to accept or reject the behests of conscience
at will.
Conscience is a token of the impress of a powerful
hand upon us; it leads every thinking man back to at least a
confused thought of God;
1. Vinet's extreme stress upon individuality led him
eventually to leave the national Church and to become one of
the founders of the Free Church of the Canton of Yaud, formed
in 1845.
2. Outlines of Philosophy, p. 360.
3. Yinet, Outlines of Theology, p. 1.
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Right, duty, are the points where man ends and God begins;
with them we penetrate into a sphere vdiere man contemplates
as his aim something external to himself. 1
This Other, which we recognize in the oourse of the employment
of our moral sense, we identify as God. The belief in God is
inherent within man. Indeed, we may go further than this and
say that the faculty which leads us to the apprehension of God
is in very truth God Himself:
Conscience is not us, it is against us; it is therefore
other than we. IfTt be other than we, it can only be
God . g
It is not Vinet's intention, however, to represent
God as being exhaustively actualized in the conscience. At
other times he speaks of conscience as the 1 ambassador' or as
the 'vice-regent* of God. Though present in conscience, God is
also above it. "Whatever be the dignity of conscience — a
dignity borrowed from God — God will not be supplanted by
conscience." 3 Yinet had encountered the difficulty associated
with making any particular element of human life the point of
contact with God. If that element be absolutely deified it
ceases to be human, and thereby ceases to be the intended point
of contact. It seems clear throughout Yinet's thought that he
1. Ibid, p. 10.
2. Ibid, p. 12.
3. Ibid, p. 13.
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wished to regard conscience as a distinctive property of human
life.
Vinet made conscience the basis of Divine-human
relations because he believed that in the moral life are found
the deepest reaches of human experience. Reason may conduct
man by a process of deduction up to the point of belief in God,
but it is only conscience which can receive this belief and
interpret the law of God to the self. It is through hearing
the commands of God that we understand His nature. 1 The
phenomena of the moral life are determinative of dogma, in a
manner similar to Schleiermaeher*s empirioal approach to
dogmatics. Vinet recognizes that this relation of morals and
dogmas in religion is what is so disconoerting to the systematic
spirit; but he himself denies the possibility of achieving an
orderly rational system.
The religion of conscience enables one to enter into
a personal relation with God. In the experience of moral demand
and in the responsive exercise of duty, we feel ourselves to be
related to an Other. The essence of religion is to obey not
ourselves or a self-imposed law, or an idea, but a Person.
Awareness of moral demand mediated by a Person is a safeguard
1. Ibid, p. 121,2. "The dogmas are supernatural facts,
in which is expressed a moral thought, so that from one end to
the other of this religion, all is moral."
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against mysticism, which is the annihilation of morality and
religion. Humanity requires for its God, a God who is personal:
An impersonal God is to humanity nothing, by the very-
reason that he is all. If he is the universe, if he
is whatever is, ourselyes included, then our relations
cease in this fusion.
He defines Pantheism as "the idea of fatalism, com¬
bined with that of order and of unity"; it is nothing more than
"an emphatic and solemn atheism." 2 Although God has created
the universe, granting it a constitution and embracing in His
thought the whole chain of successive causes, He remains still
the absolute monarch over the creation. God is supreme also
in the moral governance of His oreatures, but His supremacy
stops short of being a determinism. It is in fact man's moral
freedom and individuality, rather than a substantial differ¬
entiation, which distinguishes him from God. He affirms,
We dare to see in humanity the Eve of God, drawn from the
substance of God as was that other Eve from the substanoe
of Adam, but invested with spontaneity, with liberty, and
alone able, in the universality of things, to say I, as
God says I_, distinguishing itself at once both from things
and from God; separated from God in order to be able to
unite. 3
-*•
On the issue of human freedom, however, Yinet wavers,
as he does on many other questions. There are instances where
1. Ibid, p. 150.
2. Yinet, Outlines of Philosophy, pp. 105 & 107.
3. Ibid, p. 116.
64
he seems to equate the human response in moral action to the
providential work of God:
In the moral world, the force of God — a thing
inconceivable — composes itself of our forces, in
the same way that the work of his providence is very
often the sum of our actions The whole work of
salvation, from its origin to its consummation belongs
to God. 1
In thus equivocating on the issue of moral freedom, Vinet
compromises his one safeguard against Pantheism.
In spite of Vinet's attempt to preserve, on a moral
basis, the sphere of humanity and individuality, in distinction
from God, the tendency of his thought is constantly in the
direction of lessening the distinction between man and God. He
believes that because God has created us in His image the
attributes we ascribe to God are those of which we find the
germ within ourselves, to which we add the idea of perfection, 2
At one time he describes the human and the Divine as two poles
of the same truth, or again, as two parallel lines meeting in
infinity:
The doctrine of man and that of God, are two lines which
tending towards each other, finally join and blend at the
vertex of the angle, at a point which is one and indivisible,
where all distinctions elude the eye, and all analysis is
Impossible to the mind. 3
The weakness of theology is that it finds difficulty in refrain¬
ing from leaning too far to one side or the other, being too
1. Outlines of Theology, pp. 168,9.
2. Ibid, p. 14.
3. Ibid, p. 106.
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far removed from the vertex of the angle. On the other hand,
A living faith occupies the vertex itself, in the mystery
or in the life, whence it dominates the two sides, or two
inolines of truth, without leaning to either. 1
It may be true, as Vinet holds, that for a living
faith the problem of duality disappears; but it remains
important for theology to understand precisely how it is
resolved. If a living faith is an experience in which the two
sides are identified at a point standing beyond the possibility
of mental analysis, it is difficult to see how this experience
is any less pantheistic than the concept of a philosophic
monism. At best, it is an experience of mystic identification,
to which he declares himself opposed.
However mysterious this harmonizing life of faith may
be, Vinet thinks that he can point to one person who uniquely
embodies unity between God and the world — that is, Jesus
Christ. wIt is only in Jesus Christ that you will find both
the God who is in nature, and the God who is above nature.w 2
God has become manifest under the veil of the Incarnation. In
the term ♦Immanuel' we have the beginning and end of Christian
dogma. In Vinet's discussion of the Incarnation we note his
tendency to interpret Christian doctrine in terms of the needs
1. Ibid, p. 108.
2. rETd, p. 46.
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of man, rather than to make doctrinal affirmations: "Humanity
demands a god-man, and an historical religion; humanity never
was, never will be Asiatic." 1
The need of the God-man is implioit within man's
moral nature. Man conceives of morality as indivisible and he
knows that when he has offended against one law he has offended
g
against all. Our awareness of the standard of right action
and perception of our own imperfection implies the Fall of man.
Man is in need of an expiation and this is what Jesus Christ
came to provide. Ylnet speaks with passionate earnestness of
the love of God, manifested in Jesus Christ, vdiich incites an
answering love within man. It is only in a God who is love
that humanity is able to believe. From all time, man had
nursed within him an ideal of pure love, and was still awaiting
its realization when Christ came, but awaits it no longer since
the Crucifixion. By this sacrifice of love Christ provides for
us the sole way to God and hope of consolation in Him.
Jesus Christ for all time reinstated human nature
from its ruins so that by faith in Him we may obey the voice of
conscience, whioh before had lain dormant. Through Christ's
1. Outlines of Philosophy, p. 151. of. Outlines of
Theology, p. 153. "The truth that God must unite with man, and
become man.....is implanted at the foundation of human nature."
2, Vlnet, Melanges, p. 9. "En morale, la verite" est une."
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redemption, everything in human nature takes its proper place.
'Natural man' is therefore properly the term applied to the
regenerate man. The Christian ethic, whioh belongs to the
regenerate life, is not an other-worldly ethic; but Christ
revealed the perfect human standard of virtue. 1
In hib attempt to relate traditional Christian dogma
to his predisposing view that religion is moral in nature,
Vinet omits or Modifies those dogmas whioh fail to qualify under
2
his humanizing process. Truth for man must be human truth:
"The limits of his knowledge are the limits of his nature." 3
Vinet insists that Christianity accords well with these limits
of human knowledge. "The glory of the Gospel is not only to
have divinized truth, but to have humanized it." 4 He affirms
that revelation is necessary, but he deprives it of any super¬
natural signification. It is the means by which God assists us
to listen to the still small voice of conscience within us.
"Revelation gives certainty, a new sense, to truths that were
presupposed, but not yet living." 3 The facts of revelation
1. Outlines of Theology, p. 55. "The virtues that he
made so resplendent on the cross are human virtues in their
perfection; they are intended for our use, proposed for our
meditations; these examples form part of our inheritance."
2. Chavannes, Alexandre Vinet. p. 60. "Son 6tude morale
de l'humanitd' l'amenait ft laisser dans 1'ombre, a n£gliger
absolument, tout ce qui dans la notion traditionnelle de
l'Evangile ne rtfpondait pas aux necessites de son enterprise,
a ses propres aspirations."
3. Outlines of Philosophy, p. 4.
4. Outlinei of Theology, p. 106.
5. Ibid, p. s51
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ere perfectly human and Divine, of which Christ's teaching is
the supreme example. In the pulpit, as well as in theological
discussion, it is preferable to treat the so-called objective
truths of religion as internal moral facts, and to recognize
that faith in the Infinite is literally a law of man's being. 1
The correspondence between Christianity and humanity
is so complete that a proper concept of either one should lead
us back to the other. Faith is reducible to nature, and vice
versa. Involuntarily, in our words and actions, we render
testimony to the doctrines of Christianity. Faith is the genius
of the human heart. The perfect correspondence of Christianity
with universal human nature supports the conviction that
Christianity is the final religion. It will always be a step
ahead of civilization, no matter how far the latter may advance.
"It is in vain for the world to resist; it Is Christian in
2
spite of itself.
It is only because of our sin that we observe seeming
paradoxes in Christianity. Even as the highest mountains cast
the longest shadows, so the sublimity of Christianity makes it
seem mysterious to us. The Gospel is wider than life, and just
1. Chavannes, op. oit.. p. 45. "II n'a nullement etabli
la ndcessitd et la rdalit6 d'une r^vdlation surnaturelle
communiquant aux hommes une religion dogmatique."
2. Vinet, op. olt., p. 101.
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because of that fact, it may appear strange to us in many of
its aspects. But the breadth of the Gospel enables it to
occupy the same position as the horizon in relation to the
sensible world. It embraces the entire world in a harmony in
which nothing jars. It corrects and organizes everything in
the world, creating thereby scope for all our powers and a
horizon for all our thoughts:
The divine life and the human life blend with each
other, like the blood of the arteries with that of
the veins, and the blood of the veins with that of
the arteries without a drop escaping and being lost. 1
Everything that is true is Christian; Christian truth is a
centre pointing outward to all scattered truths and is also a
confluence towards which they tend. Christianity therefore
shows its sovereignty in its ability to assimilate all
oppositions, and to save the whole of man and the whole of
life. "For the Christian nothing is profane, everything tends
to holiness.n ^
Yinet was neither a systematic metaphysioian nor a
dogmatic theologian, and consequently an ambiguity shrouds his
thought, which took shape in sermons and essays rather than in
sustained treatises. The total weight of evidence, however,
leaves it clearly manifest that with all his moral earnestness
1. Ibid, p. 104.
2. T5Td. p. 305.
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and the evangelical fervour of his sermons, he failed to retain
a distinction between God and human nature adequate to support
the rigour of the moral order which he championed. Although he
claimed that conscience is the Divine element in man, he inter¬
preted the deliverances of the moral consciousness (religion)
strictly within the limits of human nature and in harmony with
its truth. His respect for traditional elements of the Gospel
cannot obscure this fact. Both morality and religion, which he
identified, are weakened by an attenuated theism, in teims of
which Divine truth is synonymous with human truth, and Divine
revelation is the stimulation and authentication of an inner




The German idealist philosophy, which exerted a far-
reaching influence on nineteenth century theology, has been
treated by Hoffding under the general designation of *The
Philosophy of Romanticism.* 1 In the philosophy of idealism
the All-nature of Goethe became the Spirit-nature of an
absolutism of mind. The idealist movement reached its most
powerful philosophical expression in Hegel, but sin introductory
outline of its development through Fichte and Schelllng will
serve to clarify his position.
A. Fichte
J. G. Fiohte (1762-1813) undertook, in his
Wissensohaftslehre. to present a re-statement of the Kantian
philosophy. He aimed at eliminating the bifurcation between
theoretical and practical philosophy, and between the knowing
process and the unknown thing-in-itself which Kant had retained
as the substrate of the object of knowledge. Kant had shown
that all determinations of knowable reality are dependent upon
an independent action of the mind, an action which can be
1. A History of Modern Philosophy. Yol. II.
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traced tack to an original unity of apperception which must he
postulated within the Ego. Fiohte adopted this original unity,
making it independent of any thing-in-itself as the ground of
experience. The only objects which exist, exist for the mind.
Fichte also added to the province of the Ego the sphere of
practical philosophy which Kant had kept separate from the
knowing process. Kantfs moral postulates were no longer meta¬
physical grounds for the fulfilment of moral living, but became
tile immanent grounds of moral action. Fichte was attempting
to bring the Critical Philosophy under a single, unifying
principle conceived in terms of the aotivity of Ego.
Fichte held that only two possible accounts can be
given of the origin and process of knowledge, the dogmatic and
the idealist. He accepted the idealist account as the only
genuinely critical philosophy. The inadequacy of the dogmatic
approach lies in the fact that it sets another being than the
self over against the self, making it the source of truth. In
*
Kant * s philosophy it had been the thing-in-itself. Fichte
discards this last vestige of dogmatism which remained in the
Critical Philosophy.
Man is self-conscious, active and free. In all that
enters into his consciousness, his own intelligence is pre¬
supposed. Dogmatism tends to be determinist and materialist
in making some fictional thing-in-itself the cause of
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intelligence, The idealist maintains that if he thinks any
object whatsoever he has to relate the object to himself. The
object does not exist for itself. The dogmatist tries to link
his unknowable world to the intelligence by means of the con¬
cept of causality, while the idealist requires no mediating
concept to unite the mind with its objects of knowledge:
Im kritischen Systems 1st das Ding das im Ich gesetztfcj
im dogmatischen dasjenige, worin das Ich selbst gesetzt
ist: der KTiticlsm ist darum immanent. well er alles in
das Ich setzt; der Dogmatism transcendent, well er noch
uber das Ich hinausgeht. 1
The development of Fichte's immanental science of
knowledge may be comprehended through the explication of three
propositions which form the basis of his approach to knowledge:
1} The Igo posits itself; 2) The Ego also posits the non-Ego;
3) The Ego is able to posit the Ego and the non-Ego as limiting
one another in experience; and this very fact points to the
absoluteness of the Ego. These three propositions may be
otherwise stated in logical terms as identity, opposite and
ground. Mien these three basic terms are amplified to become
the general method of the synthetic process of knowledge they
are known as the thesis, antithesis, and synthesis, the triadic
form of reasoning which attained its most powerful use in
Hegel's system. In the thought of Fichte this triadic process
1. Fichte, Wissensohaftslehre. Werke, I Abth.Bd.I, p.120
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illustrates his fundamental conviction that the Ego is an
activity which, going out from itself, returns again to itself
as the presupposed unity of the prooess.
The Ego posits itself as being identical with itself
throughout a process of reasoning. The proposition A - A
could not be made except we posit the identical self in whose
consciousness both subject and predicate of the proposition
are held together. Since all our knowledge is propositional,
an object cannot become a real objeot of knowledge unless it
be referred to the Ego. "Alles was ist, ist nur insofern, als
es im Ich gesetzt ist, und ausser dem Ich ist nichts." ^
Therefore, in order to account for the knowledge of reality
which enters into its consciousness in empirical experience,
the Ego is obliged to posit itself.
Experience also leads us to more involved proposition¬
al statements than those of simple identity. In empirical
experience we observe differences among objects, and the Ego
is obliged to make propositions of the form, not-A is not = A.
Similarly, we encounter in empirioal experience that which is
not the Ego but is over against it as an object, and the Ego is
obliged to make the proposition, the non-Ego is not « the Ego.
We have now made two propositions, one of which
1. Ibid, p. 99
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implies the existence of the self-identical Ego, while the
other implies the existence of the non-Ego. These two propos¬
itions obviously limit one another. Within the bounds of
Fichtefs presupposition that nothing exists except in so far
as it is posited within the Ego, this is a serious antinomy.
How can the non-Ego exist for the Ego, and how is the Ego
capable of making a proposition which affirms the existence of
the non-Ego?
Fichte answers that there is a third act of con¬
sciousness which resolves the antinomy created by its positing
of both the Ego and the non-Ego. The third act is that of
synthesis, v^iioh unites the two opposites without destroying
either. The Ego and non-Ego which are posited in the immediate
empirical consciousness are not independent absolutes; they
are limited by each other, and so exist only in a relation of
one to the other. They are simply what we call the subject
and object in our empirical consciousness. The combining of
subject and object is the synthetic activity of the Absolute
Ego, which is able to posit both and to reunite them again.
The Absolute Ego is the ideal ground of experience. It cannot
itself be differentiated by means of any empirical distinctions,
for it would then descend into the realm of the antithesis
which exists between the empirical Ego and non-Ego. The
Absolute Ego is, none the less, the presupposition of empirical
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experience. The process of thought which begins with the
positing of the Ego, ends in the positing of the Absolute Ego.
This highest synthesis of the system is also the absolute
thesis or presupposition upon which the whole system is based. 1
The Absolute Ego, because it contains gill reality and
all accidents within itself, is self-positing. It is an
Infinite Idea which cannot itself be thought, but towards which
we can only point. Theoretical science can take us no farther
than this in characterizing the Absolute Ego. We must turn to
practical science for a fuller characterization. In our prac¬
tical experience we have an awareness that the relation of the
Absolute Ego to the limited moments of the empirical Ego and
non-Ego within it, takes the form of an infinite activity.
Indeed, without this movement Fiohte's system in its triadic
form could not be thought at all. The possibility of the Ego
experiencing the moments of a dialeotic process requires the
prior assumption that there is a movement toward a synthesis.
If there is no activity in the system then we would possess a
moment of consciousness but no complete experience.
1, Ibid, p. 119. "Ich und Nicht-Ich, sowie sle durch
den Begriff der gegenseitigen EinschrSnkbarkeit gleich-und
entgegengesetzt werden, sind selbst belde etwas (Accidenzen)
im Ich, als theilbarer Substanz; gesetzt durch das Ich, als
absolutes unbeschrankbares Subject, dem nichts gleich ist,
und nichts entgegengesetzt ist."
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The activity of the Absolute Ego is a moral striving
which is unoeasing so long as existence lasts. The non-Ego is
the sphere of duty for the finite Ego; its opposition to the
Ego represents a challenge to be overcome. The non-Ego is not
self-activating because it is not self-existent. The source of
activity in the moral equation must then come from the Ego in
its infinitude. Consequently the Ego, in its infinitude, is the
ideal ground, and, in its self-limitation and moral activity,
tile r®al ground of all that takes place. Eichte thought that
he had united in his system both idealism and realism. 1
The Absolute Ego could not affirm itself without
becoming finite in the consciousness of the finite Ego with its
objects of consciousness. Self-consciousness is dependent
upon objects foreign to Itself. This is the sole limitation
upon the Absolute Ego. Because it is infinite, however, it is
able to place the limit between self and the objective where
it will. The limit is not an absolute, and the goal of moral
striving is to break down the limit which has been set up. The
finite Ego has a yearning for the infinite and seeks to resolve
the dualism between itself and its object.
The finite, however, remains infinitely remote from
the Absolute Ego, even to the last moment that we can conceive
1. £bldi PP* 174-6.
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in eternity; henoe we must posit the immortality of the soul.
If the end of the soul's striving should ever he reached it
would become the Infinite or God, and this would represent the
end of all experience. Experience depends for its actual¬
ization upon an objective limit to the self. The goal of self-
assertion and the moral struggle is, then, the effacement of
self-conscious experience; but it is a goal which is never
actually reached.
The Infinite or God, the goal of consciousness and
also its presupposition, is pure consciousness rather than
self-conscious personality. 1 But He is not transcendent to
the self. Fiohte found God, freedom and immortality, all of
Kant's moral postulates, immanent within the Ego itself. He
does not need to go outside the Ego to find transcendent
grounds for the possibility of the moral life. His view of God
and his view of ontology are one and the same. God is the
absolute synthesis which, though never the content of con¬
sciousness or in Himself self-conscious, is the impulse which
forms our nature and shapes for us the external world of duty.
He is the eternal will working in history and in the individual,
the power within us which makes for righteousness.
1. Everett, Fiohte*s Science of Knowledge, p. 256.
"With Spinoza, all beings are one with God; with Fichte,
they tend to become so."
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In his later work, The Way Towards the Blessed life.
Fichte characterizes the will of God as absolute knowledge,
His action as absolute love. This appears to be a more object¬
ive view of God and of His attributes; but Fichte still does
not go outside the Ego and its ideas. "The Eternal can be
apprehended only by Thought, and is in no other way approachable
by us." 1 There is no real existence beyond the life of thought,
and to live the blessed life means to discern the truth. The
outer world of sense is founded upon universal thought. Out¬
ward sense is simply "the remotest extremity of the nascent
spiritual life." 2 A true consciousness, though observing the
outer manifold of the external world, believes only in the
Unchangeable and Eternal. The external manifold exists only
in thought, for us. and has no true being:
Besides God himself, there is truly, and in the proper
sense of the word, no other Existence whatever but
Knowledge; and this Knowledge is the Divine Ex-istence
(Dasein) itself, absolutely and immediately; and so far
as we are Knowledge, we are ourselves„in the deepest root
of our being, the Divine Ex-istence.
This differentiation of Himself into the existence
of knowing subjects, presupposes the unmoved Being of God. He
remains a unity throughout the transition of His differentia
from being to existence. Change is an attribute of existence,
1. The Way Towards the Blessed Life, p. 11.
2. Ibid, p. 44.
3. Ibid, p. 60.
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and not of God in Himself. Fichte rejects the idea of a Divine
creation; it is a conception which utterly escapes thought, ^
Having no place in his system for the thing-in-itself, he
needed no concept of causation or of a creator.
Fichte believed that in the Prologue to the Fourth
Gospel he found support for his philosophy. The Divine Logos
of the Fourth Gospel is eternal and exists prior to all the
manifold of the world. The Logos is a rational principle; and
it is only as rational being that God has existence in the
world. The historicity of the 'Word became flesh' is not to
be taken in a once-for-all sense. Jesus continually becomes
flesh in all those individuals who have a living insight into
His unity with God: "He who is transformed into the likeness
of Jesus, and thereby into that of God, he no longer lives
himself but God lives in him." 2 For man to renounce himself
entirely and to become one with God is the higher morality.
The higher morality, which wipes out the distinction
between being and existence, is actualized through the operation
of the Divine love. "In this love Being and Existence, God and
1. Hirsch, Die Ideallstische Philosophie und das
Christenturn, p. 183. "Fichte hat keinen Raum mehr fur den
Gee anken des Schopfers."
3. Fichte, op. cit.. p. 114.
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man, are one; wholly transfused and lost in each other." 1
Reflection could not he the uniting bond, because its essence
is to divide itself into parts. Reflection must first transform
itself into love of the Absolute in order to unify life. Love
prevents the reason from going on to effect an infinite
division of existence into forms. "The reflexion which has
become Divine Love, and is therefore wholly overshadowed by God
Himself -— is the starting point of Science." 2
Fiohte had reached a conclusion which oan only be
regarded as a form of mysticism. He had come to disregard his
earlier insistence that self-consciousness demands a division
between subject and object, and that the moral struggle to
overcome this division is unending. He now makes the end of
the blessed life a mystic absorption of all that is individual
into God. Reflective or determinate knowledge must annihilate
itself. In God, all labour and effort vanishes, together with
all hopes and fears.
The mystical issue of Fichte's thought is not sur¬
prising in view of his presupposition that nothing exists
except for the Ego. The phenomenal world and the distinctions
of self-consciousness have no real existence in themselves.
!• Ibid. P. 187.
2. Ibid, p. 190.
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The finite self therefore has nothing to oppose to the Absolute
Ego; it is but a moment within the latter. The term ♦pantheism'
although applicable, is not a wholly satisfactory characteriz¬
ation of this system which refuses the attribute of reality to
the manifold of existence. There is no real world to enter
into an equation with God or to be identified with Him.
Solipsism or acosmism would be more adequate as descriptive
terms for Fichte's thought.
B. Sohelling
F.W.J, Schelling (1775-1854) undertook to break
through the closed system of the Fichtean Ego. He had begun
his philosophical development as a disciple of Fichte but
eventually became dissatisfied with Fichte's neglect of the
external world. He came to believe that if there is to be
knowledge there must be an external world to be known, a world
whioh possesses independent reality alongside the Ego. On
Schelling's view the Ego is not able to posit its own objective
world: "Der Charakter des Ichs liegt eben darin, dass es kein
anderes Pradioat hat als das des Selbstbewusstseyns." * The
Ego is therefore in no sense absolute, apart from the fact that
it is absolute in the process of thinking. It does not possess
absolute reality.
1. Schelling, System des transcendentalen Idealismus.
Werke, I abth., Ill Bd., p. 358.
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In any epistemology, knowledge depends upon the
agreement of subject and object; but for an avowed idealist,
as Schelling was, there must be an intelligible unity of subject
and object. When Schelling granted independent reality to the
objective world he rendered this unity less amenable to proof.
He will not allow that the split between subject and object can
be bridged by the principle of causality. This would imply the
action of an unknowable transcendental thing-in-itself upon our
consciousness, and such a concept is as repugnant to Schelling
as to Fichte. Nor may the oneness of subject and object in the
knowing process be dogmatically affirmed. Schelling thought
that it was the weakness of the Fichtean philosophy to have
been a dogmatic idealism. There the reality of the limit
between subject and object was simply denied in dogmatic fashion.
Schelling believed that he had found the answer to
the problem by showing that objective nature, as well as mind,
is intelligible in its constitution. Quite apart from the
experience of our self-consciousness in the knowing process,
in which we relate the object to ourselves, it remains true
that the subject and object are one. Intelligence can discover
itself in nature as well as in the Ego. Nature and mind are
two poles of the same truth. Every common plant is a symbol of
intelligence. The goal of all natural progress is to rise to
the manifestation of spirit and to reach its climax in man.
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Schelllng is therefore able to speak of 1 speculative1 physics
as a complementary science to transcendental idealism. "Die
vollendete Theorie der Natur wtirde diejenige seyn, kraft
weloher die ganze Natur sich in eine Intelligenz aufloste." 1
It was this view of nature which especially commended
Schelling's philosophy to the Romanticists.
Sohelling unfolds three departments of the transcend¬
ental philosophy, representing the stages of self-consciousness
by which we become aware of the objective world. The first is
theoretic philosophy, in which we examine, psychologically, the
progress of intelligence in the ego through the channels of
sensation, perception and reflection. A second and higher
department of philosophy is the practical stage of self-
consciousness at whioh we relate ourselves to the objective
world, and the will realizes itself in moral action. The third
and highest stage of self-consciousness is art. In the activity
of the artistic genius, reason reaches a higher realization
than either the theoretic or the practical stage could achieve.
Reason and will can bring only a part of man to the
highest attainment, but art elevates the whole of man to the
highest by effecting a union of his conscious and unoonscious
1• Ibid, p• 341.
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nature. In the objective world of organic nature we observe a
perfect fusion of unconscious mechanistic striving with teleo-
logical development. * In the subjective intelligence the
counterpart to this union of the unconscious and the teleo-
logical is art. The genuine artist, although he may consciously
employ various techniques in the production of his work, is
nevertheless held under the sway of his unconscious genius. 2
Art, in its various forms, comprehends the true organon of
philosophy.
That to which the union of the conscious and the un¬
conscious in art witnesses is the existence of an Absolute
Reason in which both unconscious teleologioal nature and
conscious mind are one. Although we cannot disoover the
Absolute, either in individual minds or in particulars of the
objective world, the comprehensive vision of the philosopher
is able to recognize traces of the Absolute in the broad
stretch of history. "Die Geschichte als Ganzes ist eine
fortgehende, allmahlioh sich enthlillande Offenbarung des
Absoluten." The first time in history that the Absolute, or
God, became conscious was in Jesus Christ. The Incarnation,
1. Ibid, p. 610. "Die Natur in ihrer blinden und
mechanischen Zweokm&ssigkeit representirt mir allerdings eine
urspriingliche Identitat der bewussten und der bewusstlosen
Thatigkeit.
2. Ibid, p. 619. "Das Kunstwerk reflektirt uns die
Identitat der bewussten und der bewusstlosen Thatigkeit."
3. Ibid, p. 603.
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however, is not to be regarded as a mere fact in time but as
an eternal act of the Absolute. 1
Schelling therefore does not have a truly objective,
g
independent God. His Absolute is without precise objective
daterminateness because it is the 'identity* or absolute
'indifference-point' standing between both subject and object.
He was driven to this conclusion by the presuppositions of his
system, viz., that the objective world cannot be subsumed under
the Ego, but that the objective world is nevertheless on the
same plane of intelligible reality as the mind. The ultimate
unity of subject and object had therefore to be projected
entirely outside the realm of both consciousness and of nature,
to a sphere which Hegel characterized as 'the night in which
all cows are black'. The mode of relating the self to this
Absolute is expressed by Schelling in mystical terms:
Die Ideen, die Geister mussten von ihrem Centre abfallen,
sich in der Natur, der allgemeinen SphSre des Abfalls, in
der Besonderheit einfuhren, damit sie nachher, als
besondere, in die Indifferenz zuriickkehren und, ihr
versdhnt. 3
1. Watson, Sohelling's Transcendental Idealiam. p. 180.
"God is not a personal or purely objective being, but the gradual
revelation of the divine in man."
S. Hirsch, Geschichte der neuern protestantische
Theologie, IV, p. 419. "Wird von Schelling das Sein und leben
Gottes in allem, was da 1st und lebt, durchaus pantheistisch
ausgedeutet."
3. Schelling, Philosophie und Religion, p. 64.
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In his later period, following 1804, Schelling went
on to develop a view of God which granted to Him a more elevated
and independent existence. He had come to recognize the inad¬
equacy of his pantheistic tendencies. It was at the point at
which he developed his system of identity, however, that he
attained his most influential position. It was at this point
that Hegel took up the thread of speculation.
C. Hegel
G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1830) brought to its most thorough¬
going expression the idealist philosophy which had been in a
process of development in Kant, Fichte and Schelling. Kant had
left self-consciousness and the object of knowledge to stand as
two unreconciled elements in the knowing process. Fichte
brought the two sides together at the expense of suppressing one
of them, while Schelling suppressed both. Hegel sought to unite
the two sides by holding them together in a higher synthesis.
Hegel ridiculed the Absolute of Schelling on the
grounds that it was the mere assertion of an absolute without
any attempt being made to show by what means it was derived or
of what it consisted. Hegel would show that the Absolute is a
unity of mind in which all distinctions of subject and object,
spirit and nature, are comprehended and reconciled. What hare
popularly been regarded as opposites must be shown to be the
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necessary elements of reason. Thus for him, the Absolute is
not a nondescript point of indifference, but the unity of
consciousness in -which all things are explained and have their
being.
Hegel did not propose his system of absolute idealism
dogmatically, but he attempted to show the course of development
by which spirit comes to be aware of itself as absolute. This
course of development, traced from sense perception to universal
self-consciousness, is what he designates 'the phenomenology of
mind', the title of his first major work. The movement of mind
as it gathers up all possible varieties and stages of experience
is not an 'abstract* process of thought; its movement towards
achieving an organon of total reality is the very negation of
abstraction. The abstract is that being which is cut off from
the total system of rationality. The rational is that which
is real, and the real is the rational.
Hegel insists upon the concrete historical character
of mind. This use of the term 'concrete' differs from the
popular conception, which applies the term to dead self-
existent matter in isolation from thought.
Hegel claimed to have been led to his philosophical
position by experience rather than by a priori reasoning.
Experience is just as necessary for an understanding of the
Absolute, as the Absolute is necessary for an interpretation
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of experience. In Hegel*s terms, •experience' had a broader
connotation than for Kant who restricted it to sense experience.
Hegel made the term experience stand for every conscious
relation involving subject and object, i.e.. all determinate
consciousness. There can therefore be nothing outside of
experience to transcend it, no thing-in-ltself to stand in a
causal relation to experience. There can be no false experience,
because a false relation of subject and object would be better
described as meaningless or as a contradiction in terms. 1 In
this absolutism of mind,
All the dualities, all the fissures, all the hiatus, and
so to speak, all the rents and wounds with which reality
shows itself to be lacerated by the abstract intellect,
are filled, closed and healed. 2
We cannot here enter into a detailed exposition of
Hegel's massive and difficult thought; but a brief outline of
his general method will assist us to evaluate the results in
which his thought issued. Hegel appropriated the Fichtean
dialectical method, applying it in a vastly more comprehensive
manner than his predecessor. In Hegel's philosophy it was not
used to effect a resolution of opposites, but to Include all
opposites within a total organon of thought and reality.
Eichte had referred back to the Ego at each stage of the
1. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, p. xxviii
(translator's introfiuction).
2. Croce, The Philosophy of Hegel, p. 52,
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dialectical process; but Hegel develops each stage out of a
union of two opposing lower stages until the Absolute with its
harmony of all opposites is reached. The universe is a process;
it is the evolution of the Absolute or manifestation of God.
The key to Hegel's thought lies primarily in the
Logic. Logic, for him, was not bare abstraction but the morph¬
ology of concrete thought, the form of experience. It describes
the evolution of the Notion from the bare statement of Being up
to absolute self-consciousness, in which all of the real is com¬
prehended. Consequently, the application of the Logic to the
interpretation of nature and to the specialized pursuits of mind
was merely an amplification of a system of reality already impli¬
citly developed in the Logic itself. The Kantian epistemology had
dealt first with the bare conditions rendering knowledge poss¬
ible, and the Categories were abstract forms. The content of
thought was transcendent to the form of thought. Hegel's
epistemology, on the contrary, is thoroughly immanental; form
and content are one. ^ The conditions of thought are not to
be abstracted from the experience which gives them content.
1. Hegel, Die Logik. EncyclopSdie I, p. 212. "In der
Philosophic kommt es indess nicht darauf an, dass man sich
etwas denken kann, sondern darauf, dass man wirklich denkt und
das wahrhafte Element des Gedankens ist nioht in willkhrlich
gew&hltenSymbolen, sondern nur im Denken selbst zu suchen."
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The rational is the real. The Logic will show that all
divisions of philosophy are but determinations of the Idea.
The whole is a circle of oircles in which all philosophy and
all science are but moments. When Logio describes the evol¬
ution of mind coming to absolute self-consciousness, it is, by
the same token, asserting that this supreme self-consciousness
is absolute reality as well. Metaphysics falls within logic.
The Logic itself has the familiar triadic form, con¬
sisting of the divisions of Being, Essence, and Concept. Being
(Sein) is the Notion (Begrlff) in itself, the bare statement
that something iis. This pure Being is the absolute indifference
or identity, without determinations. It is the point at which
Schelling's philosophy had ended. For Hegel, it is the begin¬
ning. Pure Being is a meaningless abstraction as it stands by
itself; and because of this abstractness it can be equated with
the negative or Nothingness. But the negative can be stated
only in so far as it itself possesses Being. So, Being and
Nothing pass over into one another and can only be described
in a relation of one to the other. The unity of Being and
Nothing is Becoming. 1
!• Ibid, pp. 169-171. "Dieses reine Seyn ist nun die
reine Abstraction, damit das absolutecnegative, welches
gleichfalls unmittelbar genommen, das Nichts ist Das
Nichts ist als dieses unmittelbare, sich selbstgleiohe, ebenso
umgekehrt dasselbe, was das Seyn ist. Die Wahrheit des Seyns
so wie des Nichts ist daher die Einheit beider; diese Einheit
ist das Werden."
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Becoming has its own contradiction or opposite with
which it likewise unites to achieve a higher unity. This
dialectical process, continuing ad infinitum, constitutes
existence (Dasein). i.e., Being with determinations. Non-Being,
then, is not the diffioult problem for Hegel that the non-Ego
was for Fichte, or the objective world for Schelling. The
negative is seen to be necessary for meaningful experience.
"Die Grundlage aller Bestimmthheit ist die Negation." 1 Non-
P
Being is nothing foreign to Being.
The division of the Logic which deals with Essence is
specifically concerned with the nature of existenoe. Essence
is the measure which remains constant throughout changes in
existence. It is the ground of various properties of things;
but it is not a transcendent ground. We know Essences only as
they appear in existing things: "Das Wesen es ist, welches
rz
existirt, ist die Existenz Erscheinung." The sphere of
Essence is the external world in which the Notion has extended
itself. It is the sphere of scientific investigation and
reflection.
1. Ibid, p. 180.
2* Ibid, p. lSl.^Im Daseyn ist die Bestimmtheit eins
mit dem Seyn,welche zugleich als Negation gesetzt, Grdnze,
Shranke ist. Daher ist das Andersseyn nicht ein gleichgUltiges
ausser ihm, sondern sein eigenes Moment."
3. Ibid, p. £60.
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The objective world with T/tfiich science deals appears
to the popular mind to constitute a permanent reality. The
philosophic mind, however, recognizes that external things are
only Essences or appearances. Matter, which seems to comprise
the basis of independent things, is an abstraction. Mere
matter, like the thing-in-itself, is unknowable. In plaoe of
abstraot transcendent matter Hegel has only appearances;
Das Innere Oder das iibersinnliche Jenseits ist aber
entstanden, es kommt aus der Ersoheinung her, und sie
ist seine Vermittlung; Oder die Erscheinung ist sein
Wesen, und in der That seine Erfiillung.
Essence passes over into other higher syntheses which
we cannot detail here, but it is worthy of note that the final
synthesis in this division of the Logic is designated as
*Reciprocity*. It is a term which connotes equation and
reconciliation. The last word describing the progress of the
Notion from simple being through its externalization in a
world is a term of reconciliation. It is still a mental
oategory; mind asserts itsesovereignty to the very end of
Hegel*s discussion of the external world. He remains true to
his principle of the inter-connaotedness of all reality in
terms of mental activity.
In the final division of the Logic, that of the
1. Phanomenologie des Geistes, p. 111.
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Concept (Begriff). Being and Essence are conceptually united.
Consciousness and reality become one. The final synthesis in
this division is effected by the Idea (Idee). This final stage
of logic at which thought and being become united in the
Absolute Idea, spells the end of the old metaphysics as a
separate enquiry. ^ It is not now necessary to search after an
objective truth transcendent to mind. The Absolute Mind or Idea
is legislative with regard to the objects of knowledge because
it subsumes all truth within itself:
Die Idee ist die Wahrheit; denn die Wahrheit ist diess ,
dass die ObjektivitSt dem Begriffe entspricht, — nicht
dass Susserliche Dinge meinen Vorstellungen entsprechen;
diess sind nur richtige Torstellungen, die Ich Dieser
habe." 2
Hegel stands alongside of Anselra and Descartes in conceding
ontological status to thought.
The Absolute Idea Is the Subject-Object which unites
the ideal and the real, the finite and the infinite, soul and
body. It is universal rather than individual, psychologically-
conceived mind; but it includes all individual minds as moments
of itself. It is the one universal substance. 3 Because the
1. Wallace, Prolegomena to the Study of Hegel's
Philosophy.p. 458. "Metaphysics has no higher category than
actuality: transcendental logic shows that actuality rests on
the Idea. — reality conceived and conception realised."
2. Die Logik. p. 385.
3. Ibid, p. 388.
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Absolute is comprehensive of life, the old Kantian distinction
between theoretical and practical reason is done away:
Die absolute Idee ist zun&ehst die Einheit der
theoretischen und der praktischen Idee und daait
zugleich die linheit der Idee des Lebens und des
Erkennens. 1
We are now In a position to comprehend what Hegel
would have us believe concerning God and His relation to the
world of experience when he makes the statement: "Gott ist die
P
Wahrheit." God is simply to be equated with the Absolute
Idea or Spirit. He is the most real Being in Whom all finite
things receive their truth and being. 3 God does not stand
over against subjective beings as an Absolute Object, but he
takes up subjectivity as an essential moment of Himself.
When Hegel says that God is the absolute Substance
and only true reality, we are not to understand from this that
he wishes to subscribe to the crassest form of pantheism. He
thinks of the term pantheism as signifying that the totality
of things in their abstract individuality and contingency is
God. He prefers to think of God as the Universal, elevated
above individual forms. He believes that "Pantheism is a bad
expression, because it is possible to misunderstand it so that
1. Ibid, p. 408.
S. Ibid, p. 30.
3» *bl&« P. 162. "Gott, der die Wahrheit ist, in dleser
seiner Wahrheit, d.h. als absoluter Geist, nur insofern von tins
erkannt wird, als wir augleich die von ihm erschaffene Welt, die
Natur und den endlichen Geist, in ihrem Unterschied von Gott,
als unwahr anerkennen."
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( 7Tav) is taken in the sense of allness or totality, not as
universality." * The substantiality of God is not that of a
dead ground underlying individual forms. The truth is rather
that He is a living Universal within Whom all differences are
enclosed and preserved. In the presence of the One, all
individual finite things disappear.
It is in those undeveloped religions where God is
conceived as absolute power that pantheistic notions are to be
found. Such beliefs are usually allied to the thought of God
as substance:
Substance is not conceived of as the active agent within
itself, as subject and as activity in accordance with ends;
not as wisdom but only as power Such is the system
which is called Pantheism." d
.. :#
On the view which holds that God is absolute power there is no
provision for strife or opposition within a system. The
Absolute, on the other hand, is safeguarded against pantheism
by its internal movement from thesis to antithesis, to synthesis,
The initial movement of the Logic which showed the antithesis
of Being and Nothing, avoided the development of a system of
identity, which is the essence of pantheism.
The pantheistic concept of God which equates Him
with abstract substance and accidents is capable only of
1. Philosophy of Religion. II, p. 52.
2. Ibid, T, p. 331.
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dogmatic affirmation by means of an extraneous notion of
identity. But the concept of God as a living Universal requires
no dogmatic assertion or mediating notion. In the Universal,
subject and predicate are one and the same because the Universal
is inclusive of all truth. 1 There need therefore be no pro-
positional affirmations made concerning the existence of God
or His nature. God as the Universal is the totality of His self-
differentiation, i.e.. the totality of all differentiation or
all truth.
In view of the evolutionary character of Hegel*s
system it may appear surprising that he rejected the teleo-
logical argument for the existence of God. He characterizes
it as the conception of power working toward ends, a conception
germane to living nature but not adequate to Spirit. 2 God is
to be known through pure speculative knowledge rather than
through a mediating inference based on the observation of
nature. To learn to know God we do not have to look for an
objective Being Who is a permanent Other to ourselves, but we
1. Ibid. II, p. 139.
2« ibTa. II, p. 162.
3. PhSnomenologie des Geistes. p. 571. "Gott ist allein
im reinen spekulativen Wissen erreiohbar und ist nur in ihm und
ist nur es selbst, denn er ist der Geist und dieses spekulativen
Wissen ist das Wissen der offenbaren Religion."
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must promote the proper unity of our self-conseious subectivity
with the Absolute Idea.^ An objective God belongs to the
lower stage of natural religion in which God is identified with
some part of nature instead of being conceived as the Universal.
An adequate religion seeks to promote the unity of finite mind
with Infinite Mind beoause the truth of religion is that the
g
Divine and human natures are one. Philosophy and theology
must be regarded as one study, as they were in the Middle Ages.
Hegel regards Christianity as the absolute religion
because it represents in pictorial fashion the philosophy of
the Absolute, rendering it comprehensible to the popular mind.
The doctrine of the Trinity represents the evolution of the
Absolute. God, as absolute Being, goes out of Himself in
self-diremption in the person of the Son, Who represents God's
externalization in the world. God returns to Himself again as
Absolute Spirit the Holy Spirit.3 The Holy Spirit is
actually the supreme member of the Trinity, presupposed at the
beginning as well as realized at the end of the Divine movement.
1. Philosophy of Religion. II, p. 330.
£. Ibid. II. p. 349. "Since we call the Absolute Notion
the divine nature, the idea of Spirit means the unity of divine
and human nature."
3» Ibid. HI* P* 25. Of. Phanomenologie des Geistes.
p. 402.
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In the Incarnation, God has symbolized the truth that
the sphere of finite nature and history is Divine. 1 Christ is
not the sole incarnation of God, but all of nature and history
is Divine. Christ merely illustrated the implicit unity of the
Divine and human natures. The expression ^od-man1 means that
"There is only one reason, one Spirit, that Spirit as finite
has no true existence." 2 This was a truth which had to be
shown in a temporal manifestation, in one particular man; but
the most comprehensive form in which the Divine is actualized
in the world is in the organization of the State. God did not
create a world and afterward become incarnate within it; the
world has its Divine character because it belonged to its very
3
nature from the beginning to be subsumed under the Absolute.
The death of Christ shows that the finite is but a moment in
the Divine; the separateness of the finite is something to be
overcome because its true nature is Divine.
Eegelfs system of the Absolute excludes all external
relations. Discordances which appear to negate the harmony of
1. Croce, op. cit.. p. 70. "The sacred character,
assumed by history, is an aspect of the charaoter of immanence,
proper to Hegelian thought, to his negation of all transcendence."
2. Philosophy of Religion. Ill, p. 73.
3. McTaggart. Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, p. 218.
"To say that God is incarnate in the finite i^ misleading. We
should rather say that the finite is the incarnation of God."
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the Absolute are merely temporary abstractions from the whole.
Evil has no independent reality. It is "the most sublime
reality, that evil is non-existent, and that man is not to
allow this distinction, this nullity, any valid existence." 1
Sin is not a fearful reality which does not belong to the
harmonious system of the Absolute; it is a necessary element in
moral experience which must be transcended in the triadic process
whereby the opposition of sin to innocence is resolved in virtue.
Man does not become aware of sin through confrontation by a
Holy God who stands over against him as an Other. If sin is
regarded as an independent faot of human existence, it is non-
rational and therefor unreal. On Hegel's terms, however, the
reality conferred upon sin is that which it possesses in its
role as a moment within the good; and thereby it loses all
seriousness.
This brief reference to the application of Hegel's
method to the subject of evil and sin illustrates most clearly
the rigidly iramanental character of his thought. In Hegel's
account of religion, the Christian faith loses its disjunctive
relations between Creator-creation, sin-grace, penitence-Divine
forgiveness, the themes with which the Biblical revelation
is fundamentally concerned. They become elementary oppositions
1. Philosophy of Religion, I, p. 99.
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within a dialectic which ends in a rational harmony. It is
true that these major Biblical themes represent estrangement
from God and a return to Him in reconciliation. In the Bible,
however, this is not a necessary movement of thought; it is
the account of wilful acts of human disobedience and spontaneous
acts of Divine grace. There is, in fact, a conflict between
human methods of effecting reconciliation and the Divine means
of reconciliation, culminating in the opposition at the Cross
of Christ.
In the Bible, the reconciliation of man and God does
not involve wiping out the disparateness between the human and
the Divine. St. Paul, as a reconciled believer, mourned at the
continuing conflict in his life between the flesh and the
spirit. Even the Eschatology of the Apocalypse leaves us still
with a picture of God supreme in majesty above all the hosts of
heaven.
It may be true, as Haldane suggests, that Hegel did
not presume to offer a thorough-going explication of the
Absolute up to its last movement of synthesis, but proposed it
only as
An ideal to be worked towards but not to be regarded as
capable of demonstration excepting in abstract terms which
were therefore^insufficient for the concrete ideas of
human beings.
1. Hegel, Science of Logic, p. 8. (Introductory
Preface by Yiscount Haldane).
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If Hegel did indeed conceive of the Absolute in such a manner,
he was betraying his basic assumption that the ideal or the
conceptual is the real. But regardless of whether or not Hegel
believed that the Absolute could be reached in human thought
and experience, the Absolute was pre-supposed at every stage
of his system. At every stage of his representation of concrete
human thought, he finds a synthesis: "Opposition thought is
opposition overcome." 1
If a harmony is attained at each and every point to
which mind is capable of rising, it matters little that the
process may be incomplete. Hegelian teleology may leave the
door open for movement in unexpected directions, so that a
conclusive judgment about the system may be premature at any
given time. Yet, if his presuppositions and method are accepted,
we can be certain that his teleology will be quite removed from
Christian eschatology. Whether the Absolute of Hegel be
realized or idealized, it is not the personal God of Christian
faith who is creatively prior to nature and human experience.
Hegel*s Absolute is universal mind, the unity of a community of
individuals, which comes to complete consciousness only in
their totality. God is not real before He is actualized in the
totality of finite minds. There is no sphere for the Divine
1. Croce, op. olt.. p. 31.
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transcendence, unless God be conceived as a transcendent Ideal.
And, as we have pointed out, the concept of abstract ideal
truth is out of keeping with Hegel's basic assumptions.
Hegel's system is more amenable to the charge of
pantheism than that of Fiehte, in view of the fact that Hegel
at least has a cosmic structure in which objects exist in
independence of the finite subjective consciousness. He has a
world which can be related, after some fashion, to God. It is
not difficult to state the relation. The world, for Hegel, has
reality only as it admits of rationality; and rationality
demands an Absolute. It is impossible therefore to avoid the
conclusion that Hegel believed that all which is real subsists
in God. It was only a false pantheism which he inveighed
against; i.e., one which rested upon a theory of knowledge
which he regarded as inadequate.
On Hegel's view, individuals gain reality by being
dialectically subsumed under the Universal, rather than by
abstract identification with God. It might therefore be more
adequate to characterize his system as a 'panentheism'. There
is no reality outside the Universal or God; but God is greater
than the individuals or sum of individuals which have their
reality in Him. The term 'panentheism' would seem to be more
applicable than the term 'pantheism' to a system which ends in
a synthesis rather than in a simple identification of antitheses.
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CHAPTER IV.
THE THEOLOGY OF IDEALISM
A. Baur
Ferdinand Christian Baur, the founder of the so-called
Tubingen School, associated with the centre where he taught
1826-60, carried the Hegelian philosophy into the field of
critical theological studies. His particular contribution lay
in the study of Church History; and Pfleiderer has termed his
work the most important in the century. * Baur construed
history, after the Hegelian pattern, as the outworking of the
Idea. He believed that in the study of history consciousness
contemplates itself. In his earlier writings Baur applied this
method of historical research to the New Testament literature,
an approach which was followed and extended to radical conclu¬
sions by his disciple, D. F. Strauss.
Baur believed in the existence of a generalized
Divine presence In the world, a point of view which enabled
him to discover a preparation for Christianity within ancient
philosophy. The principle of the God-man, which has been
regarded as the distinctive element in Christianity, is actually
1. Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology, p. 284.
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bound up with the universal essence of religion. In both Greek
religion and philosophy is to be found the ideal of a union of
the human and the Divine. 1 In Platonism as In Christianity
the goal of life and of history is a divine sanctifioation of
men. There is a striking similarity between Plato's Republic
and the Biblical idea of the Kingdom of God. In general terms,
the relation between Platonism and Christianity is that of the
difference between idea and realization or doctrine and life,
with Christianity ocoupying the role of fulfilment. 2 The
inner laws of human nature had undergone a progressive develop¬
ment such that the point was inevitably reached where they came
to historical truth in Christianity.
This attempt to relate Christianity positively to
other religions and to philosophical thought gained momentum
throughout the nineteenth century. Later studies of compara¬
tive religion proved to be more empirical in outlook, but
Baur's method of seeking similarities among religions had a
profound influence. For Baur, the discovery of similarities
1. Baur, Drei Abhandluggen zur Geschichte der alten
Philosophic, p. 161. ~~~ ~~~ ~
»• IMA* P. 238. m*;i
3. Baur, Paulus der Apostel Jesu Chrlsti,^P.23S."Das
Verhaltniss des Christenthums zum Heidenthum und Judenthum
kann s&a* als das der absoluten Religion zu den ihr vorangehenden
untergeordneten Formen der Religion bestimmt werden."
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was gratifying from the point of view of his philosophical
presuppositions. He welcomed the manifestation of close
relationships between Christianity and pagan thought and
religion, as evidence for the absoluteness and comprehensive¬
ness of the Idea. The Hegelian view of history refused to
oome to terms with particularity and uniqueness in historical
appearance.
Coming more directly to Baur's Christian viewpoint
we find that he regarded the principle of subjective freedom
as a distinguishing feature of Christian consciousness. This
is no arbitrary freedom but it consists in a unity of the
subjective with the objective. The Individual knows himself
to be at one with the universal, in the unity of the Whole of
which he is a member. In his belongingness to the Whole he
experiences inner freedom. Subjective freedom, or salvation,
rests upon the fact that there is a bond of identity between
the Divine and the human:
Die Ilbglichkeit der Erlosung beruht auf dem unzertrenn-
lichen Bande der Identit&t des Gbttlichen und Menschlichen,
darauf dass der Mensch an sich mit Gott Eins ist. 1
The authority of Jesus Christ in Christianity lies
in the fact that He imparts the Spirit (Geist) to the Church,
which is thereby exalted into the absolute essence of God. ^
1. Drei Abhandlungen, p. 274.
2. Ibid, p. 301.
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In Christ Himself the Divine and the human, the pattern and
the historical, are united in the most perfect union of essence.
The authority which Christ confers upon the Church is not that
of some external, alien power, hut it is an authority which is
consonant with the absolute authority of reason. Only so can
Christianity be the absolute religion. 1
In his important work, Paulus, der Apostel Jesu
Christi. Baur represented the manner in which he believed the
Christian life is realized. Of all men converted to Christian¬
ity he was convinced that in no one did the Christian principle
assert its absolute superiority as clearly as in St. Paul.
With the thought of St. Paul a new principle was
introduced into Christianity. The events of the life, death
and resurrection of Christ came to take on an absolute meaning,
as being constitutive of the Christian principle, rather than
2
to be but stories about the founder of a religion. The
Christian principle is capable of leading a man upward to the
point of union with God, and, in this reconciliation, man is
inspired with the Absolute. In the consciousness of the
Absolute he becomes superior to everything fleeting, worldly
1. Ibid, p. 315.
2» Paulus. p. 136. "Die absolute Bedeutung, welche die
Person Christi f'tlr den Apostel hat, ist die Absolutheit des
Christlichen Prinoipd selbst."
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and finite. The Christian principle leads one to an awareness
of the essential distinction between Spirit and flesh and pro¬
motes man's freedom from all that has a merely external
relation to him.
It was preeminently the death of Christ which enabled
the Christian principle to beoome universalized. The messianic
idea of Judaism with all its sensual elements was thereby
disillusioned and stripped away. The essential feature of
Christ's person which remained to inform the Chureh's faith
was the conviction that He had the Spirit (Gelst) within Him¬
self. The blessedness of an individual no longer depended
upon anything material and outward but was conditional upon a
sense of immediate communion with Christ, whereby he might
achieve oneness with God. The Christian man conceived himself,
in his consciousness of Christ, to be identical with the Spirit
of God. 1
The testimony of the Spirit with our spirits, which
St. Paul represents as the evidence of genuine faith, is the
highest expression of the identity of our subjective spirits
with spirit-in-itself, or Absolute Spirit. This experience is
characterized by a sense of absolute freedom, a freedom from
finite limitations. The Christian's world-view will be quite
1. Ibid* P. 139.
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different from that of other men because he is able to make
observations from the standpoint of absolute consciousness.
His consciousness is at once a community consciousness embracing
all believers. The community has its oneness in the fact that
"Christus das Prinoip dieser Gemeinschaft ist.n 1
The significance of external history for Baur is
evident when he says concerning the details of the conversion
experience of St. Paul:
Die innere Erscheinung musste auf irgend eine Weise auch
eine aussere werden, wenn sie fdr die Tradition ihre voile
Bedeutung und ihre concrete Wahrheit haben sollte.
History is not contingent, positive or unique but it is that
manifestation of the Idea, which is serviceable for its per¬
petuation and propagation. The movement from Gospel history
to the history of the Apostolic period was a necessary move¬
ment toward the practical realization of the Christian Idea.
In formal terms Baur outlines his approach to the
history of dogma. The historian in the field of dogma must
trace an immanental development of dogma, in which every
5
moment of thought is the necessary presupposition of the next.
1. Ibid, p. 184.
2. Ibid, p. 79
3. Baur, Lehrbuoh der christlichen Dogmengfcschichte.
p. 9. "Jede neu© Gestaltung des Dogma's ist sowohl ein neu©s
Moment, durch welches das Dogma in der immanenten Bewegung
seines Begriffs sich selbst bestimmt."
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The entire course of the history of dogma is the progression
of the distinctively Christian consciousness. Changes in
dogma are new positions which subjectivity takes up toward
objective dogma. These changes are to be accepted as valid
because the subjective and the objective are actually but two
sides of the selfsame spirit.
Die Aufgabe der wahrhaft geschichtlichen Behandlung kann
daher nur seyn, in alien geschichtlichen Erseheinungen die
Einheit eines und desselben Begriffs, und in jeder bedett-
tenden Epoche machenden VerSnderung nicht bloss etwas
Zuf'dlliges und WillkUrliches, Isolirtes und Unmotivirtes,
sondern eine aWs dem Wesen der Sache selbst hervorg^angiene
und durch sie bedingte Bewegung zu erkennen. 1
On this view, heresy is virtually an impossibility. All human
thought upon the subject of Christian doctrine is constantly
the expression of the Absolute Spirit.
Baur applies his method to the field of early
2
Christian history. The period of Christian history which
conforms to the first term of the familiar Hegelian dialectical
triad is that earliest period of the nascent Church when
Christianity was confined within the narrow limits of Jewish
particularism. The second period, in opposition to this
1. Ibid, p. 19.
2. Baur, The Church History of the First Three
Centuries. II, p. 127. "Looking at the various sides of the
historical appearance of Christianity we see that it develops
and realises on a constantly increasing scale the absolute
idea which is its essential contents."
Ill
restrictive tendency, was the period of the mission to the
Gentiles when Christianity became universalized. With univers-
alism, however, there was a constant danger of secularization.
The meeting and conflict with the Gentile mind precipitated
the synthetic development of the Catholic Church, in which the
specific contents and character of Christianity were preserved
while making use of the thought forms of secular philosophy.
In a broader outline of the history of dogma he
applies the same immanent dialectical formula. The period
comprehended by the history of the old Catholic Church is
characterized as the period of the production of dogma, the
objectification of the Christian consciousness. In the
scholastic period of the Middle Ages, objective dogma regressed
into subjectivism, owing to the reflective preoccupation of
the times. In the period since the Reformation both the
objective and subjective factors of Christian dogma have been
given their due, while at the same time they have been tran¬
scended within a more adequate viewpoint, viz.. absolute con¬
sciousness. 1
The method of Baur shows the implications for histor¬
ical study of a thorough-going immanental idealism. His
principles removed uniqueness from the historical content of
1. Lehrbuoh. p. 13.
*
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both Gospel history and Christian history, as contrasted with
general history. It is not the historic fact which determines
the content of Christian dootrine and the course of Christian
history, but the historic fact is the necessary outworking of
the Idea.
Like his master, Hegel, Baur has no realm of tran¬
scendence which stands in contrast with the world and human
life. There are no Divine acts which are arbitrary or novel.
With his rejection of the uniqueness of the historical facts
underlying Christian belief, Baur made a vital attack upon the
distinction between the human and the Divine in Christianity.
When history is viewed as incidental to the progress of absolute
consciousness, there is no element in Christian faith which is
outside the control of consciousness. The latter is compelling-
ly normative for belief and action. Traditionally, the histor¬
ical sources of faith had been regarded as the issue of a
transcendental Divine fiat. With Baur they are but the necessary
element in a process which is determined wholly from within.
There is no revelatory history, but all historical facts are
pliable to the self-determining Idea.
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B. Strauss
David Friedrich Strauss (1808-74) shared with his
teacher, Baur, a grounding in Hegelian philosophy. From this
basis he made his important contribution to the study of the
historical origins of the Christian faith. His Leben Jesu.
published in 1835, was the most radical historical criticism
of New Testament sources which hitherto > had been attempted.
Although he used many of the techniques of modern empirical
historical research, one cannot fail to discern clear traces
of his rationalistic idealism.
His philosophical presuppositions may be found in
his Glaubenslehre. published shortly after his first Leben
Jesu. It is the view of Strauss that theological knowledge is
not a knowledge which relates immediately to the objective
essence of things. It is primarily concerned with inner feel¬
ing and its determinations in relation to the Absolute. *
Philosophy exercises priority over religion in that it deter¬
mines the form which religion takes. Philosophy adopts a
theoretical attitude toward life while theology takes up a
practical attitude. Strauss indicates, however, that an
adequate theology should recognize the supremacy of philosophy,
1. Strauss, Die chriatliohen Glaubenslehre. I, p. 8.
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because life is rationally ordered. Failure to recognize the
supremacy of philosophy leaves one bound to a belief in a
revelation pointing to objects which are external in conscious¬
ness. "Wer zum Vernunftglauben noch nicht reif ist, der bleibt
bei'm Offenbarungsglauben." 1 It is the learned rational mind
alone which is capable of perceiving the movement of Spirit in
historical process. Only for those who are filled with the
Spirit does externalized nature return to itself in conscious¬
ness. Whether the Absolute is regarded as a transcendent God
or as an immanent Spirit depends upon the degree of intellectual
acumen of the knower. 2
The first expression of the Absolute in the world is
constituted by matter. In upward stages, it is further realized
as life in nature and as mind in man. In the course of human
history the Idea comes most fully to itself. Man is able to
recognize the movement of the Idea, or God, in nature and in his
own history, because the idea of God is already the native
endowment of his mind. The tendency to personify God must be
resisted, for God is All-personality. He is continually person¬
ifying Himself into infinite time. The Absolute is essentially
result. When Strauss has carried through his examination of
1. Ibid. I, p. 355.
2. Ibid. I, p. 359f• "Dieser absolute Inhalt, wie er
nach wissenschaftlicher Ansicht als ein der Welt immanenter
ihre innerste bewegende Seele ist: so ist er in der nichtwissen-
schaftlichen, wo er liber die weltliche Wirklichkeit hinausf&llt,
auf diese als ein Anderes nur bezogen."
115
the process of the divine Idea he concludes that there is no
room left for a transcendent sphere:
Das Jenseits 1st zwar in alien der Eine, in seiner
Gestalt als zGkunftiges aber der letzte Feind, welchen
die speculative Kritik zu bekaaipfen und wo mb'glich zu
uberwinden hat. *
At the close of a section in which he had dealt with
the history of Christian apologetics, Strauss makes the conclud¬
ing assertion that his discussion has set forth the basic con¬
cepts of Christian doctrine, or to use other terms, these con¬
cepts have returned to the mind (Geist) from which they issued.
"Das Begreifen ihres Hervorgangs aus dem Geiste ist ihr Ruckgang
in demselben." 2 Dogmatics therefore has no capital of its own
and has no abiding reality. The process of the history of dogma
nt
is its destruction. The peculiar and distinctive elements of
the history of dogma are resolved again into absolute Mind.
In Strauss^ study of the life of Christ we observe
his principles at work in his most influential writing.
He resolves a major part of the historical narrative and
4
miraoulous incidents of the New Testament into myth.
P« 739«
£. Ibid. I, p. 353.
3. Pfleiderer, The Development of Theology, p. 133.
4. Strauss, Das Leben Jesu fur das deutache Yolk,
p. 159. "Jede unhistorische ErzJfhlung, wie auch Immer entstanden,
in welcher eine religlbse Gemeinschaft einen Bestandtheil ihres
heiligen Grundlage, well einen absolute Ausdruck ihrer consti-
tutiven Empfindungen und Vorstellungen erkennt, ist ein
Mythus.n
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He believes that the Hebrew people never held a clear concep¬
tion of history because they failed to comprehend the indis¬
solubility of finite causes. Myth served to give expression
to a certain idea of the Divine Being which they, in their
human interests, desired to hold. In the history recorded in
the Gospels it is virtually impossible to trace a line of
demarcation between history and myth.
This is not a situation to be deprecated, however,
because the use of myth is essentially necessary in the
religious sphere:
If religion be defined as the perception of truth, not
in the form of an idea, which is the philosophical
perception, but invested with imagery; it is easy to
see that the mythical element can be wanting only when
religion either falls short of, or goes beyond, its
peculiar province, and that in the proper religious
sphere it must necessarily exist. 1
Strauss was as opposed to a naturalistic interpret¬
ation of Gospel history as to an orthodox acceptance of it.
The naturalistic interpretation overlooks the rational element
which mythology enshrines. The religious myth is determined
by the particular religious predispositions and aspirations of
a people. The fact that the Hebrew and Christian religions are
raised above their natural soil more than any other is evidence
1. Strauss, The Life of Jesus. (Eliot's translation),
p. 80.
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that a greater number of their myths are rooted in an idea
universal to mankind.
The Old Testament ideas which had made the strongest
religious appeal persisted on into the New Testament oommunity.
In the early days of that community, from the time of Jesus'
death until the completion of the Gospel narratives, His devotees
applied to their memory of Jesus' life and teaching, the Messianic
myths of the Old Testament with which they had been long fam¬
iliar. By the time the Gospels were actually written, it was
difficult to distinguish between the expression of a fact and
the ideas of His early partisans. When the basis of a New
Testament recital is not acceptable to reason or confirms in a
striking manner to late Jewish ideas concerning the Messiah,
the whole story should be considered as non-historic, Jesus*
own estimate of Himself as the Messiah must be regarded as
merely the expression of His religious self-consciousness.
While some narratives may be coloured by wishful
thinking, others may represent an 'enrichment' of the account
of some unusual natural event. In all cases it must be
decided whether a recorded event conforms to a reasonable
form of history. Strauss persistently used an immanent
rational principle to determine the line between the historical
and the imaginative, rather than to employ a scientific,
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empirical method of historical investigation.
Strauss made a tortuous attempt to prove the histor¬
ical unreliability of practically every miraculous narrative
in the New Testament, in his desire to resolve Christianity
into a rational universalism immanent to consciousness. He
admits that this radical criticism has destroyed the most
valuable part of the beliefs which the Christian has treasured
concerning Jesus, and has annihilated his animating motives;
and therefore in a concluding section he strives to restore,
dogmatically, what he has destroyed In his criticism.
This recovery, as might be expected, proves to be
motivated by rational Idealism rather than by the support of
historical fact. He insists that theology must not be con¬
cerned to define a supernatural, metaphysical Christ, nor be
disturbed if the historical picture of Jesus is uncertain.
It is necessary only to present the general religious truths
about Jesus which have been beclouded in the past by a
dogmatic stress upon the uniqueness of historical events.
He says,
Our age demands to be led in Christology to the idea in
the fact, to the race in the individual: a theology which,
in its doctrine on the Christ, stops short at him as an
individual, is not properly a theology, but a homily. 1
On this view, an adequate Christology must reveal to men that
1. Ibid, p. 781.
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they are essentially Christs, that Jesus exemplified the divine
possibilities of the race. It was a belief which informed much
of nineteenth century thought concerning the significance of
Jesus Christ. *
Strauss concedes that the modern critical theologian
may be obliged to adhere to the popular traditional conceptions
in his discourse to the Church. But he must use every oppor¬
tunity available to present the 'spiritual* significance of all
the traditional historical forms of the Gospel narrative, for
that Is the only truth which they possess. By a patient
process of teaching he may be able to effect "the resolution
of those forms into their original ideas in the consciousness
2
of the Church also. ** The transition will then have been made
from the external and historical to the inward and spiritual.
In his final work, Per Alte una der neue Glaube.
Strauss presented in summary form his mature views on religious
doctrine. In this work he moves far toward a radically mater¬
ialistic doctrine, in contrast with his earlier idealism. He
1. Cf. Renan, The Life of Jesus, p. 310. "This sublime
person, —— we may call divine, not in the sense that Jesus
has absorbed all the alvlne, or has been adequate to it,
but in the sense that Jesus is the one who has caused his
fellow-men to make the greatest step towards the divine."
Op. cit.. p. 783.
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asks the question whether our modern sophistication permits us
still to call ourselves Christians, and concludes that if we
are honest with ourselves we must answer, "Wir sind keine
Christen mehr.n 1
The strength of Christian teaching has been its
doctrine of the resurrection, without which myth, the teaching
of Jesus would have been long since forgotten. The resurreotion
myth illustrates a fundamental characteristic of religion, that
of wish-fulfilment. He rejects the historicity of the resur-
o
rection in unqualified terms. It is this belief which has
made Christianity hostile to a this-worldly culture. The
wishes of men have led them to devise this and other transcend¬
ental doctrines. "Hatte der Mensch keine Wiinsche, so hatte
5
er auch keine Cotter.n In this view he agrees with his
contemporary, Feuerbach.
Strauss specifically rejects those elements of
religion which seem to confer a supernatural significance upon
life. He specially singles out the practise of baptism for
rejection because it is a symbol with a supernatural reference.
1. Strauss, Per alte und der neue Qlaube, p. 61.
2. Ibid, p. 47. "Historisch genommen, d.h. die unge-
heuren Wirkungen dieses Glaubens mit seiner vdlligen
Grunlosigkeit zusammen gehalten, l&sst sioh die Gesohichte
von ller Auferstehung Jesu nur als ein welthistorisoher
Humbug bezeichnen."
3. Ibid, p. 90.
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It is preferable that our children should be raised simply as
human beings (Menschen). 1 He is willing, none the less, to
retain one basic element of religion, the feeling of absolute
2
dependence. This feeling of dependency, however, is not
experienced in the form of resignation toward a naked over¬
whelming power. The feeling is one of dependence upon order,
law, reason and goodness which we feel to be related to our
own innermost beings because of the ability which we have to
perceive and personalize these elements.
The world is no longer to be regarded as the work of
an absolute, rational and personal Being, but rather as the
sphere (Werkst&tte) in which the work of the rational and good
forces of life takes place. The universe is both cause and
3
effect, inner and outer, at one and the same time. It is a
presumption for man to oppose himself as an * other* to a
transoendent Absolute to which he owes his being:
Es erscheint uns vermessen und ruchlos von Seiten eines
einzelnen Menschenwesens, sich so keck dem All, ans dem
es stammt, von dem es auch das bischgn Vernunft hat, dass
es missbraucht, gegenUbereustellen. 4
The Absolute must rather be conceived as realizing itself in
and through man. To conceive of man as divine seems less a
presumption to Strauss than to represent him as a separate
individuality over against God.
1. Ibid* P. 60-
2. Ibid, p. 93.
3. Ibid, p. 94.
4. Ibid, p. 96f.
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He regards the traditional antithesis between mater¬
ialism and idealism as no more than a conflict over words. The
conflict, so far as it has affected Christian theology, has
resulted from the dualistic world-view which has dominated
Christian history. Man has been arbitrarily divided into soul
and body, and his existence into time and eternity; God has
been set over against a passing and created world. Materialism
and idealism should be interpreted as expressions of differing
perspectives of reality rather than of fundamentally disjunctive
systems of reality. The distinction between the two terms
should therefore be done away:
Immer bleibt es dabei, dass wir nicht einen Theil der
Functionen unsres Wesens einer physischen, einen andern
einer geistegen Ursaehe zuzuschreiben haben, sondern
alle einer und derselben, die sich entweder so Oder so
betrachtet lasst. 1
Strauss accepts Darwin's hypothesis with little quali¬
fication, Since Darwin, it is no longer necessary to postulate
the existence of an external divine Architect to explain the
design in nature. It has now been shown that natural forces
and instinots effect the purposeful developments in nature.
When we still speak of a world-goal we are speaking subjective¬
ly, and mean thereby that we believe we have an understanding
1. Ibid, p. 141.
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of the general result of the interplay of forces at work in
the world. 1 The universe is eternal and progresses toward
ever higher forms and functions. The idea of man developing
from the ape should require no greater strain upon credulity
than the belief in God becoming man, which devout men so
o
faithfully accept.
The moral action of men does not consist in obedience
to a divinely-given law but it is the self-determination of men
3
according to the idea of the race. If a man endeavours to
realize the idea of the raoe in himself and to promote the same
idea in others, he thereby relates himself religiously to the
idea of the universe, the final source of all being and life.
The fundamental concept of religion is that there is
no break in the continuity of nature and of life:
Is alles nach ewigen Gese tzen aus dem Einen Urquell
alles Lebens, aller Vernunft und alles Guten hervorgeht
— das ist der Inbegriff der Religion. 4
The realm of human experience which best serves to illustrate
the all-embracing harmony of the universe is that of art. The
harmony which is not apparent in the conflicting forces of the
world is imparted intuitively in artistic achievement and
appreciation. 5
1. Ibid, p. 149. 4. Ibid, p. 161.
2. IbTd. p. 135. 5. TbTd, p. 200.
3. Tbld, p. 159.
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Strauss did not proceed to a position of avowed
atheism, but, practically, he ended in a thorough-going
naturalistic position. He had placed God so completely within
the context of unending natural processes that there was left
to Him no sphere of distinctive operation. Strauss was not as
concerned as the orthodox Hegelians to adapt the major themes
of Christian doctrine to a dialectical scheme and to describe
the whole as an organon of the Absolute. Reason, nevertheless,
remains the supreme principle of his interpretation of life and
reality, and assures the immanent and intimate character of his
religious view. He says,
Unser Gott nimmt uns nicht von aussen in seinen Arm,
aber er eroffnet uns Quellen des Treves in unserem
Innern. Er zeigt uns, dass zwar der Zufall ein
unvernlinftiger Weltherrscher ware, dass aber die
Nothwendigkeit, d.h. die Verkettung der Ursachen in
der Welt, die Yernunft selber ist. *
Man remains, through oontrol of his reason, in immediate re¬
lation with the Deity. Because Strauss believed that the
Deity has relegated the operation of the universe to a process
of natural development, it would seem, however, to be only an
idealistic sentiment which caused him to retain the concept
and terminology of theism.
It was Feuerbaoh, writing earlier than this final
work of Strauss, who made the most complete inversion of the
1. Ibid, p. 252.
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Hegelian idealism to a materialistic position. It is of
interest to compare his thought briefly with that of Strauss.
Feuerbach forewarns that his thought will be disturbing to
minds that have been long perverted by superhuman religion
and speculations. His philosophy generates thought from the
opposite of thought - from matter and from the senses. Theology
has been too long speculative and therefore dehumanizing. He
describes religion as "the dream of the human mind." ^
For Feuerbach the true theology is anthropology. The
essence of religion is that it conceives of a human relation as
being in fact a divine relation. Man is sufficient unto him¬
self. His understanding and nature cannot extend beyond his
range of vision or other perceptive powers of sense:
Whatever is a subjective expression of a nature is
simultaneously also its objective expression. Man
cannot get beyond his true nature. 2
Any antithesis between the Divine and the human is therefore
illusory. The attributes of the divine nature ate the attri¬
butes of human nature.
In religion, man projects himself into objectivity
as God, then, in turn, makes himself an object to the object,
i.e.. to God. The personality of God is the personality of
man projected. A true religion would make man only an object
1. Feuerbach, The Essence of the Christian Religion,
p. xiii.
2. Ibid, p. 11.
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to man. Feuerbach asserts confidently, "What I love is my
heart, the substance of my being, my nature." 1 It is the
principle of love rather than God which should be the object
of veneration, because love transcends and harmonizes the
difference between the divine and the human. Only through
love can we escape the evil God of religious fanaticism.
The old opposition between a noumenal divine nature
and a visible nature of the world is merely the opposition
between abstraction and perception:
The Divine Being is the human being glorified by the
death„of abstraction; it is the departed spirit of
man.
The distinguishing of God from nature is nothing else than the
distinguishing of man himself from nature. God is nothing
other than the abstract idea of the species, to which has been
3
given a mythical form.
The doctrine of the Deity of Christ is a blending of
feeling and imagination. Faith in a future life is really
faith in the life of the present which is already regarded as
the authentic life, and should be perpetuated. The goal of
religion is the welfare of man; the relation of man to God is
his relation to his own spiritual well being. Feuerbach states
1. Ibid, p. 57.
2. TEId, p. 97f.
3. Ibid, p. 247.
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his creed summarily:
Only when we abandon a philosophy of religion, or a
theology, which is distinct from psychology and
anthropology, and recognize anthropology as itself
theology, do we attain to a true, self-satisfying
identity of the divine and human.being, the identity
of the human being with itself. 1
Feuerbach did not retain the idealism of Strauss
which enabled the latter to reserve a feeling of dependence
and to regard man as having been derived from the All of the
g
universe, a spiritual principle. Feuerbach will not get
outside the limits of human nature, although he retains,
unjustifiably, the language of traditional theology. With
Feuerbach's materiahsm, the Hegelian form of rationalism had
revealed its weakness. Its monistic principles were shown to
be equally adaptable to a materialistically or to an idealist-
ically orientated system, depending upon the sentiment of the
individual thinker. Feuerbaoh's monism refused the transcend¬
ental distinctions of value which Hegel had held, e.g.. as
between the finite and the Absolute. The end was to give up
all idealism and religious feeling in favour of a shallow
humanism.
1. Ibid, p. 231f.
2. Pfleiderer, op. cit.. p. 135.
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C. Biedermann
The Swiss theologian, A.E. Biederm&nn, (1819-1885)
may also be classed as an Hegelian, but he endeavoured to avoid
the interpretations of the extreme left and right of the
Hegelian school. ¥/hile seeking to enrich the understanding of
the Christian faith with the aid of speculative theology, he
wished to give a place to the 'facts' as well as to the ideas
and ideals of Christianity. In this attempt he shared an
affinity with Rothe. Although he made use of the criticism
of Strauss, he maintained a more positive attitude than the
latter to the content of the religious truth which remained
following the critical work. His thought is comprehensively
set forth in his Christliche Dogmatik.
Biedermann's epistemology is the key to his thought,
as in the case of the idealists whom we have already considered.
In an effort to deflect the monistio tendency of the Hegelian
tradition he asserts that the content of Christian dogma is not
found in the religious Idea alone but also in the historic form
in which Christianity has been brought to consciousness in
the Christian community. A real principle, and Biedermann
maintains that he is a realist, develops temporally and hist¬
orically. It is therefore necessary to study coordinately the
1. Biedermann, Christliohe Glaube, I, p. 2.
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development of the Idea and its historical realization as
mediated through the senses. There is an attempt in
Biedermann's thought to effect a union of Hegelianism with the
Spinozistic parallelism of thought and extension. There is
also a close relation to Sohelling's harmony of the subject and
object.
Christian dogma is the historical impression cast by
the consciousness of the Christian community. The study of
dogma is therefore historical in character. But in order that
the process of dogma in history may be adequately evaluated,
its study must be guided by rational principles with an eye to
correctness of the logical forms of the historical manifest¬
ation. * The study of dogmatics can not be carried on without
the aid of a speculative system, if it wishes to be scientific.
For Biedermann the possibility of achieving a real
knowledge of religious truths is the same problem as the poss¬
ibility of a scientific metaphysics. The religious 'God* and
the metaphysical 'Absolute1 are one and the same concept,
though reached in differing ways. He attacks Kant's dualism
between the metaphysical real and the process of knowing. The
limits of metaphysical reality are the same as the limits of
Ibid. I, p. 21. "Was der menschliche Geist so in
der Geschiohte gethan hat, das hat aber die Wissenschaft auoh
das Recht und die Pflicht zu priifen, ob es auch in den
denkrichtigen Formen gesohehen sei."
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knowing* Perpetuation of Kant's dualism has led extremists to
fixate upon one or other term of the dualism and to develop
either a monistic idealism 01* a monistic materialism,
Biederaann designates his own theory of knowledge
'Pure Realism*. The term has methodological rather than meta¬
physical meaning. The *real* is not something which we know
independently of the facts of the knowing process, but the facts
of consciousness, including both form and content, constitute
reality.
Der reine Realismus in der Erkenntnisstheorie besteht in
der Durchfiihrung des Grun&satzes, das Bewusstsein und seinen
Inhalt rein so zu nehmen, wie es uns thatsachlioh gegeben
1st. 1
Consciousness itself constitutes a real relation of subject and
object, an ideel-reale relationship: "Die Thatsache des
Bewusstseins ist die uns am unmittelbarsten gegebene Thatsache
ideeller Realitat." 2 Because the subjective and the objective
do not have separate existence, as we perceive them in our
experience, it is therefore unnecessary to confer upon them
separate metaphysical subsistence. They are in fact
oonsubsistentlelle.
Pure realism takes the two moments of consciousness,
as they are given, holding them together in a unity without
subjective alteration. Viewing the subjective and objective
1. Ibid. I, p. 71.
2. Ibid. I, p. 75.
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moments of consciousness separately is what leads to the
fallacy of the natural-supernatural antithesis and to belief
in two irreconcilable substances. Perception is an undivided
relation of the material and the ideal to the subject. It is
all that makes out the world for the peroeiving subject.
The content of consciousness is neither the 1 object'
of naive realism nor a transcendental reality but "stets das
Product eines sinnlich-objectiven und eines ideell-subjeotiven
Factors." The object of consciousness is perception-content.
That which the mind is able to subjectify and raise to pure
ideal consciousness, and so use as the material of thought,
3
must first have been produced by perception. Ideas are
sensuous or mental, depending on whether they have entered
from outer or from inner perception. But all the material of
thought must stand in real rapport with consciousness. The
prooess of thinking fixes ideas and provides the formal element
of consciousness. The reason, by its speculative activity, is
able to abstract from the sensitive element of experience to
achieve logical forms. The processes of pure thought can
represent the objects of mathematics, conceive general concepts,
1. Ibid. I, p. 100. "Alle Substanz ist uns essentiell
nur als Einheit sinnliehen und ideeHen Seins gegeben: jeder
wirkliche KSrper, jeder wirkliche Mensch, das wirkliche
Universum."
2. Ibid, I, p. 114.
3. Ibid. I, p. 125.
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and, finally, attain to the objects of metaphysics in which
are sought the basis of unity for both the ideal and material
elements in our experience.
Upon this epistemological groundwork, Biedermann
concludes that the metaphysical basis of unity for experience
is a Being which penetrates the whole of world existence and
is constitutive of its process:
Den Letzten, alles unter sich begreifenden Grund des
Welt-daseins kiSnnen wir nur als ein Sein denken, in
welohem dieses durch das gesammte Welt-dasein durchgehende
un den Welt-process constituirende YerhSltniss seine
Begrundung findet. 1
Kant's ultimate ideas, or postulates, had been necessary for
the immanent processes of thought but, as objects of thought,
he made them transoendentally remote. This remoteness is what
Biedermann would avoid.
There is a psychological and religious element in
Biedermann, contrasting with Hegel's identification of
philosophy and religion. Religion oonsists in a personal
elevating of the human soul to God, as man strives to free
himself from the negative limitations of his finite existence.
This subjective raising of the soul to God and opposing of
itself to the material finite world, presupposes the being of
1. Ibid. I, p. 150.
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God as Absolute Spirit, standing in a real relation to the
human Ego. ^ This mutual relation between God and man takes
plaoe within the spiritual life of man, in his spatio-temporal
existence in the world. The relation between God and man is
not existentially distinguished from man's experience of the
world. That which is existentially over against man is finite,
not Absolute Spirit in its pure, ideal, spaceless and timeless
essence. 2
The Divine element in the processes of the religious
life is revelation. 3 Immediate revelation is the self-evidence
of God as the Absolute Spirit in the Ego of man, His self-
evidence as the metaphysical ground of man's finite mental
life. Mediate revelation is constantly given through general
nature and the nature of man himself: "Das Medium der mittel-
baren Offenbarung ist die Weltordnung, in ihrer Einheit als
a(S 4
physische und^moralische." It is a false bifurcation in
apology which tries to do justice to the concept of miracle as
dependent upon the absolute immediate power of God, and at the
same time, insists upon an immanent world-order of God, in the
interests of the scientific understanding. The interests of
1. Ibid. I, p. 243.
2. Ibid. I, p. 253.
3. Ibid. I, p. 264. "Subject und Object der Offenbarung
ist Gott selbst als absoluter Geist."
4. Ibid. I, p. 284.
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faith and of the understanding cannot be separately satisfied,
but must be seen in their inner unity with one another. 1
In his doctrine of God, Biedermann stands closely by
the Hegelian position. God is not one spirit alongside of
other spirits, distinguished only by the fact that He is
absolute spirit. He is pure spiritual being and hence Absolute
Being. The Absolute is not mere abstract negation of finite
being; this would be nothingness. But the Absolute is
comprehensive of all finite being. "Absolut$ - sein 1st:
reines Inslcbjmd Durchsichselbst—• sein und in sich Grund -
?
sein alies Seins ausser sich." God, as an independent Being,
is transcendent, the logical antithesis of the dependent
sense-world; but a3 Absolute Being and ground of finite pro¬
cesses, He Is every moment immanent. ^
The concept of God Includes first, the formal
description of Absolute Being, and secondly, the actual
determinations of Absolute Being within the hxunan spirit.
The positive expressions concerning God must come from the
second element, the experience of man. In view of this fact,
1. Ibid, II, p. 481.
2. Ibid, II, p. 517.
T5Td, II, P. 527. Cf. Ibid, II, p. 548. "Jedes
einzelne Moment des Weltprocesses ist in seine^. Da-sein und
So-sein endllch bedingt und vermittelt durch den" alien
Immanente Natur^ordnung und hat in dleser Vemittlung seinen
absoluten Grand In Gott."
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anthropomorphic attributes must be carefully avoided. The
attribute of personality is not one which can be attached to
God, for this is to introduce a finite character into pure
Being. Much rather is God Himself the presupposition of all
finite personalities.
The truth that Absolute Spirit is the ground of the
world is revealed in the fact that mental and spiritual life
rises out of the natural processes of human life. The Absolute
Spirit reveals Himself as the norm for the self-objectifying of
the finite spirit in thinking, feeling and willing. He is also
the norm for the ethical and aesthetic development of man within
the circumstances of his natural history. The Absolute does
not act as a personal Providence promoting an external finite
goal, after subjective fashion and interest. Providence is
simply the conviction of faith, that there is an absolute goal
for human existence.
Man possesses the image of God in that he is not a
mere natural being with an animal soul, but has a potency
toward becoming an independently real spirit. The fulfilment of
the Divine image within man consists in his achieving a real
as well as a formal unity of the self with God, in an
immediate unity of love. The image of God is not an isolated
1. Ibid. II, p. 538.
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Divine element within man; it infuses his whole being:
Der Mensoh hat als endlicher Geist seine gottebenbildliehe
Bestimmung auf jeder empirischen Stufe seiner naturlichen,
von blossen Natur-dasein l^gehenden Entwicklung seinem
Wesen als Potenz und eben damit seinen subjectiven
Geistesleben als Trieb immanent. 1
The image of God in man represents not only the objective
possibility of man*s achievement of union with God but it
forces him to a recognition of the estrangement between himself
and God, and the need of reconciliation. The tendency toward
sin in man has its ground in his finite spirit, which is not
yet fully united with Absolute Spirit.
The Incarnation is the fundamental principle of
Christianity. This Christian principle first became a reality
in the religious consciousness of Jesus as He appeared upon
the plane of history, and in the faith which arose concerning
Him. The content of the Christian faith is not such that it
oould have been realized in human experience apart from the
historical fact of the Incarnation. Here we note his insist¬
ence upon the independent reality of nature and history along¬
side of spirit. At the same time, Biedermann will not allow
that the Incarnation introduced a spiritual principle alien to
humanity. The Christian faith expresses the true relation
between God and man by providing the principle of redemption,
1. Ibid. H, p.577
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which removes the contradiction between God and man occasioned
by sin. Concerning the content of the faith he says,
Sein Inhalt muss sich daher doch ausweisen als an
sich im Wesen Gottesund des Menschen enthalten und
alleln als die voile Verwirklichung des darin
Snthaltenen. 1
For all time Christ is the historical prototype of the effect¬
ive redemption principle which is the inalienable heritage of
mankind.
Biedermann concludes that the world of finite,
spatio-temporal existence has God not only for its eternal
and everpresent ground, but as its eternal goal as well. The
finite world serves as a medium for God to fulfil His final
goal. The finite spirit fulfils its end by a personal comm¬
union with the Absolute Spirit, whereby the former subjectifies
the Absolute Spirit, as life's ground, norm and goal.
It is questionable whether Biedermann made any im¬
provement upon the Hegelian doctrine, from the point of view
of establishing the external world. He tried to do justice to
the external world by making his epistemology dependent upon
the mediation of the Idea through sense experience. He affirm¬
ed that the world has independent existence and is not merely
the self-objectification of Absolute Spirit. But the independ¬
ence which he confers upon the world is only a seeming
1. Ibid. JE, p. 582.
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independence. The Absolute, as ground and goal of world his¬
tory and of finite spirits, determines all that takes place
in history, according to immanent laws. Historical events
must be subjected to a logical critique before they may be
incorporated within the fund of knowledge. There is a con¬
fidence that the world of scientific study will accord with
rationally-conceived logical forms. There is no provision
for novel or arbitrary occurrence in experience, but all
existence must conform to a logical necessity.
In a sense, this system lacks the element of tran¬
scendence In Hegel's philosophy. In that Hegel's Absolute
transcended the finite particulars of the world which were
moments of its realization. In Biedermann*s epistemology the
world of finite particulars must eternally exist as the inde¬
pendent vehicle for the expression of the Absolute, in spite
of his reference to final goals. Hence, he has no genuine con¬
cept of teleology or immortality. The soul is the ideal side of
the body and is necessary to give meaning to consciousness;
but It ha3 no priority over the body or persistence beyond It,
Biedermann made a distinction between God and the world to
provide for the psychological experience of aspiration toward
1. Ibid, I, p. 664.
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the Divine, hut he did not ascribe to God that transoendenoe
shioh could give Him creative control over the world or assure





The fruits of speculative theology, plucked from
the tree of German Idealism, were made current in Britain
largely through the theological writings of Samuel Taylor
Coleridge (1772-1834). It was his express desire to bring
to the attention of his countrymen an interpretation of the
works of Kant, Eiohte and Schelling. 1 In this role he
introduced to British theology a liberalizing tendency which
had not been significantly manifest prior to his time. 2
Together with Thomas Erskine, he exercised a commanding in¬
fluence upon the development of the Broad Church party in
Anglicanism. Although he was a staunch defender of the
orthodox doctrines of the Church of England, he brought to
them a new ideational or ♦spiritual' interpretation. He was
not content to accept an authoritarian religion, but demanded
that religious truth should be in accord with the principles
1. Coleridge, Biographia Literarla. p. 94,
2. Hunt, Religious Thought in England, p. 92.
"Coleridge helped most in the transition to a new era."
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of reason and science. 1
Coleridge endeavoured to unite reason and revelation,
in his view that the reason is a power which sees by its own
light. He accepted the Kantian definition of the understanding
as the faculty of judging according to the data of sense per¬
ception; but in similar vein to Jacobi, he differed with Kant's
definition of the reason. For Coleridge, reason does not have
a mere formal or regulative function but it perceives, immed¬
iately, the highest objects of knowledge, viz., the spiritual:
The spiritual (corresponds) to the will and the reason,
that is, to the finite will reduced to harmony with,
and in subordination to, the reason, as a ray from that
true light which is both reason and will, universal
reason, and will absolute. 2
Reason is in fact a part of the image of God in man. 3
Anterior to his study of the German idealists,
Coleridge's thought was grounded in the Platonic idealist
tradition. 4 In his Treatise on Method. 5 he follows the
pattern of Plato's architectonic of Ideas:
1. Coleridge, Aids to Reflection, p. 74. "He who
begins by loving Christianity, better than truth, will proceed
by loving his own sect or church better than Christianity, and
end in loving himself better than all."
2. Ibid, p. 23. Cf., Ibid, p. 161. "Reason is the power
of universal and necessary convictions, the source and substance
of truths above sense, and having their evidence in themselves."
3. Ibid, p. 107.




From the first, or initiative Idea, as from a seed,
successive Ideas germinate......Method, requires not
only the proper choice of an initiative, but also the
following it out through all its ramifications.
The essence of things are not united by accident, but by an
Idea. Idea and law are correlative terms. There are gradations
of Ideas, the highest class being the metaphysical and the
spiritual. Theology stands at the summit of human knowledge.
In true idealist fashion, Coleridge conceives of an ultimate
truth as standing at the apex of all Ideas. He queries,
And is not he the truly virtuous and truly happy man,
who seizing first and laying hold most firmly of the
great first Truth, is guided by that divine light through
all the meandring and stormy courses of his existence? 1
In grasping the ultimate Truth, mind is not passive but it is
undergoing a process of self-realization. Human imaginative
powers are the repetition, by the finite mind, of the eternal
act of creation in God. 2
In The Statesman's Manual his idealism assumes a
more absolute, and thus immanent, character. The human mind
encompasses all laws and activities of outward nature, and
without the presence of the subject, all modes of existence
in the external world would be but flitting shadows.
The fact, therefore, that the mind of man in its own
primary and constituent forms represents the laws of
nature, is a mystery which of itself should suffice
1. Ibid, p. 14.
2. Biographia Literaria, p. 172
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to make us religious: for it is a problem of which
God is the only solution, God. the one before all,
and of all, and through all. *
That he is not here speaking in the language of the New
Testament but in that of idealist philosophy is clear when he
invites his readers to join with him in the prayer that we may
be able to find within ourselves that which cannot be found
elsewhere:
That one only true religion which elevateth knowing
into being, which is at once the science of being,
and the being and the life of all genuine science. 2
Coleridge shared with Schelling the confidence that
there is a perfect correspondence between subject and object
in the process of knowing. He writes,
All knowledge rests on the coincidence of an object
with a subject For we can know only that which is
true; and the truth is universally placed in the
coincidence of the thought with the thing, of the
representation with the object represented. 3
The sum of all that is objective he calls nature and the sum
of the subjective is self or intelligence. He regards the two
as antitheses, but he is unwilling to concede that they should
for ever remain so. The perfecting of natural philosophy
would consist in the •spiritualizing1 of the laws of nature
into those of intellect:
1. Coleridge, The Statesman's Manual. Append. B, p.465
2. Ibid. Append. B, p. 472.
3. Biogranhla Literaria. p. 150.
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The theory of natural philosophy would then be completed;
when all nature was demonstrated to be identioal in essence
with that which, in its highest known power, exists in man
as an intelligence, and as self-consciousness; when the
heavens and the earth shall declare, not only the power of
their Maker, but the glory and presence of their God. 1
In Coleridge's opinion, man's belief that things exist
outside him can never be more than a prejudice which he dogmatic¬
ally affirms. But because this prejudice is universally held
and is accepted as unquestioningly as the existence of the self,
the transcendental philosopher is obliged to accept the situ¬
ation and to try to offer some explanation. He does so by
making the assumption that there is a correspondence of subject
and object, and that things outside us must unconsciously be
involved in the knowing mind. If this be called idealism, then
it is at the same time the most binding realism. The true
realism maintains that
the object which it beholds or presents to itself,
is the real and the very object. In this sense,
however much we may strive against it, we are all
collectively born idealists, and therefore, and
only therefore, are we at the same time realists. 2
Coleridge abides firmly by his conviction that truth must be
correlative with being.
He moves beyond the subject-object antithesis to posit
an absolute, independent truth which is founded upon itself and
1. Ibid, p. 152.
2. Ibid, p. 155.
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does not require to be mediated. This Absolute is not to be
found in either subject or object alone:
As no other third is conceivable, it must be found in
that which is neither subject nor object exclusively,
but thai which is the identity of both. 1
The identity, however, is not Schelling's indifference point.
The Absolute is a Subject, which becomes such by objectifying
itself to itself, but which is never an object except for
itself. It carries on a process of self-objectification with¬
out ever ceasing to be self-identical. Coleridge's Absolute,
although neither subject nor object exclusively, is more
intimately related to the subjective-consciousness of man than
to the objective world. It is through subjective consciousness
that we attain to a conception of the Absolute and of the unity
of knowing and being:
If we elevate our conception to the absolute self, to
the great eternal I AM, then the principle of being,
and of knowledge, of idea, and of reality; the ground
of existence, and the ground of the knowledge of
existence, are absolutely identical. 2
The transcendental philosopher does not ask what ground of
knowledge lies outside our knowing, but only what is the last
element in our knowing itself. "We proceed from the SELF, in
order to lose and find all self in God." ® The natural
1. Ibid, p. 157.
2. Ibid, p. 158.
3. Ibid, p. 160.
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philosopher, likewise, does not deal with objects lying outside
the principle of knowing, which stand in a relation of 'unknow¬
able' cause to experiential realities. He too finds that the
principle of knowing and of being are identical and therefore
must inhere in an Absolute. 1
In spite of his philosophical interests, Coleridge
did not believe that Christianity is a theory or speculation,
but a life. It is a life motivated by a spiritual principle,
implanted by God, and capable of surviving the natural life.
The validity of the Christian faith is established in the fact
that it is suited to our human needs. Christian truth would
remain unshaken even if the Bible and all historical traditions
were out off. As we read the Biblical record of the workings
of the Word and Spirit, the influence of the same Spirit in
our own beings enables us to discern and understand the working
of the Spirit upon men in the Bible.2 Coleridge finds that
revealed religion is in accord with his own philosophical
presuppositions:
Revealed religion (and I know of no religion not
revealed) is in its highest contemplation the unity,
that is, the identity or co-inherence, of Subjective
and Objective. It is in itself, and irrelatively, at
once inward Life and Truth, and outward Fact and
Luminary. 3
1. Ibid, p. 161.
2. Coleridge, Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit, p. 606.
3. Ibid, p. 62l
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Religion has its objective historical and ecclesiastical pole,
and also its subjective and spiritual pole.
The Scriptures express that which is employed in all
science. Science whispers that which religion utters as with
the voice of a trumpet. "As sure as God llveth, i3 the pledge
and assurance of every positive truth, that is asserted by the
reason." 1 With his belief that the actual and the real are
one, Coleridge had little difficulty with the idea of pre¬
destination as presented in the Scriptures. Both the necessary
truths of science and acts of human volition are always in
conformity with the Divine Providence:
In the Bible every agent appears and acts as a self-
subsisting individual; each has a life of its own, and
yet all are one life. The elements of necessity and
free-will are reconciled in the higher power of an
omnipresent Providence, that predestinates the whole
in the moral freedom of the Integral parts.... The
root Is never detached from the ground. It is God
everywhere: and all creatures conform to his decrees. 2
The power, love and wisdom of God fills and shines through
the whole of nature and human life. 5
Coleridge, however, does not wish to be classed as
a pantheist. He speaks out against the brand of pantheism
common among romanticist poets such as Wordsworth. There was
a tendency among the romanticists to think of the omnipresence
of the Divine in any sense but the legitimate one, viz., 'the
1. The Statesman's Manual, p. 431.
2. Ibid, p. 4W>
3. Ibid, Append. A, p. 462.
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presence of all things to God.' In the pantheism of the
romanticists he finds that
there is an inward withdrawing from the personal being
of God, a. turning of the thoughts exclusively to the
so-called physical attributes, to the omnipresence in
the counterfeit form of ubiquity, to the immensity, the
infinity, the immutability; ...the attributes of space
with a notion of power as their substratum. ... a Fate,
in short not a moral creator and governorJ 1
He protests, in similar vein, that the idea of God held by
natural theologians is often little different from the idea
of the law of gravitation. But although man's head may thus
incline toward a doctrine of pantheism, Coleridge is never¬
theless confident that his heart and moral nature ever whisper
that we qiust conceive of a better and higher than ourselves. 2
God is immanent in the laws of nature but He is also tran¬
scendent and independent of His modes of being. He has an
inner life of His own which is superior to that which is
revealed in His universe.
Coleridge brought to British theology an impulse
toward the ingratiating of theology with the modern scientific
temper. He tried to show that religion, and particularly the
Christian religion, was germane to the needs of the human soul.
He popularized that approach to the Scriptubes and tradition
which would seek in a 'religious idea' the spiritual truth
1. Aids to Reflection, p. 317.
2. The Philosophical Lectures, p. 127.
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behind the form in which religion has been mediated and
historically developed.^- He affirmed that revealed religion
is not the imposition of an external creed but the revelation
of religious truths and values which are properly the poss¬
ession of man, the element of the Divine within him. A final
clue to the motive and character of his theology may be dis¬
covered in a passage from The Statesman's Manual in which he
reveals his fundamental idealism: 2
0 what a mine of undiscovered treasures, what a new
world of power and truth would the Bible promise to
our future meditation, if in some gracious moment one
solitary text of all its inspired contents should but
dawn upon us in the pure untroubled brightness of an
idea, that most glorious birth of the God-like within
us, which even as the light, its material symbol,
reflects itself from a thousand surfaces, and flies
home to its Parent Mind enriched with a thousand forms,
itself above form and still remaining in its own
simplicity and identity.
B. Maurice
The germinal and suggestive thought of Coleridge
had a direct influence upon P. D. Maurice (1805-1872), whom
we may consider as a leading representative of the Broad
Church party in mid-nineteenth century Anglican theology.
1. Storr, The Development of English Theology, p. 195.
"Coleridge was one of the first in England to apply to the Bible
the categories of life and development."
2. Page 450f.
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The party included such theologians as Stanley, Thos. Arnold,
Robertson, Hare and Kingsley. From a position outside Church
theology, Carlyle entertained similar views and exerted a
like influence. The Broad Church party in contrast with the
conservative Evangelical and Anglo-Catholic parties, was
sympathetically disposed toward the current# of European thought.
Maurice believed, with Coleridge, in the trustworthi¬
ness of rational or spiritual experience in mediating truth.
0m
He held that religious truth does not come to man from without,
but God is the educator of the soul. Although the span of
Maurice's theological writing encompassed the period of the
publication of Essays and Reviews, with its radical Biblical
criticism, and the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species,
he did not show an inclination to come directly to grips with
the new scientific concepts. 1 His thought none the less
exerted an influence upon a number of other men who were moved
to deal with the relation of theology to the rising tide of
scientific investigation. Maurice pointed the way toward the
apologetic writings of Lux Mundi.
It was a fundamental principle of Maurice that the
Divine is very near to man and to the natural order of the
world:
1. Wood, Frederick Denison Maurice, p. 16.
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If man is capable of knowing God, it must be because
there is that in him, that in every cart of his being,
whioh responds to something in God. r
Without the divine order, hidden as it may be, nothing which
we behold in the natural order has any meaning or substance.
The will of God is the law of the universe and that will is
absolutely good. Although man does not create a revelation,
there is that within him which demands a revelation. The
revelation may come to him through the mediation of various
natural channels:
The message may come through any man's voice, through
the parent, the wife, the child It may reach us
through the letter of a book, or through music, or
through a picture. It may be brought to us through
the glory of a sunset or the darkness of a night. It
may come by fervent expectations or by bitter dis¬
appointment, by calm joy, or by intense anguish of body
or soul. But the source is ever the same Living Word
of God. 2
Maurice is willing to regard all religions of the
world with tolerance, as they are all manifestations of the
one religious ground. ® The conviction of the Buddhist that
his human spirit must in some manner be Divine, reaches its
justification in Christianity. The great moral and religious
leaders of the ages owe their inspiration to the same source
as the Christian of today. He could say;
1. Maprice, faith and Action (an anthology) p. 184
2. Ibid. P. 2577:
3. Maurice, The Religions of the World, p. 216.
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The conscience and reason of Marcus Aurelius could not
have been called forth - as I believe yours and mine
oannot be - by any less divine Teacher than the one whom
he confessed but knew not how to name. 1
A common ground among all mankind for the appropri¬
ation of the Divine is the conscience. There are distinctive
laws among various peoples, just as there are separate
languages, but the common homage to Law, lying beneath respect
for particular laws, is found in all races. This common
homage, or fact of conscience, is not only the distinctively
2
♦human* within man but the Divine within him as well. The
conscience witnesses to a supremacy over us that is of a
personal character rather than to an impersonal power belonging
to the very structure of the world. He says,
I do not proceed from the world to myself; but from
myself to the world; I know of its governor only so
far as I know of mine. 3
The awareness of God which a man has within himself is his
only ground for positing the power and presence of God in the
world without.
Maurice stressed the point that the Bible represents
God as the Father of a family. It is this sacred truth whioh
1. Maurice, Social Morality, p. 225.
2. Maurice, The ConscienceT p. 136. "Law carries with
it for the Conscience a witness of divinity even when those who
administer it have become devilish."
3. Ibid, p. 137.
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strengthens the concept of brotherhood among men. 1 The
concept of God as Father can prevent us from bowing before a
vague 'world* in pantheistic fashion. In the intellectual
questings of men of every culture he finds that
the temptation of one and all has been, to
form an abstraction which is called a God, and which
may be anything, everything, nothing. The witness
in all these hearts has been — It cannot be so that
we arrive at Divinity. There must be the sons of a
God. An abstraction, a generalization cannot be their
Father. 2
In Maurice the emphasis upon the Fatherhood of God was not
only a defence against pantheistic doctrine but it was also
a reaotion against the stern transcendentalism of an older
theology. It suited the temper of the nineteenth century to
regard God in terms less austere and remote.
The Incarnation was held central in Maurice's
theology, as the supreme example of the eternal union of God
with man. The divine Logos has always been present in man.
If Christological doctrine has become dull and arid to many
minds it is because they have ceased to believe that Christ
is the source of all light and all righteous thought and
1. Wood, op. cit., p. 23. "The Victorian era in
religious thought is marked by a transference of interest and
emphasis from the sovereignty to the fatherhood of God, from
the doctrine of the Atonement to the doctrine of the Incarnation,
from the concern for personal to the concern for social
salvation.n
2. Maurice, Theological Essays, p. 74.
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actions within man. * Christ is not One whom we have created,
nor is He within our control; yet He belongs to each and every
one of us. Maurice confesses,
Apart from Him, I feel that there dwells in me no good
thing; but I am sure that I am not apart from Him, nor
are you, nor is any man. 2
Faith in an actual Son of God must not be absorbed into an
abstract philosophical theory, but must rest upon a revelation
which is vindicated in experience. Wherever the belief is held
that Jesus of the Gospels is the express image of God, after
which man himself is created, there we find all that is pure
and moral in our convictions. God could only show himself to
man in a Person, and in the New Testament He unveils Himself
in the perfectly moral Person of Christ. Christ is the root
and the fulfilment of all that justice, sincerity and fidelity
3
which exists partially in any man or nation.
Jesus Christ atones for man's sin by the influence
of His moral perfection and by His manifestation of the Divine
love. Maurice affirms that his own theology "rests on the
Eternal Love, which overlooks all distinctions and embraces the
universe. 4 Christ, by His death, did not bear the substitute
penalty of human sin but He delivered men from their sins by
teaching them of the love of God whereby their separation from
1. Ibid, p. 50.
2. Ibid. p. 58.
3. Social Morality, p. 403.
4. Theological Essays, p. 115.
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Him may be ended. The Resurrection of Christ was not a super¬
natural event which lies outside the possibilities of genuine
human nature:
The Resurrection from the dead is a resurrection for us
as well as for Him; it has vindicated man's true con¬
dition, not subverted it. i
The Ascension proves that Christ was not bound to the conditions
of space; and therefore space cannot divide us from Him. As
spirits, we are constantly united with Him. The Last Judgment
of Christ is not to take place at a distant time which is
transcendently remote from us, but we stand before His tribunal
now in our innermost beings.
Maurice taught that the inspiration of the Bible is
not generioally unlike the inspiration which God bestows upon
us now. We are able to hear Christ speaking directly to our
hearts today:
He can teach us without a theory of Inspiration,
which is taking the place, it is to be feared, in
very many minds, not only of faith in Inspiration,
but of faith in Him. 2
Rational views of Biblieal inspiration lack a proper belief in
the Holy Spirit. While rejecting a generalized rational view
of inspiration, Maurice does not represent the Holy Spirit as
acting now and then at special times and places and in some
particular individuals. It is true that there may appear to
1. Ibid, p. 223.
2. Ibid, p. 260.
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be unique periods in history when the Spirit is working out a
new heaven and a new earth;
But such moments, however surprising they may seem to
us, obey some fixed law, and are connected by close,
however invisible, links, and denote the action and
inspiration of One who is dwelling in the midst of us.
.....Thanks be to God for the witness whioh is born in
our day for the spirituality, not of a few men, but of
man as man. 1
The general indwelling of the Holy Spirit does not preolude
the concept of His personality, in Maurice's thought. The
concept of the Personality of the Holy Spirit prevents men
from bowing down to worship their own faculty of worship.
Concerning the doctrine of the Trinity, Maurice
states that every state of consciousness which he has dis¬
covered in man, together with each fact of revelation which
answers to it, points to the truth in Trinitarian doctrine.
We do not have to secure the validity of the doctrine through
appeals to Scripture, tradition or philosophical inferences,
all of which are beyond the scope of the way-faring man. The
Name of the Trinity is "implied in our thoughts, acts, words,
in our fellowship with each other.2 Each part of the Name of
the Trinity answers to some aspect of human nature, and of the
nature of the universe as well.3 It is therefore false to set
1. Ibid, p. 286. 2. Ibid, p. 315.
3. Social Morality, p. 246. "According to the Christian
Creed the Authority of the Father, the Obedience of the Son,
lies at the root of the universe, is implioit in its consti¬
tution. In a living Spirit the Authority and the Obedience
are for ever united."
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one part of the Name over against another part, a process
which has been the cause of so much theological strife. The
Trinity is not a theological tenet which is the special
interest of theologians alone. "The Trinity is the
ground on which the Church stands and on which Humanity
stands." 1
Maurice believed that the Gospel of God's love
applies to all men and that divine punishments are but instru¬
ments of His love. The love of God is reflected in human love
and is, in fact, its substance. (It was this universalism
which cost Maurice his professorship at King's College,London).
He advanced the view, in his Theological Essays, that there is
no eternal life nor eternal death in the acoepted orthodox
sense:
The eternal life is the righteousness, and truth, and
love of God which are manifested in Christ Jesus; mani¬
fested to men that they may be partakers of them. 6
These are gifts of God which are always surrounding man's life
and he requires only Christ's manifestation of them to be
stimulated to participation in them. On the other hand,
eternal punishment is the deprivation of these benefits:
1. Theological Essays, p. 335,
2. Ibid, p. 315. "The charity of God may find its
reflex and expression in the oharity of man, and the charity
of man its substance as well as its fruition in the charity
of God."
3. Ibid, p. 340.
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The eternal punishment is the punishment of being
without the knowledge of God, who is JLove, and of
Jesus Christ, who has manifested it. 1
Eternity, in relation to God, has nothing to do with duration;
it is a generioally different quality of life. Maurice was
unwilling to project either eternal reward or punishment to a
time and place transcendent to present human life relation¬
ships.
A characteristic doctrine of Maurice was that the
Kingdom of Christ is to be realized here and now. He was a
champion of the immanental conception of a 'realized*
eschatology. He took practical steps to effect his conviction
in his promotion of the Christian Socialist Movement in
England. In The Kingdom of Christ he characterizes the Church
of England as a true incorporation of the fellowship of the
Kingdom because it teaches the full truth concerning the
Gospel, sacraments and form of the Church. The Kingdom,
however, is universally latent within mankind even where men
are not striving to bring about its corporate realization in
a Church or social order. He says,
That the Kingdom of Heaven is within us, not through some
effort of ours to believe in it, but because it has always
been - when we knew it and dreamed of it least, - I am
more and more convinoed. 2
1. Ibid, p. 341.
2. Faith and Action, p. 225.
159
The proclamation of the Divine Kingdom, that the Son of God
has appeared and will hereafter be Lord of the universe, is an
announcement which is never outmoded, "because it is a proclam¬
ation of the eternal Law of the universe, which wears not out,
which grows not old." 1
In The Kingdom of Christ he countered the conviction
of the Quakers that ecclesiastical and liturgical forms have
no place in religious life. Reason may indeed be the one
faculty of man which is able to comprehend the Being who tran¬
scends space and time, but all of man's other faculties are
under the conditions of space and time. In view of this latter
consideration,
It would be nothing strange or contradictory if the
facts which embodied the revelation should be such
as at once presented him to all the faculties which
we possess, and enabled that highest one to realise
its own peculiar prerogative of looking through them. 2
The old Catholic Church, and latterly the Reformers, set up
Churches or Kingdoms because they could not see how else God's
purpose could be realized in the actual world. The Book of
the Acts describes the founding of a spiritual society within
the framework of this present world. The Book of Revelation
describes a Kingdom of Heaven upon the earth, to which all
kingdoms are meant to be in subjection.
1. The Religions of the World, p. 242.
2. Maurice. The Kingdom of "cKrist. I, p. 179.
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The idea of the Scriptures is that Jesus Christ came
upon earth to reveal a kingdom, which kingdom is founded
upon a union established in His person between man and
God, between the visible and invisible world, and
ultimately upon a revelation of the divine Name. 1
That the establishment of the Kingdom involved miracles,
according to the Bible, does not take away from its this-earth]y
character and design. If Christianity is a religion which is
to satisfy the dreams of past ages and to show to all future
ages the lav/ which is to govern them, and the Giver of that
law, then it is difficult to conceive how such a religion
could enter the world without miracles. 2
In the New Testament we do not read about a
freligion* but of a "Kingdom of Heaven! Where we first hear
of it in the words of John the Baptist, it is announced as
being at hand. Men were therefore taught that Christ came to
unveil the Divine life, of which human life in its social
condition and circumstances was to be the image, reformed in
terms of the higher life. The principle of the Kingdom of
Heaven, that the Chief of all must become the servant of all,
is the foundation for an ethic which is demanded by the very
relationships of the human family. 3
In Roman times the Christians, like the Imperialists,
recognized a supreme will as the ground of order for man. But
1. Ibid. I, p. 261.
2. ma*; II, p. 159.
3. Social Morality, p. 246.
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the absolutism of the Christians' creed, concerning the
relation of God to his creatures, was such that the Church
could not exist side by side with the Roman state without
conflict:
That a Fatherly Will is at the root of Humanity and
upholds the Universe was the announcement which shook
the dominion of capricious daemons and the throne of an
inexorable fate in the Roman Empire. 1
It was inevitable that the Christian creed should take shape
in a worldly corporate society and that it should challenge
every other visible order. If the Kingdom of Heaven is not
conoerned with the reformation and regeneration of the world,
then Maurice believes that Christians have been imposing a
lie upon their fellow men.
It is not necessary for us to dream ourselves into
some imaginary past or Utopian future to rectify our social
morality. We must rather hold fast to our own present
professions of moral conviction, and believe in what we utter
when we are most earnest. Then we may uncover the principle
of self-sacrifice whioh is latent within us, and which lies
at the root of humanity itself. This basic principle supplies
the foundation for all national equity and freedom. If we
cling to this and similar innate principles of morality,
there will be discovered, beneath all the politics of
the Earth, sustaining the order of each country,
1. Ibid, p. 26.
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upholding the charity of each household, a City
which has foundations whose builder and maker is
God. It qiust be for all kindreds and races " i
Consequently, Christianity must wage war upon all sectarian
and all imperialistic divisions within human society, in
order to further the universal fellowship of humanity in terms
of the Christian ethic, i.e.. within the Kingdom of Heaven.
In spite of the faot that Maurice gave central
prominence to the principle of the union of the human and the
Divine represented by Christ, and its present realization in
the Kingdom, he did not wish to support an apotheosis of
humanity. He did not believe that the Divine is based in any
way upon the human, but that the very opposite is true.2 He
held that the prevailing form of unbelief in his day was "the
tendency to look upon all theology as having its origin in the
spiritual nature and faculties of man." 3
While Maurice left room for the creative Divine
sovereignty and eschewed pantheistic doctrine, the purport of
his work was to make the Divine more at home in the world.
His Christian Socialism was an emphasis which continued to
1. Ibid, p. 413f.
2« Ibid, p. 102. "I can value every conception which
men have formed about a union between the human and divine.
I can see why those conceptions must become false when they
assume the human as the ground of the divine."
3. The Religions of the World, p. 245.
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grow throughout the nineteenth century, and its activistic
outlook is a distinctive feature of present-day Christianity.
In criticism, it must be pointed out that Maurice's
emphasis upon the relevancy of the Gospel to the human situ¬
ation was made at the expense of weakening the distinctiveness
of the Christian faith in relation to other religions, and by
making its benefits indecisive. If Christ is already united
with every man, whether he knows it or not, the Gospel
revelation offers only a stimulation to the latent divine
potentialities of the human spirit. Rationalistic idealism
had prevented Maurice from accepting transcendental doctrines
of revelation, redemption and eschatology.
C. Martineau
James Martineau (1805-1900), the outstanding
Unitarian theologian of the last century, may be included
among those who were influenced by Coleridge. With the freedom
of thought encouraged in his tradition, his interpretation of
religion was more closely related to philosophical and psycho¬
logical studies than was the case with Maurice. He approached
theology with the attitude of a reverent religious spirit
rather than from the standpoint of confessional loyalty.
Martineau believed that the immediate presence of
God may be perceived in the laws of our rational nature; but
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he Is not on that account to be classed as an idealist* 1 He
did not place exclusive emphasis upon thought. God is power
and love as well as wisdom. The external world is not merely
the object of a thinking subject; it is the result of the
causal activity in space of an omnipresent loving and
intelligent Will. Martineau was convinced that no monistic
scheme, beginning from the standpoint of nature, self, or God
2
could adequately explain the facts of our nature and life.
The external world is a reality which limits and resists our
volitional activity.
Martineau would determine the common element persist¬
ing through all forms of religion and credulities of undeveloped
reason, and in this element, discover the point of contact
between man and God;
To this universal essence of all religion we must resort
as the shrine at which human appeal and Divine response
are in contact with each other, and whispers pass and
flashes gleam from behind the veil of the Infinite. °
It is within our conscience that we are able to distinguish
between the religious and the non-religious. Only that which
inspires us with enthusiastic trust, speaks to us in religious
tones. No one can sincerely worship either nature beneath him
1. Upton, Dr. Martlneau's Philosophy, p. xxxvii.
2. Martineau. Types of Ethical Theory. II, p. 5.
3. Martineau, A Study of Religion. I. p. xxiii.
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or a thought within him. As long as we are detained by our
own thought we are not religious. We must come to the point
where we recognize that our ideals, which point beyond us, are
the 'real', "the abiding presence and persuasion of the Soul
of souls. ** 1
If we live in union with God, we must touch God at
many points, for our beings are complex:
We suffer, we think, we will; what we feel is the
pressure of his laws; what we know is the order of his
reality; what we choose is from his possibilities: and
how can there fail to be a path to him from the sensi¬
tive, the intellectual, and the moral passage of our
history? 2
The emotions of wonder, admiration and reverence further reveal
the ideal essence, speaking to us respectively of causal Thought,
divine Beauty and transcendent Personality. These objects lie
beyond the sphere of phenomena and attest to the existence of
a sphere of spiritual realities. But Martineau insists that
whatever higher inspiration visits our world, it must do so
through the organs of our nature. It must use our receptive
capacity and mingle with our existing thoughts. He finds, in
the fact that men are often deflected into a course of action
sublimer than their own highest dreams and ideals, a proof
that there is a transcendent, Divine will in control of human
life.
1- Ibid. I, p. 12.
2. Ibid. I, p. 16.
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Martineau characterized natural religion as a human
elaboration in which a number of steps are placed between our¬
selves and God, by a method of mediate knowledge. Revelation,
on the other hand, is immediate and intuitive. It is therefore
first in the order of thought; and it is only in the subsequent
history of its influence that it is rendered amenable to the
conceptions of natural religion. The Divine life imparted by
revelation exists in various intensities within men, and in a
more or less veiled form. With some it may consist of vague
impersonal ideals and dim yearnings, while others may feel
themselves to be brought into the personal presence of the
supremely Holy. But to all, the immediate experience of God
in revelation declares the reality of God both within and
beyond the world and its conditions:
The immediate self-disclosure of God to the human spirit,
.....carries in it the consciousness of a present Infinite
and Eternal, behind and above as well as within all the
changes of the finite world. It brings us into contact
with a Will beyond the visible order of the universe, of
a Law other than the experienced consecution of phenomena,
of a Spirit transcending all spirits. 1
There are transcendental relations implicit within the char¬
acteristics of human consciousness, in reason, conscience and
affection, which cannot be covered by any conceptions borrowed
from sensible experience, but which must be recognized as
1. Martineau, The Seat of the Authority in Religion.
p. 311.
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indications of a capacity to receive revelation.
It is peculiarly within conscience, however, that we
find the germ of a piety with a transcendent reference. As
moral agents, we are not objects within nature but transcend
it in causal activity. At the same time, we ourselves ex¬
perience a moral dependence upon the universal Cause, which
is not felt in the coarse of sensible experience. Ethics must
therefore be treated before religion, because they contain
implicitly the resources from which religion draws its char¬
acteristics and its glories. 1 Moral consciousness is a basis
of communion between man and God which has always been a
possibility, although unfortunately it has not always been
completed in the conscious answer of the worshipper:
So does the law of righteousness spring from its
earthly base and embrace the empire of the heavens,
the moment it becomes a communion between the heart
of man and the life of God. *
When God is regarded as bearing a holy partnership with the
conflicts of our humanity than ethics may be saved from the
cold light of a metaphysical theory.
Although the authority of conscience is known by the
self, it cannot be created by the self. We cannot repeal the
compunctions of the conscience. While the act of perception
1. A Study of Religion. I, p. 18.
2. Ibid, I, p. 2(j.
168
reveals an * other* than ourselves; the act of conscience
reveals a 'Higher' than ourselves:
We know ourselves to be living under command, and
with freedom to give or withhold obedience; and
this lifts us at once into divine relations, and
connects us with One supreme in the distinguishing
glories of personal existenoe, wisdom, justioe,
holiness. 1
Conscience is the overflowing of the holiness of the Divine
I&nd. Our moral natures are not intelligible unless we see
in them a response to an objective Holy Law which pervades
the universe.
Relative to us, God is identical with the superlative
of all that we reverence. He is the summit of everj man's
conscience. If we wish to make conscience the interpreter of
God we have but to contemplate the elements of moral perfection,
and these are the attributes which we may ascribe to God. God
is likewise the informing authority of moral society, and the
lineaments of His nature are to be seen in the corporate life
of righteousness:
The moment the two truths are apprehended, of the
spiritual unity of our nature, and of the All-
righteous as its Source and Head, the idea inevitably
1. The Seat of Authority in Religion, p. 70.
2. Ibid. p. 75. "The causality of the world.........
s at the disposal of the all-holy Will; and whether within
s or without us, in the distant stellar spaces or in the
elf-conscious life of the tempted or aspiring mind, we are
n one divine embrace, - 'God over all, blessed for ever •
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follows of our united human life as constituting
a kingdom of God: for it has no binding laws that
are not His: no" offences, that are not sins: no
just penalties, that are not expressions of His
will: no noble passages of history, that are not
the march of His advancing Providence. The
Theocratic conception of Society rests upon
indestructible foundations in our nature, and must
for ever return, unless that nature becomes atheistic. 1
The moral consciousness which establishes the point
of contact between man and God is also the ground of man's
freedom. The volitional nature of moral beings saves them
from pantheistic absorption. A moral being stands within his
own sphere, "a free cause other than the Divine, yet homo¬
geneous with it." 2 A man cannot even declare himself a
pantheist without self-contradiction; for in so doing, he
indicates that he has an independent assertive power which
deals with the not-self as objective. There is actually a
fundamental duality of causation exercised by God and man which
eliminates a simple identification of the two. God has created
us with power to act as causes, and, for a season, He has given
us faculties of freedom. "He may be the cause of all our
possibilities without being responsible for our actualities." 3
If God is immanent in the various aspects of our
conscious life, this does not exclude the fact of his
1. A Study of Religion, II, p. 47.
2. tbld. It, P. 16".
3. Tbld. II, p. 168.
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transcendence as well. There may be no epistemologieal need
for any domain lying beyond the phenomena we see and feel to
serve as a receptacle for God; but, at the same time,Martineau
feels that it is impossible for nature to swallow up the
supernatural. The genuine theist holds to a conception of God
in which the Divine Being is greater than the sphere in which
He is said to be immanent:
It is sufficient for him, if God be somewhere more than
the contents of nature, and overpass them in his being,
action and perfection. Let this condition only be saved,
there is no limit to the admissable identification of
what are called 'natural powers' with his, or of organic
purpose with his design. Hie pantheist, on the other
hand, makes no return for this concession to his favourite
conception of 'immanency': he can allow no 'transcendency':
the life with which he charges the universe has no actual
or possible existence but in the aggregate of finite things:
it speaks its whole being in the cosmic laws. The
opposition therefore lies between All-immanency and Some-
transcendency. *
Martineau takes his stand in favour of Some-transcendency.
There could be no truth at all in the immanent con¬
ception, he claims, unless the latter is conditional upon the
Transcendent. Changing phenomena could have no meaning save
in relation to the Permanent. The permanent objects of
theology and the changing objects of science co-exist. Theology
and natural science, with their respective spheres of study,
may therefore persist side by side:
1. Ibid. II, p. 142
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It is no hindrance to theology if the laws of phenomena
pursue their undeviating way: it is no hindrance to
science if the laws of nature are laws of God. 1
It is sufficient if we keep clearly in mind the 'distinction'
between the two fields of study. Nature is characterized by
birth and death, by an aggregate of objects, an organism of
intelligibles; while God is eternal, the infinite Subject and
Intellect of which nature is the expression.
In order to believe In God's transcendence to the
sphere of nature, it is not necessary to hold that He is
external to the world in tems of a spatial metaphor. All
cosmical forces may be regarded as media of His conscious
causality, and nature as the evolution of His thought. Belief
in the final causation of God does not involve a belief that
the locale of the Divine Mind is outside the objects which He
directs:
Why a supramundane Disposer should be obliged, in order
to carry out his purposes, to absent himself from the
scene and succession which he orders, and 'stand outside',
is altogether unintelligible. 2
Martineau insists that Christianity knows nothing of an
Absolute God abstracted from the living world. We can say
nothing about the Transcendent apart from our scientific,
religious, and moral experience. An adequate theism requires
1. Ibid. I, p. 8.
2. Ibid. I, p. 329.
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only that the immanence of God does not ahsorh the faculties
of human personality and that His transcendence does not stop
short at the limits of the cosmos, but stretches beyond it as
infinite possibility.
God, as Cause of the phenomena of the world,
possesses all power. This is not to affirm, however, that
there are no possible transcendent limits to His power:
From the finite we cannot legitimately infer the
infinite. When therefore we speak of God as almighty.
the epithet is, thus far, warranted only if it is
content to cover all the might there is. and must
not be understood to mean mighty for absolutely all
things.
It is a scholastic and artificial enterprise to ascribe
infinitude to God in a strictly metaphysical sense. It does
not imply any weakness in God to limit His attributes to their
actual manifestation in the finite world which He has created.
Since all causality is volitional, the aotual world is only
one of an unknown number which might have been brought into
being by its Author, had He so willed.
Because man inevitably thinks of the living energy
which he beholds in the physical universe in anthropomorphic
terms, there is a native provision for conceiving the doctrine
of monotheism. Man cannot help investing the forces of nature
with an identity similar to the pattern of his own identity.
1. Ibid. I, p. 375.
173
The intellectual dominance of his own personality will assure
the attribute of unity in his thought of the Divine. It would
require the experience of two or more universes to make poss¬
ible for thought the idea of more than one Divine Will as the
source of all things. 1
Martineau devotes considerable discussion to the
evolutionary hypothesis, which had made a far-reaching im¬
pression upon theology in the latter half of the nineteenth
century. He declares that the Immanent conception of growth
and development, although valid within limits, does not do
away with the need of transcendent causation. The lesser can-
not cause the greater. A cause must be measured in terms of
its most perfect rather than its most elementary effects. He
insists on regarding "consciousness and free-will as initiating
stages of evolution not deduoible from the preceding." 2 The
evolutionist may be able to effect a series which is empiric¬
ally successive, but it will be logically disconnected.
Martineau claims that it is Impossible to find the moral in
the immoral and the order of right in the order of might, as
the evolutionary theory would do. It is his sentence against
the theory that, "it subjugates character to science, instead
of freeing it into religion." 3 In so far as a theistic view
1. Ibid. II, p. 381.
2. Types of Ethical Theory. II, p. 398
3. iDld. II. p. 424.
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is made subject to the evolutionary theory it will inevitably
issue in a false immanence, i.e.. one which is not conditional
upon a realm of transcendence.
Concerning the person of Jesus Christ, Martineau took
a position not far removed from that of many liberal theologians
of his century who belonged to a Trinitarian tradition. The
Divine can be found, if anywhere, in what Jesus Christ was in
moral and spiritual character and in His relation to God.
Unfortunately, Christianity has come to mean some dootrine
about Christ rather than the religion of Jesus:
Christianity understood as the personal religion of
Jesus Christ, stands clear of all the perishable
elements, and realizes the true relation between
man and God. 1
Martineau believed that Jesus Himself made no pre¬
tensions beyond that of claiming to be the herald of the
Kingdom. In the religious sphere it is not necessary for a
revealer to know more than we, but that he should be better
than we, and so help us to approach the supreme Perfection.
Jesus Christ has given men help toward developing that capacity
of their souls whereby they are able to have an immediate
apprehension of God. He says,
If Jesus of Nazareth, in virtue of the characteristics
of his spirit, holds the place of the Prince of Saints,
and perfeots the conditions of the pure religious life,
1. The Seat of Authority in Religion, p. 651.
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he thereby reveals the highest possibilities of the
human soul, and their dependence on habitual commun¬
ion between man and God. 1
Afl we might expect from a Unitarian, Martineau avoids any
transcendent doctrine of Christ, but makes Him an outstanding
moral and spiritual representative of the race.
In Martineau we have seen a reaction against some
of the materialistic implicates of science and against the
pantheistic strain in idealism. By his assertion that the
Divine Being is not exhausted in His cosmic manifestations,
he reserves a sphere of transcendency. Yfith his ethical
idealism and the freedom of causation which he claims for
human beings, he resists a deterministic system - whether
materialistic or idealistic in character. Men are held to be
more than transient modes of God's eternal life, or
epiphenomena of the process of a material universe.
There was a strain of mysticism in Martineau*s
thought, with his characterization of God as the 'Soul of
souls', and his belief that man is in immediate contact with
God at other than rational approaches of human nature. In
the main, however, his position was that of an ethical
rationalism. Whatever other avenues of approach might be open
1. Ibid, p. 652.
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to God he would accept only a religion which was consonant
with reason and conscience. His assumption of a Transcendent
Deity was akin to Kant's moral postulate of the existence of
God. He would make no metaphysical assertion concerning the
transcendent being of God, other than to say that transcend¬
ence is necessary to assure our independent moral and
religious consciousness. In so far as we oan know the
Transcendent we must know His attributes in the moral and
religious experience of mankind1- in the ideals of truth,
beauty, righteousness and love.
1. Hunt, op. cit., p. 245. For Martineau "the religious





The idealism of Coleridge had been expressed in
scattered and often vague writings; consequently his influence
had consisted in the initiating of an impulse rather than in
the promotion of a system. It was in the latter part of the
century that doctrinaire idealism became a significant factor
in British thought through the writings of a group of neo-
Hegelians. This transplanting of German idealism to British
soil exerted a powerful influence upon British theology, an
influence which was maintained on into the twentieth century.
Thomas Hill Green (1836-1882) was perhaps the best
known of this group of idealists. His philosophy stemmed from
a primarily ethical interest in contrast with the more
theoretical preoccupation of the German idealists. He found
the basis for faith in God both in the intellectual and in the
moral nature of man. Our knowledge of the world pre-supposes
the existence of a self-conscious Subject in the universe Who
is the ground of all our knowing. Our moral striving after
ever higher and better forms of life is likewise evidence for
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the existence of a Best which is both the source and end of
our ethical life. Religion is the continual putting to death
of a lower and the coining to birth of a higher self, a truth
most effectively illustrated in the life and teachings of Jesus.
It can be seen from this that Green1s thought was teleologically
orientated throughout.1
The obvious fact of the transcendence of the human
mind over nature served as a basis for Green*s idealism. If
man were a being composed merely of natural forces he could not
form a theory about those forces, much less about himself.
Green asks, "Can the knowledge of nature be itself a part or
product of nature?" 2 This transcendence of the self over
nature, however, does not place the self out of relation to
nature. We never experience nature as a series of unrelated
objects; and therefore we must assume that there is a principle
in consciousness which corresponds with the bond of relation
existing among the objects of consciousness. That bond must
be rational or spiritual rather than material in character.
1. Works of Thomas Hill Green. Ill, p. xci {Intr.)
For Green, "God is the ultimate being or reality, that to which
we come when we think out what is implied in the existence of a
world to be known and a mind to know it, that of which there is
already a forecast in the most elementary factor of human ex¬
perience, and of which the fullest human experience is still
only a forecast."
2. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, p. 11.
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Nature is a system of related appearances; and related appear¬
ances would be impossible without the action of an intelligence.
Green shares the familiar protest of earlier ideal¬
ists against Kant's separation of appearances from a transcend¬
ent ground. He believes that the relationship among appear¬
ances does not depend upon inherence in an unknown ground but
in a knowing subject. Such idealism as this, he believes,
does not necessarily dispense with the concept of material
substance.
It is not denied that there are material substances,
but their qualification both as substances and as
material will be found to depend on relations. By a
substance we mean that which is persistent throughout
certain appearances. 1
But matter could not exist without mind, nature without the
non-natural. The self-distinguishing consciousness which is
necessary for the existence of material nature, Green calls a
'spiritual' principle. 2
Nothing can be termed 'outer' or objective save for
a consciousness. Therefore all the objective knowledge which
we humans are able to obtain only by stages, must have eternally
existed for a consciousness. Our acquisition of objective
knowledge is a growth toward this eternal consciousness.
The most primitive germ from which knowledge can be
developed is already a perception of fact, which implies
1. Ibid, p. 55.
2. Ibid, p. 56.
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the action upon successive sensations of a conscious¬
ness which holds them in relation, and which therefore
cannot itself be before or after them, or exist as
succession at all. *
Our consciousness thus develops as the reproduction or realiz¬
ation, under empirical conditions, of the eternal consciousness.
The latter, though not existing in time, is the condition of
there being an order in time. It cannot itself be the object
of experience but it is the condition of all our intelligible
experience. It has reproduced itself in man in suoh a manner
that although man is limited by an animal organism be is able
to be an object to himself. This ability we may distinguish
as the divine element within man.
Man expresses himself in relation to the manifold
world through both thought and desire. Will is the expression
for the union of thought and desire, as the subject strives
toward the realization of an idea. Man unfortunately can never
come to the completion of his striving toward fuller development,
and can speah only negatively of the state of moral perfection:
Yet the conviction that there must be suoh a state of
being, merely negative as is our theoretical apprehension
of it, may have supreme influence over conduct, in moving
us to that effort after the Better which, at least as a
conscious effort, implies the conviction of there being
a Best. 2
1. Ibid, p. 75.
2. Told, p. 180.
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God is the presupposition and end of the moral life.
The same divine principle of will, however, may make
the voluptuary seek self-gratifioation. Will in itself may be
bad. Green therefore makes the reason superior to will. Man's
innate consciousness of what he ought to be must be dominated
by the rational faculty:
With this consciousness directed in the right path, i.e.,
the path in whieh it tends to become what according to
the immanent divine law of its being it has in it to be
rests the initiative of all virtuous habit and
action. 1
If it seems presumptuous to speak of the Divine thus manifest¬
ing Himself in human subjects, it would be still more unreason¬
able to think of Him as realizing Himself in an entity to which
self-consciousness cannot be ascribed. It is man's distinct¬
iveness over nature that it is only in him that God realizes
Himself consciously.
The possibility of moral action demands the existence
of an eternal Subject Who is all that our temporally-existing
selves are able to become:
He is a Being in whom we exist; with whom we are in
principle one; with whom the human spirit is identical,
in the sense that He is all which the human spirit is
capable of becoming.a
The moral idea in man, no matter how vague or unfulfilled it
may be, is a communication of the idea as It is in God.
1. ifria. P. is®-
2. Ibid, p. 198.
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"Whatever else God may be, He contains within His being the
♦ideal' manhood; and man, on his part, possesses partial
divinity.
The moral reformer must possess an idea for moral
improvement which has never yet been actualized. This ideal
forever remains tantalizingly removed. As long as man continues
to have an animal nature with struggles and conflicts, a con¬
trast of degree will remain between himself and the Infinite
Spirit:
He must think of the infinite spirit as better than the
best that he can himself attain to, but (just for that
reason) as having an essential community with his own
best. *
At his very best, man must retain an attitude of reverence
before the infinitely Holy; but even so he will not forget
that his principle of self-development is within himself. If
it were possible for him to fully realize his potential
development, his bliss would be an intrinsic value and not
derived from any agency outside himself. The ultimate good
for man must be the full development of the human spirit.
Green's attitude toward the positive doctrines of
the Christian faith is avowedly that of a philosopher.
Christian doctrine must be transferred Into a philosophy and
1. Ibid, p. 329
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assimilated by the reason under the form of ideas. If religion
is to exist we must be able to imagine God in terms amenable
to the human understanding. The most adequate imagination of
Him is in the form of a man in whom the end of moral progress
has been fully attained.
Christ is the necessary determination of the eternal
subject, the objectification by this subject of
himself in the world of nature and humanity. I
The belief in the necessity of a Divine Incarnation under the
conditions of ordinary human life also carries with it the
demand that this Person should still be spiritually present to
us. The transition from historical manifestation to present
spiritual reality is most fully represented in the Fourth
Gospel, as compared with other Scripture. It is the most
spiritual of the Gospels in that the historic event of the
2
Incarnation is made rationally immanent. It is assumed by
Green that the historical is more certain when it has been
taken up into a moral and spiritual concept.
Green holds that God is identical with man at the
point of man's innate ideal. But this is not tantamount to
saying that God and man are identical in every respect, or
that God does not far supersede man in power and presence.
1. Works. Ill, p. 183
Ibid. Ill, p. 219.
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Green says,
We need not be frightened.....from the doctrine that
man is identical with God on the ground that it makes
God 'no more than man' the acorn is in poss¬
ibility identical with the oak, but the oak is nothing
to the acorn. 1
The identity of God with man consists in His being the con¬
dition of man's ability to be conscious of his own self, the
realization of man's determinate possibilities, and the
completion of all that is imperfect and unreal in man. The
identification is not one of equality.
God is Himself reason and His self-revelation is
reason. The revelation, however, is not given in abstract
categories but takes its form from, and gives life to, the
history of man. His revelation therefore is not given in a
day, or even in a century. But the revelation given in history
has to be immediately and subjectively appropriated through
reason:
It is in himself and in his thought, which yet is in
the truest sense a revelation, and yet a revelation
through Christian influence, that each one of us finds
God, if he find him at ail. 2
The great failing of theology has been to externalize God in
a mystery or in a Book. The original revelation must needs
have been given in historical events, but the only way in
which the revelatory values can be passed on is through
1. Ibid. Ill, p. 225f
2. Tbld. Ill, p. 244.
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rational ideas.
Green regards the nature of man as indivisible. His
moral and spiritual desire to be reconciled with God is one
and the same as his scientific impulse to know nature. The
two motives are bound together in the unitary spiritual nature
of man. Science should not then try to discredit reason or
the spiritual; the very existence of science is a witness to
the spiritual. The scientific sceptic should recognize that
just because the spirit is the source of all knowledge, it can¬
not be itself one of the objects of knowledge. ^
In view of the fact that the spiritual, or rational,
is the basis of man's scientific ability to study nature, we
should not expect to find the Supreme Spirit in outer nature,
but in the spiritual agent, i.e.. in man himself. We are able
to find God in countless phenomena of subjective mental activ¬
ity, and failure to do so is only a mark of spiritual obtuse-
ness:
It is our very familiarity with God's expression of
himself in the institutions of society, in the moral
law, in the language and inner life of Christians,
in our consciences, that helps to blind us to its
divinity. 2
In the most highly developed forms of the Christian religion,
awareness of God has reached a stage such that He is no longer
1. Ibid. HI. P. 265
2. Ibid. Ill, p. 270
186
perceived as an outer power but is conceived as reconciled
with man and indwelling. This is the point at whioh the true
Kingdom of the Spirit has been reached.
This account of Green's teleologioal idealism shows
that he left room for a qualified transcendence of God, in
that He is always beyond the actual Knowledge and perfection
attained by men at any point in time. But it is a transcend¬
ence of degree; God is identical with man in possibility. He
is ideally what man should become. On the other hand, God is
immanent within man as the rational ground of man's intellectual
and moral activity and as the ideal, of his self-realization.
This immanence is inferred rather than immediately experienced.
The Divine attributes cannot be Known except in the
form of human ideals of the highest in thought or moral action.
Transcendent attributes, or manifestations of transcendent
power, cannot be received in human experience, as long as
striving and process oontinue we cannot say that at any point
we have experienced God as he truly is. The knowledge of
nature which we possess never satisfies our rational desire
for complete reality. This unfulfilled desire is faith,1
which must stand as the bridge between ourselves and the
complete realization of God.
1. Ibid, III, p. xcix.
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Green's system was not tortuously built up by
logical processes to an absolute, as in the construction of
Hesel. He thus avoided in some measure the inclusive, pan¬
theistic character of Hegelianism. The teleolcgical movement
of Green's system makes the world and man not actually but
potentially Divine.
B. J. Caird
Another version of neo-Hegeiianism, more fully
developed along logical lines than that of Green, was advanced
in the writings of the Scottish theologian and philosopher,
John Caird (1820-1898). His position was shared in its main
details by his younger brother, Edward Caird, the noted inter¬
preter of Kant. John Caird reacted strongly against the
phenomenalism of modern science, which he considered to be an
inadequate basis for the unification of experience or explan¬
ation of the moral and spiritual life. Only a rational
organon could harmonize the divergent elements of life and
provide meaning to existence.
He directed a strong polemic against Herbert Spencer
on the ground of the letter's limitation of science to things
finite. * He acknowledges that Spencer retained a trace of
1. E. Caird gives a fuller discussion of Spencer's
agnosticism in The Evolution of Religion. I, pp. 96 ff.
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idealism in his belief in the Absolute as the presupposition
of experience. But in Caird's opinion Spencer's Absolute was
a mere phantom. It was postulated as a necessary basis of
experience but could be received in no experience. It was
merely the abstract background of phenomena, before which we
must have silent reverence. By maintaining an agnostic
attitude toward the Absolute, Spencer had thought that he
assured freedom to phenomenal science.
Caird tries to show that without first having a
rational Absolute, Spencer is not justified in bringing to¬
gether the two ideas, viz.. that knowledge is limited to
phenomena and that an Absolute must be postulated. He charges
that the theory of Spencer
first creates or conjures up a fictitious logical entity,
and then charges consciousness with imbecility because
of its inability to think that fiction. 1
An adequate view of the relation between thought and reality,
subject and object, sees an indissoluble unity between these
oorrelatives. No limit can be drawn between phenomena and an
unknown background, any more than we can separate the centre
of a circle from its circumference or one end of a stick from
the other. That which remains when we have separated thought
from an unknown something is not an Absolute^ but non-entity.
1. J. Caird, An Introduction to the Philosophy of
Religion, p. 19.
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Spencer's agnosticism concerning his transcendent Absolute
leaves his position practically indistinguishable from
materialistic science.
Caird holds that although individual mind may be
limited and contingent in its scope, universal mind must be
presupposed in all objective reality. The human mind must
find a permanent unity manifested in all thinking beings and
in all objects of thought. In such a rational Absolute, the
finite mind finds, not a limit to its thought, but its fullest
realization and freedom. Instead of ending with the negative
infinite of the unknowable, the rational and religious mind is
constrained by an inward impulse to rise to the higher Infinite,
which is re%-ealed in ail the riches of nature and human exper¬
ience. The Absolute requires our reverence because it extends
beyond the reaches of our thought, not because it is unknowable.
We must ooneeive of that in Him which lies beyond our knowledge,
as, though unknown, not unknowable." * To worship an unknow¬
able would be to turn away from all the concrete world of
thought and being to deify a thin logical abstraction.
The philosophy of the Absolute does not exclude
intuitive experience in the religious life; but its function
is to seek an explanation of the religious life in terms of a
Ibid, p. 27.
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deeper harmonizing unity than that which intuitive religion or
science discovers. Religion is thereby enriched and the finite
consciousness returns to union with the Infinite. The philo¬
sophical study of religion is not the thought of a finite
observer concerning the being of God and our relation to Him;
it is simply a self-conscious development in which the finite
mind finds its true self in the life of God. "God is not
proved or known by anything foreign to His own being. He
reveals Himself in thought and to it." 1 Our moral and
religious knowledge is not limited to inexplicable intuitions;
its justification comes from its being a moment within the
organic whole of eternal order and system, i.e.. within God
Himself. The rational knowledge of God is, in one sense,God*s
knowledge of Himself. He is the beginning and end of all
thought and being. 2
Revelation cannot impart religious truth to us any
more than intuition, unless it is related to the reason. It
is a contradiction in terms to say that thought can think
anything outside itself. That #iich is above reason is really
contrary to reason. "Nothing that is absolutely inscrutable
to reason can be made known to faith." ^ Man's reason, however,
1. Ibid. P. 48.
2. Cf. E. Caird, op. cit.,1. p. 166. "All our life
is a journey from God to God."
3. Ibid, p. 73.
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is able to rise from its finite limitations to achieve an ever
higher communion v/ith the Infinite, a process assured by the
very nature of man. Man, possesses the image of God; a qual¬
ification which enables him to reflect the spirituality and
infinitude of God. *
Caird believes that our rationality and spirituality
consist in our power to transcend the narrow bounds of our
individuality and find ourselves in that which appears to lie
beyond us. "To be ourselves, we must be more than ourselves." 2
The perfect union of our individual life with God, however, is
a goal which constantly eludes our pursuit. We continue to
seek the goal only because we are conscious of a relation of
identity with the end. 3 This consciousness of our identity
with the Divine, through rationality, is the ground of our
confidence in God's existence. Caird restates the ontological
argument:
As spiritual beings our whole conscious life is based
on a universal self-consoiousness; an Absolute Spiritual
life, which is not a mere subjective notion or conception,
but which carries with it the proof of its necessary
existence or reality. 4
There is a sense in which we have to renounce the
1. J". Caird, The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity. I,
p. 177.
2. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p.116.
3. Ibid, p. 128. "If we were wholly finite we should
never be conscious of our finitude."
4. Ibid, p. 150.
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self in religious aspiration; but that to which we surrender
ourselves is actually our truer selves. This would not be so
if God were a self-identical Being outside us. In view of our
organic relation to God, no matter how far we may advance in
knowledge or in goodness, we will not be appropriating qualities
v,rhich are alien to us. The development of our latent poten¬
tialities is coordinate with the Divine self-revelation:
If we regard the history of the world as a manifestation
of a divine idea or purpose which is ever moving on to
its fulfilment, it becomes in a deeper way a revelation
of the infinite possibilities of our spiritual nature. *
Caird pays considerable attention to the problem of
pantheism and deism, In their divergence from Christian theism.
He perceives the root of the problem in our naive attempt to
use ordinary representative thought to explain the kind of
unity which pertains to spiritual things. We oannot discover
in images borrowed from sensible experience a representation
of the relation of all finite souls to God. By such thought
processes we invariably end with a pantheistic identification
of the finite spirit with the Infinite in which their organic
relation is overlooked. A narrow rationalizing logic like¬
wise tends to be inadequate in dealing with the concept of the
Infinite. It either construes a pantheism which reduces the
world and man to an illusion, or, on the other hand, it
1. The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity. I, p. 190f.
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constructs a materialism or anthropomorphism in which there is
no place for God. If one is strictly governed by the logioal
law of non-contradiction in thinking of the relation of the
Divine to the human he cannot escape denying God or annulling
the independence of man. An adequate philosophy will avoid
such an over-simplification.
Vftiat Pantheism gains by the sacrifice of individuality
and responsibility in man, by depriving the finite world
of reality and reducing Nature, Man and God, to a blank,
colourless identity, a true philosophy attains in another
and deeper way. It gives us a principle in the light of
which we can see that God is all in all, without denying
reality to the finite world and to every human spirit. I
Nature, finite mind and God are not irreconcilable ideas but
belong to one organic whole.
The traditional concept of God as substance is
wholly misleading. Frequently the concept is interpreted to
mean that God is the unknown substratum of the finite world.
From another point of view, substance may be regarded as
causality in the sense of omnipotent force; the world then is
viewed as an isolated finitude apart from God, or as an abstract
pantheism which is not distinguished from Him. A more satis-
0
factory conee.pt of God apprehends that He is infinite spirit
and that His highest creation is not a world, but spirits made
in His own capable of knowing and loving Him. It is
1. An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion, p.221.
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the very essence of the nature of these finite spirits to
renounce their separate existence, to restrict the self whioh
divides then from God, Mand to return not into pantheistic
absorption, but into living union with Him from whom they
came." 1 What God is and what He creates belong to one organic
whole; and He has designed all nature and history in suoh a
manner that He may be all in all.
Caird made the acute observation that pantheistic
doctrine emphasizes the absoluteness of God to the point of
making the world an illusory appearance. It is only from a
superficial viewpoint that we can describe pantheism as a
deification of the world. In actuality, it makes the world of
appearance a phantom. Pantheism represents a desire, as in
its great proponent, Spinoza, to get behind the world of change
and finiteness, rather than to accept or explain it. The
pantheist is really affirming that God is the only substance
2
there is, and that temporal things are insubstantial. All
things must be contemplated under the form of eternity.
Against this position Caird declaresj
The great and fundamental defect of Pantheism is, that
in the effort after unity it expunges instead of explain¬
ing the existence of the finite world; in other words,
that it gives us an Infinite which obliterates, instead
of comprehending and accounting for, the finite. 3
1. Ibid, p. 245.
2. The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity, I, p.87.
3. Ibid. I, p. 104f.
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Caird admits that in one sense all philosophy is
pantheistio, unless it he dualistic (and therefore unsatis¬
factory from his point of view). An idealistic philosophy
tries to explain all things in relation to God and to avoid
rending the universe. But it does not simply merge the finite
with God, any more than it confers an exaggerated independence
upon the finite.
The Infinite which is reached by annulling all
determinate being is merely a logical abstraction. It is a
unity aohieved by abstracting from all the diversified exist¬
ences of the world rather than by explaining them. What such
an abstract pantheism achieves is not union with the Infinite
but an unreal mimicry of that union. Its Infinite would not
lead us to a larger and fuller life but to a life in which all
thought and realism are lost. He makes this summary judgment
against pantheism:
It is the passing away, as if by a suicidal act, of
all consciousness, all activity, all individuality,
into the moveless abyss of the unconditioned. 8
Caird describes what he calls the 'Christian deific¬
ation' of the world. According to Christian thought, there is
a genuine sense In which it may be said that God is in all
things. Every object, no matter how insignificant it may be,
i- I» P- 104 and 140
2. TbTd, I, p. 109.
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is the revelation of the Divine presence. ^ But it is a
deification which makes distinctions of value within world
existences rather than to apotheosize all things alike. The
weakness of crude, unchristian pantheism is its deification of
the base things of a man's nature along with the highest. It
tends to promote contentment with things as they are and to
bring to an end all moral struggle and creative action.
Turning next to deism we find that, in contrast with
pantheism, it sets God over against the world in an antithetic¬
al relation. Caird believes that such an external contriver
or ruler is a being who is less than the true God. He is
merely a bigger or colossal man. The concept of an external
creator fails to do justiee to the richness of relationships
existing among material things or within the mind:
Even in the material world there are things which we
cannot conceive of as made from without; and a made mind,
a spiritual nature created by an external omnipotence, is
an impossible and self-contradictory notion. 2
We cannot reasonably bridge over the gap between external
power and material things by means of the concept of an arbitrary,
inexplicable act of creation. The complex relation of elements
Involved in the existence of even an inanimate stone implies
3
that God is in the stone and constitutes its inner essence.
1. Ibid. I, p. 111.
2. Ibid, I, p. 118.
3. IbTd. I, p. 122.
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A satisfactory view of creation sees the Divine
power at work as a formative energy which lies within things:
We are carried here beyond the Deistic Creator, dwelling in
some celestial sphere and operating from above, to the
conception of an immanent God, manifesting himself in, and
in a sense identifying Himself with, the inner life and
being of the world. 1
When we consider the deeper reaches of man's life, we must
recognize that spiritual qualities cannot be 'rained into the
soul.' They must be developed there in a movement of freedom.
The deistic view would deny all spiritual as well as physical
freedom to men. An arbitrary God governs the universe accord¬
ing to fixed laws implied in His work of creation. The inner
relations of the world of existence are left an unexplained
enigma.
Wherever deism does in faot permit us to see signs
of intelligence in nature or in the providential rule of the
world, it is making a concession to an essential want of our
nature, a desire to feel at home with God. But in so doing,
deism repudiates its characteristic idea of absolute, external
rule, and is trying to show us a deeper, more intimate view
of God and our relation to Him. We are permitted to see that
God is righteousness and love, that His aotion is determined
Ibid* P. 122. Cf. E. Caird, op. oit.. I, p. 318.
"I should not expect to find what is above nature anywhere,
if there is not something above nature everywhere."
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by His essence, and that it is of His very nature to externalize
Himself in a world. If we free ourselves from all traces of
deistic thought we shall come to see that so-called supernatural
events, lacking all rational explanation, are lower and not
higher expressions of Divine power. The widespread attachment
of special value to such events betrays the survival of delstio
notions about God In Christian minds. 1
The Christian doctrine of the Trinity, when properly
understood, is a safeguard against both pantheism and deism, by
the distinctions which it makes within the Divine activity.
Caird justifies breaking up the functions of the Godhead by
pointing out that the unity comprised within en organism has no
life save in the activity of its several organs. So also the
highest Unity realizes itself through its differentiations. We
can readily observe that every living intelligence is in a sense
not one but two. When locked up by itself it has only a bare
possibility of being. To conceive of God then as a self-
identical infinite would be to make Him not greater but less
than man. Existing by Himself, God could not be love. To
realize Himself In all the fulness of His nature He must set
something over against Himself to be known by Him and to call
forth His love. 2 The relation of 'other' to God has been
1. Ibid. I, p. 136.
2. Tbld. I, p. 72.
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fulfilled {in part) by man; but man had a beginning in time and
can not have been an object to God from all eternity. It is
in Christ that God's purposes for the world have been eternally
given. Christ is the human element in God. 1 In the Fourth
Gospel we learn most clearly that Christ is the 'other' of God
which exists eternally.
The Incarnation has not only revealed, under the form
and conditions of time, the human elements within God, but
Christ has also revealed the Divine elements within men. 2 In
Christ the Christian life has been perfectly realized. He had
a mind which was the perfect medium of the Divine intelligence
and a heart that throbbed in unison with the Divine. The
atonement which Christ effected was to show us that the peace
of tranquillity may be had through union with God. He taught
us that our reconciliation with God must be upon a moral basis.
The highest blessing which He has procured for us is
simply participation in that life of love of which
his whole earthly history was the manifestation. 3
!• Ibid. I, p. 157. "If man cannot be explained without
ascribing to his nature a divine element, it follows that the
divine nature cannot be understood without ascribing to it a
human element." Cf., Ibid. II, p. 102.
2. Cjf. E. Caird, on. cit.. II, p. 233. "Christ is
divine just because he is the most human of men, the man in
whom the universal spirit of humanity has found its fullest
expression."
3. J. Caird, The Fundamental Ideas of Christianity. II,
p. 193.
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We participate in the life of union with God by becoming more
perfectly human in terms of the pattern of Christ's life.
The presence of Christ, in its essence, is never
withdrawn from us. With the Resurrection, He ceased to be the
friend of a few men to become the indwelling life of all
believing souls, "a presence not intermittent, but constant,
transfused through their inmost being in all regions of space
in all ages of time." ^ The only knowledge of Christ which
is of lasting importance is the ideal meaning of His teaching
and of His actions. His disciples therefore were not in a
more favoured position than we. The doctrines of the Ascent
of Christ and the Descent of the Holy Spirit, are pictorial
presentations of the paradoxical truth that "the divine
principle which manifests itself in the human person and life
of Christ never did nor can pass away from the world." 2 For
in the fact that individual believers and the Church corporate
still experience the presence of the ascended Christ, we are
reminded that the spiritual life transcends our finite thoughts
and feelings and yet is also within us, enabling us to fulfil
our true destiny.
In principle, the system of Caird does not differ
substantially from that of Hegel, which we have evaluated
1. Ibid, II, p. 238.
2. THd. II, p. 247.
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elsewhere in these pages. British idealism came in the post-
Darwinian era when the theory of evolution had become widely
accepted and the idea of progress more firmly established
through the advance of soience. British idealism therefore had
a wider appeal as a moral and spiritual interpretation of life
compared with German idealism which was confined mainly to
academic circles. The developmental and optimistic character
of idealism commended it to the spirit of the age. In the
Britain of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century,
the revival of idealism served as a stay against the agnosticism
and materialism invoiced by phenomenal!stic science. A
philosophy which rested upon a rational harmony could not
indefinitely persist; but for a time it convinced many reflect¬
ive minds of the divine character of life, and that the God




THE THEOLOGY OF RELIGIOUS VALUES
A. Ritsohl
In the latter half of the nineteenth century the
most influential German theologian was Albrecht Ritsohl
(1822-1889) who gave his name to a significant theological
movement. His thought marked a break from the dominance of
Hegelian rationalism. Although Ritschl had been an idealist
at an early stage of his career, he revolted against the use
of metaphysical categories in theology. He developed a
theology of moral and religious values based upon the histor¬
ical revelation of God in the Christian Church, or Kingdom of
God.
Ritschl's theology was subject to an uncertain
epistemoiogy which wavered between historical positivism and
remnants of the idealism which he had formally renounced. He
expressly admitted his indebtedness to Lotze for the former
emphasis. With Lotze, he shared a Kantian background, but
rejected Kantfs separation of a metaphysical, noumenal world
from the phenomenal and historical world. He recognized in
phenomena alone, the thing, as the cause of its phenomenal
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signs, as the end which they serve, and as the law of their
constant changes. *•
Upon such an epistopological basis, the field of
religious truth may well include a study of all the phenomenal-
istic sciences Ritschl insists, however, that the field of
distinctively Christian theology lies within the experience of
the Church or Kingdom founded by Christ. God is not received
through reflective categories but He is known as the signs of
His presence and work are evidenced within the Christian
community. Contrary to the individualistic approach of
Schleiermacher, he emphasized the corporate and historical
locus of religious apprehension. 2
Religious judgments are directed upon the same
objective data as the judgments of science. The distinction
between them is that scientific judgments are theoretical while
religious truth is apprehended in value-judgments. It is true
that the scientific judgment may also involve valuing; but its
evaluation will be dispassionate, whereas in moral ancl religious
judgments the thinker distinguishes himself in value from all
the world about him. The metaphysician likewise views the
world from a coldly objective height, tending to lump mind and
1. Ritschl, Die chrlstliohe Lehre von der
Rechtfertiguag und VersShnung, III, p. 20.
2. Ibid, p. 29f.
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matter together in one unbroken world-view. The religious
thinker, on the other hand, distinguishes man from the appear¬
ances and effects of nature. Not only his view of the world
but his thought of God centres upon the value which accrues to
us for the realization of our human blessedness. 1
Ritschl considers that metaphysical knowledge is
superficial. It fixes attention upon isolated objects in
general, then later relates them to one another without regard
to the concrete relationships of historical reality. He denies,
however, that he excludes all metaphysics from theology. There
is one religious concept which offers scope for metaphysical
thinking, viz., the doctrine of God. 2 This concession does
little to establish the theological role of metaphysics;
because he goes on to assert elsewhere that by its means no
concept of Gcd as conscious personality can be formed. Meta¬
physical arguments offered in proof of the existence of God
are merely concepts about world unity. Although it appears to
have been the desire of Ritschl to represent God as a Being
transcending the sphere of phenomena, the praotical method of
his theologizing ruled out the possibility of making statements
Ibid, p. 376. "Alle Erkenntnisse religioser Art sind
directs Werthurtheile. Das was Gott und g'ottlich ist, icSnnen wir
auch dem Wesen nach nur erkennen, indem wir seinen Werth zu
unserer Seligkeit feststellen."
2, Ritsohl, Theologie und Metaphyslk, p. 38.
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about God, other than positivistio judgments made from the
standpoint of the historical revelation in the Christian
community. At the same time, it is an injustice to say that
Ritschl reduced God to a subjective value-judgment. He
believed that God was objective to our valuing and that the
data of religious experience and history are 'given* by Him.
Ritschl rejects natural religion along with meta¬
physics. Natural religion consists of general religious con¬
cepts which have been abstracted from nature and which may be
held independently of positive religious experience. In such
a system of belief God is commonly regarded as an abstract
cause divorced from the real life of nature. A genuine,
living theology will view God as intimately bound up with the
life of the world and manifest in phenomena:
Wenn man Wirkungen richtig denkt, so denkt man die
Ursache in den Wirkungen. Es 1st nur der falsche
Ansatz des vulgaren Mensohenverstandes, dass man die
Ursachen in einer Raumflaohe vorstellt hinter der
RaumflUche, in welcher man Erscheinungen anschaut,
die man als Wirkungen jener Ursachen vorstellt, Oder
dass man die Ursachen in einen friiheren Zeitpunkt
setzt, als die Wirkungen. 1
The effects of God's action which we experience do not represent
their Author as a remote being, but they convey Him to us as
immediately present in our experience.
Ibid* P. 46.
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Ritsohl also proscribed mysticism as an avenue to
knowledge of God. Medieval, schastic psychology had encouraged
this type of piety because of its preoccupation with the 'thing'
behind phenomena and its belief that the soul is one with its
object in the sphere of the unio mystica. Mysticism overlooked
the actual historical revelation of God in Christ and in Eis
Kingdom. It was not that Ritschl decried'religious experience',
but mysticism represented to him an undesirable kind of
religious experience. He sought to balance the experiential
with the historical and ethical character of the Christian
faith. Ee pictured the twofold relation by means of his famous
figure of the elipse, the two foci of which are the experience
of personal redemption through Christ, on the one hand, and on
the other, the ethical Kingdom of God within history. *
Historically-conditioned experience within the Kingdom of God
is the only experience which can speak authoritatively of faith
and its doctrines.
He agrees with Luther's psychological answer to the
question, 'What is it to have God?' God is the possession of
men who make trust in Him their highest good. They do not find
God as a result of intellection but they take Him up in a
spiritual activity in which feeling, knowing and willing meet
1. Rechtfertigungt p. 11.
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together in a meaningful experience.* The soul is not passive
but aotive in relation to the historically given revelation.
It recognizes that there is a distinction between its own
causal activity and the outer causes which act as stimuli to
P
its perception. In this belief, viz., that the soul*s
activity is different from the activity of the outer world,
Idealism is repudiated.
The scientific theologian must therefore study the
Christian religion in terms of its own peculiar experience of
God*s gracious action, and in the responsive ethical action of
the Kingdom. Christianity can be interpreted only in the light
of itself. We can know God only in our personal experience of
Him:
Der wissensohaftliche Beweis fur die Wahrheit des
Christenthums wird iiberhaupt nur in der Linie des
schon von Spener ausgezeichneten Gedankens gesucht
werden diirfen. Wer den Willen Gottes erflillen will,
wird erkennen, dass Christ! Verklindigung wahr 1st. 3
The test of the validity of the Christian faith will concern
its ability to give the believer a sense of mastery over the
world. The justification of Christian doctrines depends upon
an immanent human norm of value.
The Kingdom of God, through which revelation is
1. Ibid, p. 21.
2. Ibid, p. 22.
3. Ibid, p. 24f.
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mediated, is supermundane, In so far as it is ideally regarded
as superior to the partial and imperfect forms of ethical
community ordinarily found among men:
Das Reich Gottes, auch als gegenwartiges. Erzeugniss
des Handelns ans dem Beweggrund de^fieSe^also wie
es in der Welt zu Stande koramt, ist Uberweltlich,
sofera man unter Welt den Zusammenhang alles
natUrlichen, naturlieh bedingten und getheilten
Daseins versteht. *■
The Kingdom of God goes on unchanged, even though the natural
conditions under which the spiritual life is lived may alter.
Writhin it the practical life of man is founded upon a super¬
natural God rather than upon an uncertain concept of nature or
man. The men who are united within the Kingdom and share in
its goals bear upon them the impress of the supernatural and
supermundane. 2
It Is only from within the Kingdom, In Its world-
setting, that one can apprehend the concepts of God, sin,
conversion, eternal life, or the truth of Jesus* significance
as founder of the religion. These concepts are not transcend¬
ent abstractions but Involve a relation between God and the
world:
Der xKreis, in welcheirn eine Religion vollstMndig zur
AnschauwlTig kommt, ist nur durch die drei Punkte Gott,
Meneeh, Welt zu beschreiben. Denn es handelt sich
jedesmal darum, dass die In der Welt stehende
1. Ritschl, Unterrioht in der chrlstlichen Religion.
p. 6.
2. Ibid, p. 8.
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Religionsgemeinde, gewisae Guter in der Welt Oder tiber
der Welt durch das gbttliche Weeen zu gewinnen suoht,
well dasselbe Uber die Welt maohtig iat. 1
It would be impossible to conceive of a religion which is
accidental in relation to the world and which could be severed
from it. Particularly is this so in respect of the Christian
religion, in which we confess that God is Creator and Governor
of the world,
A rational knowledge of God takes up its standpoint
in formal antithesis to God, and never for more than a moment
can it transpose itself Into the standpoint of God. Genuine
dogmatics on the other hand must set forth the actual manner
in which salvation is effected by God, through an analysis of
the way in which man appropriates the works of God. It is
alone within the context of life that God is known. 2 This is
not tantamount to saying that the world of experience is
pantheistic; but in RItschl's view, God is mediated in and
through the experience of the Christian community in the world.
The Christian view of God does not enslave Elm within
nature but regards Him as a spiritual being Who presides over
the works of His creation. God disposes men to eternal life
1. Rechtfertlgung, p. 29.
2. Ibid, p. 34. "Ausserhalb der Selbstthatigkeit, in
welcher wir die wirkungen Gottes aufnehmen und fur unsere
Seligkeit verwertcn, haoen wlr auch kein Verst&ndniss der
objectiven Dogmen als religioser Wahrheiten.w
210
through membership in the Kingdom, which is both His manifest
goal within the world and over the world. Ethical action
within the Kingdom is conceived to be the highest good, and our
determination toward a supermundane goal. The concept of God
is the ideal bond uniting the Christians view of the world
and his view of the highest good.1 In Christianity, ethical
action is bound up with the religious view of God; which
Ritsehl believes is not necessarily so In religion as such. 2
Ritsohl claims that the weakness of pantheism and
materialism, in their various forms, lies in the fact that they
take the laws of a special area of existence and set them up
as the highest laws of all existence, overlooking an explanation
3
of the spheres of life which have been by-passed. The
phenomena of spirit are left unexplained in these systems;
which is likewise the tendency of natural science in general.
Die Collision, welche vorgeblich zwischen Naturwissenschaft
und chrlstliche Religion stattfindet, besteht in
wirkliohkeit zwischen dem mit der wissensohaftlichen Natur-
beobaohtung versohmolzenen Triebe der Naturreligion und der
Geltung der ohristlichen Weltanschauung, welche dem Geiste
seinen Yorrang liber der ganzen Naturwelt sicher stellt. 4
A pantheistic outlook is furthered by the deceptive power of
the imagination, which is able to see all forms of reality
within some narrow segment of existence, e.g.. plant life,
musical perception, or logical thinking. This self-deception
Ibid, p. 192
2. Ibid, p. 197
3. Ibid, p. 198f.
4. IblT. p. 199f.
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has received its greatest impetus from philosophical idealism
with its presupposition that the law of theoretical reasoning
is the law of the human spirit in all its functions. Ritschl
sees that if pantheism should prevail and the boundary between
the Divine essence and the world should be wiped out, giving
the universe an absolute character, man will then be merely an
emanation of a world-soul or a being who is to be superseded
by higher forms of development within the universe. In such a
system, aesthetic sympathy with the universe or moral resign¬
ation before it, can do little to offset the subordination of
the human spirit. The only satisfactory view of God regards
Him in the light of His worth for us, in our desire to achieve
mastery over the world. God must therefore remain an object
of faith to us rather than a substance or being which is bound
up with the world. 1
In the Christian life, which is ethically-determined
within the Kingdom, faith has no uncertainty concerning the
reality of God. The activity of God in the world is without
question. The awareness which we there have of God's creative
activity, His moral governance of life, and His design for an
ethical Kingdom, convinces us of His reality and also of the
truth that our own spirits are supernatural. Hitschl agrees
1. Ibid, p. 202. "Gott und Glaube gehoren untrennbar
zusammen.M
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with Kant that the moral experience is the ground for valid¬
ating the idea of God, as the solution to the world's puzzle,
and as the basis of unity between knowledge of nature and
knowledge of the spiritual life. * In the Christian view of
God, the actual world and the creative Will which ethically
conditions men are ideally bound together. In his moral
experience, the Christian gains the insight that his own prac¬
tical goal is identical with the end for which God created and
governs the world.
The Christian concept of God as personality avoids
V
some of the gravest errors in thelstic thought. It disting¬
uishes God from the idea of limitless Being whereby He is
made the substance of the universe, or from the idea of a
First Cause which need not be viewed as loving will, and from
the idea of a Pure Being who reflects only in Himself, in
abstraction from the world. Concerning the Christian concept
of a personal God Ritsohl says,
Der aufgestelite Gottesbegrlff 1st gar nicht so beschaffen,
dass er eine Verschiebung in der Pantheismus Oder den
Deismus erfahren kann. Eine hierauf zu grttndende Theologie
1st also nicht rationalistisch. Sie 1st vielmehr positiv. 2
A personal God is not known through pure concepts which lie
beyond scientific observation but in the moral and religious
experience of men within the historical Kingdom.
1. Ibid, p. 215.
2. Ibid, p. 217.
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The concept of God's eternity could have no meaning
for us if we thought of it as tiaelessness, or as time which
has no beginning or ending. We cannot abstract ourselves from
time in order to distinguish God from the temporal world. 1
The Christian view is that "die Ewigkeit ist im Allgemeinen
die Macht des Geistes uber die Zeit." 2 We recognize the
eternity of God in the fact that God remains the same in His
purposes, amid all the changes in His acts, ever maintaining
the goal for which He has created and for which he governs the
world. 3 Ritschl avoids pushing the thought of God's constancy
of purpose into becoming a transcendent concept. We can obtain
no knowledge of His purposes of eternal reward or eternal
punishment for His creatures. Such knowledge lies outside the
4
possibility of a definitive idea.
Because God is the creator of all that exists, the
world is the expression of His own self-activity. All things
are constantly comprehended by His self-consciousness:
Es ist kein Bruch in diesem Sein und diesam Bewusstsein
denkbar, da kein Eindruck von Dingen Oder von Vorstelldngen
vorkommen kann, welcher nicht im Voraus in die Einheit des
Erkennens und des Wollens aufgenommen ware. 5
If it appears from this that Ritschl has slipped into the
idealist position of the identity of thought and being, we must
1. Ibid, p. 223, 4. Ibid, p. 71.
2. Loc. oit. 5. Rechtfertigung. p. 224f
3. Unterrlcht. p. 12.
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balance the statement by the reminder that he held to a belief
in God's oreation of the world in time. 1 The conoept of God's
free-will in creation and His election of the Church, point to
His transcendence over temporal existenoe. Indeed, the
Christian view claims that the Church was elected prior to the
creation of the world, and that the latter serves as a medium
to effect the eternal purposes of God for His Church. 2 The
world is not a hindrance to God as it so often is to us; God
retains His freedom and remains certain of His plan at every
step of His oreation.
The key to an understanding of the relationship
between God and the world is most fully oontained in the
characterization of God as loving will. Only from the point
r j 9
of view of God's love in Christ can we understand His revel¬
ation to the Kingdom or solve the world-problem. A merely
formal view of God as personal will could be interpreted
pantheistioally. Almost any possible content could be ascribed
to the bare concept. If we did not join the attribute of love
to the ooncept of the Divine personality, we could not see why
God created such a world as He actually did create. His
purpose of love determines the direction of His will: "Der
Zweck seiner selbst bezeiehnet die Richtung seines Willens." 3
1. Ibid, p. 284.
2. TbTd, p. 286.
3. TbTd, p. 268.
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A concept of God as indeterminate Will could very easily permit
Him to be degraded within existence, or to become the Absolute.
We know God only as love, in the predioate of His loving
activity. If we ware to think of God as being first a tran¬
scendent Person, Who later took on the attribute of love, then
He would not be the living God known to the Church:
Indem Gott als die Liebe in der Beziehung seines Willens
auf seinen Sohn und die Gemeinde des Reiches Gottas
gedacht wird, wird niohts an ihm gedacht, was er vor
seiner Selbstbestinmung der Liebe ware. Entweder wird
er so gedacht Oder er wird gar nicht gedacht. i
If man is to be esteemed as like God in nature, then
the human race must be brought under the attribute of unity -
a unity different from its natural generic unity. The desired
unity may come through love of neighbour. If an ethical unity
of love is achieved through membership in the Kingdom of God,
then human motives to unity will be enlarged or superseded in
supermundane fashion. The unity of the race in love may then
become the correlate of the love of God.*' In fact such a
correlation is not only the goal of the Kingdom but it is, at
the same time, the completed revelation of God as love. 3 The
description of mankind as a perfected community of love is not
an additional revelation to be tacked onto the Christian
!• Ibid, p. 268.
2. Ibid, p. 267.
3. Ibid, p. 276.
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doctrine of man, but is integral to it.
Ritschl defines Christian freedom as the character¬
istic of being able to direct one's life through thought of
the goal that is to be achieved within the Kingdom. We are
completely free only when we recognize that, with respect to
the totality of circumstances, our self-activity is dependent
upon the freedom of God's love. 1 Our goal is to achieve a
correlation with the love of God, and His love is inclusive
of all reality. Although we experience only an ambivalence
of freedom and dependence, God can see the whole, and freely
determines all things by His loving will.
The religious view of the world, regards all natural
events as standing at God's disposal. It is not surprising
therefore that any unusual natural events associated with His
Divine grace are regarded as miracles:
Die Vorstellung von Wundern (steht) in notwendiger
Weehselbeziehung zu dem besondern Glauben an g&ttiteher
Vorsehung* und ist ausserhalb dieser Beziehung gar nicht
md'glich. 2
Although, we have neither a comprehension of the future nor a
knowledge of the eternal past, we may have confidence in the
1. Ibid, p. 279.
2« Unterricht. p. 14. Cf. Ibid, p. 43. "Der Glaube an
die v&terliche Torsehung Gottes 1st die christliche Weltan¬
schauung in verkiirfeter Gestalt."
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fatherly providence of God, wherein He regards us as His
ohildren. The religious goal of mastery over the world is
effected through faith in Divine Providence. 1 This faith
relates independent, supernatural Spirit to ell the relation¬
ships of the world. We ourselves are given a sense of
independence, in the light of which we may evaluate the
world about us. On the ground of our experience of recon¬
ciliation with God, we believe that He is Lord over the
world and our Father, and that He insures that all things
2
will work together for our good.
Ritschl is unwilling to ascribe the attribute
of deity to Christ on the ground of a substantial or hypo-
statical union with God; His deity must rest on the basis
of the predicates of His life and action. Christ has the
♦religious value of God* for us, because He is the perfect
expression of God's love and grace. We ascribe lordship
over the world to Christ because of His solidarity with
the Father, as seen in His institution of the Kingdom
of God, which is God's own self-end. His deity is to be
inferred from His worldly activity:
Dieses Attribut kann namlich nicht vollzogen werden,
wenn nicht dieselben Thatigkeiten, durch welche Jesus
1. Reohtfertlgung. p. 583.
2. Ibid, p. 590.
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Christus sich als Menchen bowahrt, In deraelben
Beziehung und Zeit als eigenthiimltohe Predicate
Gottes und als die eigenthiimlichen Mittel seiner
Offenterting dure 3b. Christus gedacht werlen. 1
It would he superficial to conclude that Hitachi's intent was
to regard Christ as only a superior nan. It is on the ground
that Christ is similar to C-od in will, rather than in substance,
that His nature may be called Divine, The method of Ritschl's
theology, however, limited the attributes of Christ to those
expressed in His humanity. No transcendent attributes could
be conferred upon Him,
A complete historical evaluation of Christ is only
possible within Ills Church. He serves as a pattern to all
Christians, in the independence over the world which He mani¬
fested. The normative value of Christens life is an abiding
rule for us, and we know that it is only by His stimulus that
we can come into a right relationship with Cod and with the
world. It is this ethical Influence of Christ which makes Him
central to our faith. According to the New Testament, His deity
is proved by His faithfulness in carrying out his Life's calling
and His refusal to base His life on that which was temporal and
worldly - therefore less than divine. We must not go to the
New Testament to find a clear doctrine of the deity of Christ
1. Unterricht, p. 22. Cf, Reohtfertigung, p. 377.
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that may be drawn forth exegetically. 1 We can have no
knowledge of a pre-existent Christ. We have no basis for
saying that His divine actions were related to inborn qualities
of His person. His divinity must be found simply in the
historical form of His life.
The doctrine of the Holy Spirit in Ritschl, establishes
a oneness of the human spirit with the Divine. The Holy Spirit
is the knowledge which God has of himself and also of His own
self-end. It is also the basis of the Church's capacity to
receive the revelation of God and to live the ethical life of
the Kingdom. 2 Because the conscious aim of the Kingdom is
identical with God's own self-end, we may conclude that the
practical knowledge of God achieved within the Kingdom is
identical with God's knowledge of Himself.
The great value of Ritechl's theology lay in its
repudiation of rationalism in theological study and its focus¬
sing of attention upon the historical Christ and the historical
development of theology. But we cannot be satisfied that
Ritschl understood the relation between revelation and history
from a Christian point of view. It is one thing to say that
a knowledge of God must be received in an historical milieu
and another to deny any but an immanent, historically-
1. Rechtfertlgung. p. 378
2. Ibid, p. 260.
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conditioned knowledge of God. He indicated a recognition that
the concept of God may involve metaphysics, accepting the
doctrine of creation and the givenness of historical data; hut
he was unable to bring forward any determinant transcendent
concepts. Like Schleienaacher, he barely acknowledges the
conditionedness of the world and of history, then proceeds to
condition all knowledge of God in terms of historical experience.
Hitachi attempted to come to terms with the main
doctrines of the Christian faith (although he said little about
the Holy Spirit or eschatology). His historical positivism,
however, became, in the hands of others who did not share his
Christian 'idealism', a method whereby they developed a
syncretlstic philosophy of religion. Ritschl contributed
materially to the development of the religionsgesohlohtliche
movement, with its radical historicism. He encouraged the point
of view that history, qua history, constitutes revelation. The
historical movement in theology was not content to regard
Christianity as the final religion but found immanent religious
truths in all positive religions.
Ritschl had made a break with the rational a priori
of Idealism but his pragmatic a priori, the condition that
religion must minister to man's happiness, was no more satis¬
factory in relation to the Biblical view of discipleship.
Granted that religious valuings may be about objective
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realities or qualities, if the norm remains subjective, the
given historical data of revelation may be subverted to serve
a humanistic religion. Ritschl's use of the adjective
ubematurlioh. and the more frequent Uberweltlich, tended to
signify an ideal ethical superiority rather than a transcendent
relation.
B. Troeltsch
The theology of Ritschl exerted a two-fold influence.
On the one hand it inspired the group of men known as
Ritsehlians, to pursue a Christocentric theology in which the
Christian sources in the New Testament and the historical mani¬
festation of the Kingdom of God were held to be normative for
theology. On the other hand, his positivistic, historical
approach was appropriated by the religlonsgeschichtliche school
in their attempt to disodver general religious truths in all
the positive religions.
These students of the history of religions felt that
Ritschl had overlooked the developmental character of history,
and hence of religious manifestations. At no stage did they
feel justified in speaking of a final religion. They criticized
Ritschl on the ground that he had failed to extend his histor¬
ical method to include a thorough literary and historical
critioism of the Christian sources, and that he had not attempt¬
ed to relate Christianity to other religions and to cultural
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and scientific movements of the times. The history of religious
movement made historicism its method, in the fullest sense of
the word, ruling out transcendent concepts. Even Christianity
was shown to he a syncretistic historical development in which
elements of Jewish religion and Hellenistic thought were fused
together.
Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) was generally considered
to he the leading reflective thinker of the movement. In
considering a brief outline of the principles of his thought
we shall actually be making an excursion into the theological
work of the present century. But Troeltsch represents, in a
sense, the culmination of leading trends in nineteenth century
theology. We see in Troeltsoh a conscious attempt to unite the
two dominant theological trends which we have noted in our
survey thus far. He tried to unite the positive, historical
and experiential factors of religion with the informing /absolute
of idealism. As a one-time disciple of Ritsehl, he had moved
beyond a rationalistic system of idealism; but throughout all
the objectively 'given' data of historical experience he per¬
ceived the progressive evolution of a Divine purpose.
Troeltsoh agreed with Ritsehl that religion is not a
philosophy. Hence he did not share the confidence of some
members of his school that a general philosophy of history,
with its discovery of universal concepts, was adequate to
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interpret Christian history, or for that matter, the history
of any other positive religion. History manifests individual¬
ity in its development; and Christianity is an historical
individuality. He states his conception of historical develop¬
ment in the following terms:
The universal law of history consists precisely in this,
that the Divine Reason, or the Divine Life, within history,
constantly manifests itself in always-new and always-
peculiar individualisations — and hence that its tendency
is not towards unity or universality at all, but rather
towards the fulfilment of the highest potentialities of
each separate department of life. *
Each historical religion must therefore be studied by itself
and its values'appropriated through the impression which they
make upon us. It is only in some far-off ideal future that we
may catch a glimpse of an universal history.
In developing his doctrine, Troeltsch rejects the
absolutistic, metaphysical doctrine of history which had been
the heritage of Kant and the idealists. The modern conscious¬
ness-philosophy which sprang from Descartes had been extended
by the idealists to the philosophy of history, and their inter¬
pretation of history had worked the same tyranny as natural
law, in its divorce from the spirit. He Insists that the
historical datum is first of all a thing for itself before it
becomes a thing for us. 2
1. Troeltsch, Christian Thought: Its History and
Application, p. 14.
2. 'Troeltsch, Per Hlstorlsmus und seine Problems,
Gesammelte Schrlften, III, p. 43.
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Troeltsch observes that the modern scientific out¬
look has made philosophical system well-nigh impossible; yet
he himself resists the tendency to give up seeking for meaning.
In all history he denotes an immanent purposiveness which
persists through manifold changes and appears in every partial
and individual segment of reality. In all the various histor¬
ical individuations there appear to have been absolutely
'given' original dispositions or laws of development. Such
an initiating element may be variously designated as fate,
predestination, or creation. Eventually these elements tend
to become the logical category through which the actual,
existing state of the historical individuation is explained. 1
Belief in such a suprahuman factor in history is an act of
faith rather than a conclusion of science. He says that Jesus
and Paul and other great religious geniuses have been right:
"Gnade und Erwahlung sind das Geheimnis und Wesen der
Geschichte." 2
In the movement of history it is impossible not to
see a common spirit working through the impulses and tendencies
of its development. Although Troeltsch is willing to describe
this spirit as Divine, he is not prepared to assert that a
transcendent Absolute, or God, stands at the beginning of
historical movements. The presupposition of purposive factors
1. Ibid, p. 38.
2. Ibid, p. 101.
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in history is the * unconscious1. This is not the unconscious
of the psychologist; it is simply the recognition that our
feelings, actions, instincts, and decisions in history bear
far more presuppositions than we can ever consciously know,
and that they have a much greater, or different, meaning with
regard to the whole than we are aware. *
Historical objects must not be thought in abstract
isolation, but in relation to other objects, in an unbroken
flow of becoming. Keen historical observation will reveal that
the various individuations in history are not completely
isolated but they are interpenetrated by a Unity of becoming. 2
We must see a pattern of suprahuman value in all the individual
patterns of history:
Der Glaube an ubermenschliohe, ewige Werte in der
Geschiehte, an die Ziele des Geistes, die in aller
Arbeit um des Lebens Notdurft und organisatorische
Sicherung dooh erst den Sinn des so befestigten
Lebens zeigen, und dann die lebendige Anschauung
von diesen Werten in den grossen Bildern der Gesehichte:
das 1st eine grundlegende Bedevtung fur die
Weltanschauung. 3
Troeltsch is dissatisfied with both naturalism and
historicism.; as providing final clues to value and meaning in his¬
tory. Naturalism tends toward a cheapening of life, while histor-
icism ends in scepticism and historical relativity. The concept cf
♦individuality', the heritage of romanticism, is the standpoint
1. Ibid, p. 47.
2. Ibid, p. 55.
3. Ibid, p. 82.
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from which we may properly measure historical worth. The con¬
cept of individuality combines within it the thought of the
ideal and the actual, both of which combine to create the
novelties and imponderables of history and its values.
Der zentrale Begriff der Wertlehre (wird) der der
Individualitat in aem Sinne einer Vereinigung von
Faktischenv und Ideal em, von naturhaft und umstand-
saassig Gegebenem und zugleich etisch Ausgegebenem.
In diesem Sinne ist der Begriff der Individuality
der der grunds&tzlichen Wertrelativity. 1
We are not to assume that the expression * relativity of values'
means the same as'relativity'. It is not meant that anarchy
reigns in the doctrine of values, but that ever-new, creative
relationships arise out of the interplay of factual and purpos¬
ive being in history. The 'individual' Is capable of faith in
a constant purpose running through the apparently Indecisive
course of history.
Belief that a constant purpose runs through the pro¬
gressive, relative values of history, constitutes faith in the
Absolute:
Die Wertrelativitat aber hat nur Sinn, wenn in diessm
Relativen ein Absolutes lebendig und schaffend wird.
Sonst wSre sie nur Relativitat, aber nlcht Wert¬
relativitat. 2
The Absolute is a creative will, which, when it has first
become manifest in the course of history, may serve as a divine,
1. IfriQ. P. 211.
2. Ibid. P. 212.
227
formative impulse to finite minds. The Absolute may, of course,
be conceived only as a myth - as it was in Plato, and also in
Christianity. He believes that the Christian concept of a
living, Divine Spirit, active in the finite world, is a myth.
This myth, however, has led to most acute and precise psycho¬
logical observations which have probed the riddle of the soul
more deeply than any psycho-genetic or rational a priori
theories have been able to do. 1 The mythological Absolute is
to be respected as long as it gives meaning to life and history.
It is, in fact, only the concept of an Absolute, informing
relative or emergent values, which can explain the changing
scene of history. The peculiar movement of history cannot be
explained through universal, logical or empirical concepts.
Although Troeltsch criticized Hegel's spiritual
monism and scholastic dialectic, he appreciated the dynamic
prinoiple of development in Hegel*s thought. He was not satis¬
fied with the popular idea of progress, united as it was with
a scientific teleology. 2 The dynamical development of history
points toward the achieving of a universal philosophy of history
at some remote future, not to a teleological end, postulated on
the basis of current empirical science.
Ibid, p. 213.
2. Ibid, p. 464.
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Der historische Entwicklungsbegriff hat eine universale
und philosophische Bedeutung, die immer wieder
hervorbrechen muss. ^
The idea of development toward an ideal universal philosophy
of history is indispensable if we are to retain a sense for
unity and interrelation of meaning amidst present historical
individuation. The concept of an universal history may be
organized on the analogy of existing cultural syntheses, which
have been developed out of diverse historical life situations. 2
Troeltsch has made an application of his develop¬
mental view of history to the history and significance of
Protestantism. He notes that the breakdown of the old scholastic
civilization at the Reformation did away with the precise,
logical distinction between the Divine and the human, which
had everywhere been determined by the Church. The tendency of
Protestantism was to confer a higher impressiveness and value
upon all the elements of life in the world; and life's ends
tended to become an ideal transformation of the present world.
Protestant civilization became individualistic and progressive.
The authentic Protestant principle he described as
the transformation of the idea of freedom and grace
into the ideas of the self-directing personality and
a spiritual fellowship having its roots in history,
all on the basis of a thei3m which has taken up into
itself the idea of immanence. 3
1. Ibid, p. 656.
2. Ibid, p. 656.
3. Troeltsch, Protestantism and Progress, p. 183
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Protestantism came to be a search for God in one's own feelings
and will, and in the course of historical experience.
When Troeltsch applied his historical principles to
the significance of Christianity as a whole, he removed the
revelatory uniqueness and absoluteness of the faith. He incor¬
porated within his own approach the method of Schleiermaeher,
in which the analysis of the Christian consciousness provides
the data of theology. In the study of the actual,historically-
conditioned revelation of God in the lives of men, Troeltsoh
claimed to find that Christianity penetrates more deeply to
the root of man's being than any other religion. The claim of
Christianity to universality rests upon the supremacy of its
values. In the fact that Christianity has become the religion
of such a highly developed racial group as we find in Christen¬
dom, there is evidence of its greatness of spiritual power and
truth. Christianity has final and unconditional value for us
"because we have nothing else and because in what we have we
can recognise the accents of the divine voice." * The finality
of Christianity for us, however, does not exclude the possib¬
ility that other advanced cultures may have their own medium
of the divine voice:
The great religions might indeed be described as
crystallisations of the thought of great races,
1. Christian Thought, p. 26.
230
as these races are themselves crystallisations of
the various biological and anthropological forms. 1
Religion is an epiphenomenon of culture; and therefore, in
Troeltsch's opinion, Christianity should constantly accommodate
itself to new concepts of nature, social order, and spiritual
outlook.
All religion has a common goal in an ideal Unknown
Beyond (analogous to the sphere of universal history), and also
a common ground in the immanent Divine Spirit which is guiding
the finite mind onward to ever fuller light and truth, "a Spirit
Which indwell3 the finite spirit, and Whose ultimate union with
it is the purpose of the whole many-sided process.*2 A final
victory for man over his problems and the partial nature of his
existence would mean the end of all struggle and freedom — a
situation which we cannot feature. It will ever remain true,
therefore, that the religious transcends the moral, i.e.. the
highest moral idea is always projeoted into an other-world of
the spirit. 3 Man transcends history in his aspirations and
longing. That is the occasion for the doctrine of justification
by faith; man's desire for perfection far exceeds his actual
moral attainment.
The Kingdom of God, in Christianity, is commonly
regarded as transcendent history and therefore it cannot really
1. Ibid, p. 29.
2. Ibid, p. 32.
3. T5Id. p. 62f.
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change the history of natural events:
The Kingdom of God, just because it transcends
history, cannot limit or shape history. Earthly
history remains the foundation and the presuppos¬
ition of the filial personal decision and sancti-
fication. 1
General history has conditioned the rise and advancement of the
Christian Church. Christian culture grew out of an amalgam¬
ation of tensions existing between the values of this world and
the supermundane world of religion. The development of such an
advanced religion depends upon a favourable historical destiny
as well as breadth of spiritual qualities.
Troeltsch believes that there are many indications of
the Unknown Beyond which we may encounter during the struggle
of the spirit upwards, but the future itself is never revealed
to our eyes. Clearly, for him, there can be no revelatory
incursion of the transcendent at any time during the course of
history:
History within itself cannot be transcended, and knows
of no salvation except in the form of devout anticipation
of the Hereafter, or glorified transfiguration of partial
salvations. The Kingdom of God and Nirvana lie outside
all history. In history itself there are only relative
victories. ^
In the end, Troeltsch shows himself to be sceptical of even such
residuallsm idealism as that which looks forward to a Kingdom
1. Ibid, p. 68.
2. Ibid, p. 128f.
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of the Beyond. He suggests that such an outlook can really
make no difference upon the actual course of life. Its
struggles will remain, and we shall gain no more ethical
mastery than those without a hope for the future. The religious
man is merely ahle to affirm his hopes more joyfully than the
man whose prospects are limited to this life. 1 Christianity
must remain a compromise between the Utopian hopes of the King¬
dom of God and the permanent circumstances of an actual human
life.
The immanentism of nineteenth century theology came
to perhaps its fullest expression in Troeltsch. His theistic
concept was so meagre, however, that his thought represented
little more than an optimistic naturalism. The Divine Being
is assumed to be transparently visible through all historical
development, but at no point in the development can there be
a clearly defined doctrine of God. There are no possible
transcendent revelatory attributes of God. The doctrine of
the relativity of values, implies a provisional and relative
view of God. God is in process, even as history is in process.
The movement of individual historical forms toward universal
history may turn up quite different religious forms and
doctrines of God than those which are now useful. It is
1. Ibid, p. 129.
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idealism only in the sense of sentiment which moved Troeltsch
to retain traditional Christian concepts and to hold fast to
his confidence in the Divine purpose informing history. He
had no doctrine of origins, other than an appreciation of
myth; and he lacked a transcendent doctrine of last things.
His belief in emergent Divine values throughout the course of
mundane history was little more than a descriptive principle
or hypothetical faith which could quite readily be the





Thus far in our survey of nineteenth century theology
we have seen that the dominant positions were heavily weighted
toward an immanental view of the Divine. We should not close
our study, however, without taking brief notice of an incipient
reaction against immanentism, which admittedly gained little
recognition during the nineteenth century itself. It took the
form of a revived transcendentalism, established along radically
different lines than traditional views of transcendency. In
view of the fact that this reaotion had a profound influence
upon Karl Barth and the contemporary theology associated with
his name, a consideration of its main features may serve as
a useful link between nineteenth century and present-day
theologioal discussion.
The Danish theologian and philosopher, Soren
Kierkegaard (1813-1855) made a radical break with immanentism
at a time when Hegelian absolutism was at the peak of its
influence. He rejected the possibility of achieving a general
theory of knowledge. His theology made epistemological
scepticism the prerequisite of faith. His approach to the truth
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of religion involved the categories of the subjective and the
individual — the categories of existence rather than of
reflection. To attain to truth we must "reason from existence,
not toward existence." ^ It is from within the pathos of
existence that one is able to grasp the paradoxical truth of
Christianity. **
Kierkegaard held that an existential system is
impossible; it could never be completed. System and finality
always go together. Hegel1s introduction of movement into
logic was a contradiction, for only in existence is there move¬
ment and progression.
Every system must be pantheistic precisely on account
of its finality. Existence must be revoked in the
eternal before the system can round itself out; there
must be no existing remainder. 3
The systematic idea comprises a unity of thought and being,
while existenoe is their separation. In existence, therefore,
we can have no concept of Qod whioh, at the same time, gives
us the being of Cod. On the other hand, the subjective passion
of existenoe constitutes the true synthesis of finite and
infinite, 4
1. Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, p. 31.
2. The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard, Ted. by Alexander
Dru) p. 89. "The idea df philosophy is Mediation — Christian¬
ity^ is the paradox."
3. Kierkegaard's Concluding Unscientific Postscript,
(tr. by D. F. Swenson) p. Ill,
4. Ibid, p. 350.
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Existential thinking is individual and subjective.
Reflective, objective thought takes no account of the thinker;1
the subject is accidental, and existence is something vanishing
and indifferent. The dispassionate spectator apprehends the
world-historical sphere in terms of metaphysical concepts and
views it as a relationship of cause and effeet. The ethical
and religious goal of an eternal happiness, however, can be
achieved only by those who are individual and subjective in
their thinking. "All eternal decisiveness is rooted in
subjectivity." 2 Kierkegaard goes so far as to say that
"subjectivity is truth, subjectivity is reality." 3
An objective knowledge of God can be merely an approx¬
imation process. God is a Subject and exists only for subject¬
ive inwardness. If we approach the question of God's existence
objectively, we shall be reflecting upon the problem of whether
a certain "object" is the true God. The subjective approach
recognizes that truth resides in the relation, and asks only
"whether the individual is related to a something in such a
manner that the relationship is in truth a God-relationship.4
Kierkegaard concludes that, grasping an 'objective uncertainty'
with an infinite subjective passion, is the highest truth
5
attainable for an existing individual.
1. The Journals, p. 142. 4. Ibid, p. 178.
2. Postscript, p. 173. 5. Ibid, p. 182.
3. Ibid, p. 306.
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Existence may be expressed in three different stages,
the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious, If a progressive
transition is to be made from one to the other, it must take
place through a profound inward decision. The aesthetic stage
is the stage of the natural man, in which the basic realities
of existence are neglected in favour of immediate pleasure. In
the ethical stage, a man chaoses the normal life of struggle
for self-betterment. Here a sense of guilt arises which can
only be dealt with in the religious sphere. At the stage of
religion, the individual renounces himself and strives, through
infinite pathos, to relate himself to an eternal happiness, an
absolute telos, In which his whole existence may be transformed.
Kierkegaard made a definite distinction between two
kinds of religion: religion A is the religion of immanence,
while religion B is the religion of paradox, or, Christianity.
Religion A is a human religiosity In which the individual is
content to believe that truth is immanent within his subjectivity.
It is believed that all men everywhere have a share of the
Divine within them and that the transformation of the individual
may take place from within. 1 But in the religion of immanence,
there is a constant unrest. The individual senses that he is
infinitely guilty before God and thus qualitatively divided
1. Ibid, p. 509.
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from Him. His relationship to God is being constantly annulled;
and the end is despair.
Religion B (Christianity) makes a complete break with
immanence. The religion of paradox can be entered only by a
leap of faith. The sense of guilt, which was an alteration
within man's own subjectivity, now becomes the awareness of
sin, a qualification of the subject's entire being. 1 "The
consciousness of sin is the conditio sine qua non of Christian¬
ity. " 2 The Christian must remain constantly aware of the
qualitative distinction between himself and God.
Christianity is not content to be an evolution within
3
human nature. Man's salvation no longer depends upon an
inner transformation; he now bases his eternal happiness upon
something historical. Kierkegaard reveals at this point that
his principle of subjectivity yields only a provisional truth,
a truth which brings a man to the position where he must take
the leap of faith into the absurd. Reflective or objective
processes of knowing would never have induced him to rest his
happiness upon something historical, In Christianity the
Eternal is not immanently united with man's subjectivity, but
1. Ibid, p. 517.
2. The Journals, p. 131.
3. Postscript, p. 496.
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reveals Himself in Christ at a definite point in time. 1 This
is a miracle, and it is only in miracles that God can show
Himself to man. 2 The revelation remains Veiled*, and does
not become a common possession.
In view of the fact that there is an absolute differ¬
ence between God and man, man most adequately expresses his own
nature Mien he is giving expression to the difference between
himself and God. That expression is given in worship, where
the worshipper signifies that God is absolutely all for him. 5
Kierkegaard makes the transcendence of God so
absolute that he annihilates all rational knowledge of God.
When reason pursues a knowledge of God, it comes into a
collision with the Unknown, a mere limiting concept. 4 Even
the knowledge which one receives from God cannot be understood
by the reason. 5 Rationalism is completely ruled out. It is
clear, however, that Kierkegaard did not intend to succumb to
the charge of irrationality. He held firmly to the doctrine
of a self-authenticating Divine revelation. Only God can
create within man the condition for learning the truth. 6 The
1. Ibid, p. 290F. "Christianity is no doctrine con¬
cerning the unity of the divine and the human, or concerning
the identity of subject and object; but the fact that God
has existed." Of. Philosophical fragments, p. 83. "Faith and
the historical aire correlative" concepts.*
2* The Journal, p. 134.
3. PostlToVfpt f p. 369.
4. Philosophical Fragments, p. 35.
s. roidr~pr~37. ~
6. Ibid, p. 10.
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Teacher, ¥/ho is God Himself, must bring the truth to man. It
is because He cannot be conceived that God came in the form of
a servant. * The Teacher alone can prompt the learner that he
is in error and be a Saviour to him;
Moved by love, God is thus eternally resolved to reveal
himself His love is a love of the learner, and his
aim is to win him. 2
When God miraculously implants His revelation in the human
vessel He makes a new creature. 3
The condition for knowing God must be received anew
in each succeeding generation. There is no conceptual capital
which can be handed on second-hand. "A successor who receives
the condition from God himself is a contemporary, a real con¬
temporary. 4 For the actual contemporaries of Jesus it was an
historical fact that God came into being. For the contemporary
of Jesus today it is an object of faith that God has come into
being:
The question is if one will give assent to God's having
come into being, by which God's eternal essence is
inflected in the dialectical determinations of becoming. 5
Kierkegaard views the disjunction which he has made
between God and man as a disjunction for us. It is an unlike-
ness based upon our finitude and sin. He does not support a
1. Ibid, p. 51.
2. Ibid. p. 27.
3. Ibid, p. 56.
4. Ibid, p. 56.
5. Ibid, p. 72.
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Deistical view of God's relation to the world, but believes in
a most intimate providential control of all things. God
created all things ex nlhilo. 1 There is nothing independent
over against God, Although he granted a measure of independ¬
ency to man, we nevertheless owe everything to Him. He
constantly sustains the universe:
It is so impossible for the world to exist without God
that if God oould forget it it would instantly cease
to be. 2
We cannot really grasp the idea of providence, any more than we
can grasp the idea of redemption. It must be believed. Prov-
idenoe means that God is concerned about the individual. Belief
in redemption is a faith that God will continue His providence,
that He will ever care for the individual. 3
God does not exist immanentiy, in terms of the
general concept, simply because He does not exist. God only
is. It i3 for man alone that He exists, and then lie can exist
only for faith. 4 It is faith which sees the Eternal holding
together the oleavages of existence. Faith presupposes that
God is the middle term in everything a man does. It is
unbelieving man who is not conscious of the union of God and
man. 5 The unbeliever vainly tries to comprehend God's
relation to the world by means of a ooncept.
1. Ibid, p. 181. 4. Ibid, p. 173.
2. Ibid, p. 46. 5. Ibid, p. 133.
3. Ibid", p. 171.
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By the attribute of the omnipresence of God,
Kierkegaard understands that He is not only present everywhere,
at all times, but that He is wholly present in His presence.
He is not, as it were, broken up and partially present
in each and wholly present to himself through a sort of
succession; that is pantheism. He is wholly present
in everyone in particular and yet in all things; that
is theism, personality, individualism. 1
This position is not to be interpreted &a an uniform
deification of all existence, in which God is the only term.
Kierkegaard believes that his view does not reduce all indi¬
viduation to God, but confers a new value upon the individual¬
ities within the organic whole of the world -— "just as an
army would not be smaller because every soldier was a general
in spirit." 2 This view of God's presence does not seem to
leave room for God's creative purpose in history — for the
doctrine of election. The music of life is pitched an octave
higher without changing the melody.
Kierkegaard had made an absolute break with immanent
rationalism and religiosity, but he cannot be charged with
being an ultimate sceptic. He believed in a transcendent
revelation of God, immediately perceived in faith. As we have
seen above, he believed also in the immediacy of Divine prov¬
idence. But from the point of view of his positive contribution
1. Ibid. p. 83.
2. Loc. cit.
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to theology, it may well be objected that Kierkegaard's
radical individualism and discontinuity is not wholly adequate
to an historical faith — important as was his hyperbolic re-
emphasis upon the gulf between a Holy God and sinful man.
God's revelation has been made in history, and the Church has
been obliged again and again to make definitive statements
about that revelation. Kierkegaard's exclusion of revelation
from the historical plane and from rational statement makes it
appear close to the Ineffable of the mystic. His one great
concession to the historical, in keeping central the manifest¬
ation of God in Christ, was not developed into a well-rounded
Christological doctrine. It has been aptly suggested by
1
H. R. Mackintosh that in some respects Kierkegaard was not
paradoxical enough. The tension between the Divine and the
human is a feature of every aspect of existence. The paradox
lies in the fact that the discontinuous and the continuous
exist together in human life and history.
1. Types of Modern Theology, p. 250.
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8. Kahler
In Martin Kahler (1835-1912) we ean readily discern
a herald of twentieth century Barthi&n theology. He shared the
revulsion of Kierkegaard against rational categories of thought;
and as a contemporary of the scientific historical movement in
theology, he reacted strongly against universalized concepts of
history. He centred his theology in the Biblical revelation,
at the heart of which stands God's self-revelation in Christ.
In Biblically-recorded events we are confronted by an indis¬
soluble unity of the historical and suprahistorical. The Bible,
Church, and personal experience are in constant interrelation
in Christianity.
Kahler insisted, like Karl Barth in our own times,
that theology is a work of the Church. Christianity is not
comprehended by its historical manifestations, and, therefore,
the study of Christianity cannot be carried on by the general
science of history. It is to the individual that the Holy
Love of God is conveyed; and it is only through an uniquely
individual experience of the action of God that one may become
a theologian.
Die Theologie 1st die Wissenschaft der Offenbarungs-
Reiigion und darum wie die Offenbarung Gottes in
Christo durohaus eigenartig und Selbstandig. 1
1. Kahler, Die Wissensohaft der ohristlichen lehre.
p. 10. *
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The philosophical method of seeking the universally valid is
not appropriate to Christian thought. Neither psychological
and anthropological empirical research, nor ontological and
ethical metaphysics can secure an understanding of the hist¬
orical event in the fullness with which Christianity under¬
stands it.
Christianity is more than an historical phenomenon;
it is suprahistorioal. Some of the materials with which
theology deals are open to scientific, anthropological and
historical studies, hut not the Uebergeschlchtllohe in the
Christian faith. 1 Theological knowledge is unique in that it
is able to discern the suprahistorical fact within the hist¬
orically-given experience, as the latter works upon our inner
life. The object of theological study is God in Christ, i.e.,
God in His revelation for the salvation of men. 2 An hist¬
orical study can therefore only become theology when all the
works of God are viewed in relation to the revelation in
Christ. Kahler affirmed the finality of the revelation in
Christ.
The Christian theologian has no need and he has no
right to make use of some reflective basis as a starting point
1. Ibid, p. 24. "Der Historlcismus verlauft in Skepsis
gegen das Uebergeschichtliche und bleibt die Lbsung der
elgentlich theologischen Aufgabe schuldig."
2. Ibid, p. 26.
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for theology. Although God does not offer Himself immediately
to the scientific observer, we are not justified in taking
refuge in some metaphysical idea which stands above the anti-
theses of the experiential world. God reveals Himself in
the immediacy of justifying faith. Salvation and revelation
are coordinate in experience: "Die Heilsgewissheit des
Gerechtfertigten ist die vollkommene Gestalt der religiBsen
Gewissheit." 2
God is to be distinguished as a 'third* outside
ourselves and the world. In His personality, He is distinguish¬
ed from the totality of material things, or from an absolutism
of thought; In His independence, He is in antithesis to the
Infinite sequences of conditioned existence; in His oneness,
He is separated from the infinite possibilities of differen-i
tinted being.3 Pantheism and deism are postulates of relig¬
iosity or ethics, originating in a desire to provide an
hypostasis for an unifying scientific view of reality.
Eventually, pantheism and deisia tend to become interfused with
one another to form an idealism. The latter again may issue
In atheism, scepticism or sensual monism (materialism).4 If
theology presumes to make the content of the consciousness
of God perspicuous to all, it is likewise in danger of
1. Ibid, p. 150.
2. T5Td. p. 155f
3. Ibid, p. 157f.
4. Ibid, p. 160.
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betraying itself into pantheism or deism. 1
God is the utterly Unique, Who proclaims Himself.
God makes Himself present in our inner being, that is the first
term of religious experience. No man really seeks after God
until God has first given him unmistakable evidence of His
presence to him in an historically mediated experience. The
full mutual relation between man and God involves the joint
action of an inner experience of God with the general experience
of God in history. 2 Revelation is neither mystical nor
ahistorical.
Kahler directed a strong attack upon the »historical
Jesus* of liberal Protestantism. He made a sharp distinction
between the historlsche Jesus and the geschlohtliche Christ, a
distinction which plays a crucial role in present-day German
theology. The historlsche Jesus was the Jesus of historicism,
the figure whose biography could be written like that of any
other man, through the aid of general historical science. The
geschichtliohe,or Biblical, Christ has both a natural historical
and a Divine history; and a history thus qualified by the
suprahistorical, is not amenable to the principles of scientific
historical research.
1. Loo, cit.
2. Ibid, p." 167.
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KShler was ooncerned to present to men the Biblical
Christ and not the ideal Christ, nor even the Christ of dogma.
The Gospel writers were not providing source-material for a
biography of Jesus. * The Gospel, like all revelation, is,in
its presentation of Divine events, the object of faith. What
the men of the Bible understood by revelation wa3 the living
Word, the life-giving, self-proclamation of the living God. 2
It is Kahler*s protest that, wDer hlstorische Jesus der
•X
modernen Schriftsteller verdeckt una den lebendigen Christus.M
The Christ of dogma may also be a rationed caricature of the
real Christ. The most learned theologian holds no advantage
over the simplest Christian in relation to the Christ in whom
one must believe.
Der wirkllche Christus 1st der gepredigte Christus.
Der gepredigte Christus, das 1st aber eben der
geglaubte. *
The preaching of Christ, whereby He is made the
object of faith, takes place in the Church. Christianity
cannot he freea from history and its conditions. Kahler would
hold together in tension the sphere of the transcendent and
the immanent. In keeping with this principle he finds that
in the New Testament the Person and the work of Christ are
1. Klhler, Per sogenannte historiache Jesus, p. 23.
2. Ibid,
3. 1515. p. 44.
4. T5I3-; p. 66.
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understood together. "Sein Werk 1st seine Person in ihrer
geschichtlich-Ubergeschichtlichen Wirkung." *
Kahler unites the dootrine of Providence with
soteriology:
Fur das christliche Denken gibt es keine Moglichkeit,
einen Rat3chluss Gottes fiber die Welt an und fiir sich
von dem Ratschluss fiber das Heil sachlich zu unter-
scheiden. ®
God*s creation, and His preservation, of the world is mediated
through His Word, i.e., God Himself, in His love, is aotive
in the world. The Christian knows that he is an immediate
object of the Divine action, upon which his life is dependent,
and in relation to which he has only a conditioned independenc
He does not look upon the oonstant creative act of God pan-
theistically, as the mere exercise of power, but he perceives
the loving purpose of God, with his personal experience. 4
KShler provides a fitting climax to the study of our
period, with his protest against the predominant theological
outlook of his own century, and with the pointer which his
thought provides toward present trends in theology. The
parallels with Barth which one cannot fail to discern in his
Biblically and Christ©logically centred theology, fail,however
at the point where Kahler discusses the imago del. KMhler
1. Ibid, p. 94.
2. Die Wlssenschaft der christlichen Lehre. p. 229.
- 3. Ibid, p. 2*52^
4. Ibid, p. 253.
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believes that the Divine plan of salvation and the plan of
creation, or world development, fall together in one. 1 The
Redeemer and the redeemed are not radically unlike:
Der Heilsrat hat seinen mittlerischen Gegenstand an
don Menschensohn, in dem sich Gott als Person
offenbart. Also ist das ganze Menschenleben gottartig
und die sinnenfallige Leibhaftigkeit unserer PersSn-
lichkeit badingt die Ebenbildlichkeit mit. 2
1. Ibid, p. 259. "1st der Heilsrat der Schopfungsplan,
so fallt aueh die Weltentwickelung mit der Heilsgeschiohte
zusammen.n
2* Ibid, p. 261 and ff.
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CONCLUSION
In the theological systems which we have passed in
review, we have discovered a prevailing immanental outlook,
broken only by counter trends which were little more than
protests in relation to the broad movements in theology. We
have, admittedly, ignored large areas of theologioal activity
in the nineteenth century, the mediating, conservative, and
liturgical elements. But it may be reasonably argued that
the 'liberal1 theology of the last century bore the mantle
of theological leadership, and conferred upon subsequent
theology the chief heritage of the theological reflection in
what E.R. Mackintosh has termed, the greatest century in
theology since the fourth.
The extent to which immanentism was a product of
the general climate of thought in the nineteenth century,
would be difficult to assess. Political liberalism, scientific
naturalism, and developing socialism, all played a part toward
inducing a 'this-worldly' outlook upon life. While the
theology which we have studied made its contribution to the
total outlook, we have seen ample evidence of the fact that
theology made a great effort to accommodate Itself to the
temper of the age. It would be an interesting study in itself
1. Types of Modern Theology, p. 190.
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to investigate the interrelation of this great period of
theological study with its social and cultural milieu. The
more important work of theology remains, however, the examin¬
ation of its own sources and history.
We have discerned two principal streams of thought
in nineteenth century theology: the idealistic on the one hand,
and the positive and historical on the other. Both had their
roots in Kantian epistemology and were influenced by romanticist
individualism. The individual and his humanly-conditioned
experience, whether interpreted rationally or empirically,
became normative for truth. The Christian view of Divine
revelation was subjugated to the limits of man's empirical or
ratiocinative experience. God was either made the all-inclusive
tern of a system or the 'limit* of experience.
In idealism, the tendency was unmistakably in the
direction of pantheism. When God is made an absolute, the
negative of distinction, He loses that distinctiveness which
constitutes transcendence, and remains necessary to the system
just so long as it suits the thinker to retain an 'ideal' back¬
ground of experience. In Strauss, Feuerbach and Marx, the ideal
gave way to naturalism and atheistic materialism.
The experiential and historical approach to the
religious life tended to exclude the being of God Himself from
the positive search for knowledge. No field of experience was
£53
left as the peculiar sphere of Divine revelation and action.
The whole of experience was leased out to the special sciences;
and theology lost its unique claim to truth. Schleiermacher,s
subjective approach to religion suffered at the hands of the
psychologists of religion, who could interpret all psychical
phenomena in terms of natural cause and effect. Hitachi1s
claim for a circumscribed historical sphere of empirically
discernible revelation, the Kingdom of God, could not long
hold out against the claims of historicism to bring the whole
of historical experience under the survey of universal
positivistic norms. With Troeltsch there remained only an
optimistic faith in the progress of relative value within
natural process.
The theology of the present century has been dis¬
illusioned by the naturalistic issue of the older liberal
theology. Since the theology of Karl Barth first made its
influence felt, there has been a widespread return to a
transcendental view of God and to the use of such terminology
as, revelation, miracle, Creator, and holy.
We cannot here enter into a discussion of contemporary
theology. The aim of our study has been to perform the limited
service of investigating the background of current theology,
rZ
against which perspective, we may see the present in clearer
outline. One observation we may make is that the revived
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transcendentalism of our time has by no means returned to a
scholastic construction of the relations between God and the
world. It lives in the post-Kantian era. There is a revived
claim for the legitimacy of a theological metaphysic in some
quarters, ^ but for the most part theology steers clear of
systematic metaphysical support.
The theology of Karl Barth has moved on from its
sterner paradoxes and dialectical disjunctions of earlier days
to become more adequately a theology of the Word of God. His
theology does not consist merely of a protest against the
immanentism of the last century but has entered into the
P
problems of historic theology in massive detail.
The revival of a Biblical theology, which is by no
means confined to Barth and to his coadjutors, is more than a
redirection of theological forces; it is a recovery of faith.
The Church has been reminded again of its true sources. There
must be a point at which theology is declared no longer Christian
1. See Cherbonnier, "Biblische Metaphysic and Christian
Theology." Theology Today. Vol. IX, No. 3. October 1952.
2. In discussion with the writer, Barth insisted that
he is not in reaction against nineteenth century immanentism,
but that he is seeking to go forward to a more adequate state¬
ment of the problem, in terms of the theology of the Word of
God.
He volunteered further, that he is not opposed to belief
in God's immanence, as such, but to the allgemein view of
immanence.
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if it outs itself off from its own distinctive origins, as
they are mediated through the Biblical record. We who bear
the name of Christ must constantly be recalled to the tran¬
scendent events, upon the plane of history, which we claim
as the basis of our faith.
It is precisely from the perspective of faith that
the ♦problem1 of the relations of God to man and to the world
must be solved. The concepts, immanence and transcendence,
whioh are the currency of philosophical discourse, may very well
be a hindrance to the Christian view of God in spite of the fact
that a theologian cannot well avoid them when entering into an
Auseinanderzetzung with other forms of thought. When either
term is used, it is assumed that there is something over against
God which is, or, may be, resistant to Him, a limitation upon
His will or power — or, to the conoept of God whioh the thinker
has first formulated for himself. Too often these concepts are
found indispensable because the theologian has previously
accepted a scientific or philosophical world-view, other than
the Christian, to which he feels obliged to adapt the Christian
view of God.
The Christian view of God properly regards Him as the
Creator of the Universe, Who remains sovereignly in control
of His creation. The problem of how God maintains creative
control of His universe is of a different order than the
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philosophical problem of freedom, or the scientific concept
of law. The Biblical view of God represents Him as acting
through free determinations of His will, by election, and by
His eternal purpose to bring about a final consummation of
His power and glory. All life and history is under the
providential care of God. The Biblical antitheses are not of
the order of, transcendent: immanent, but, Creator: creature,
Lord: disciple, and spirit: flesh. These polarities are of a
spiritual and moral character rather than theoretic or
metaphysical.
It is true that theology has a responsibility to
interpret, in so far as it can, the Christian view of God and
the world — and in terms that are meaningful to men. But
the theologian must remember that where God has left a veil
between His action and our knowledge we must not substitute
a mediating theory. We can only speak, as Christians, of
that event or that thought in which we have recognized God in
His self-disclosure. Mediation represents a move toward deism.
It is not always transcendentalism which is deistic. A tran¬
scendental view of God, oombined with a view of immediacy in
revelation and providence, should not be described as deistic.
The Biblical expressions concerning God's intimate
fatherly rule of the world, particularly in the Old Testament,
may appear to be based upon a naive world-view, and to be
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scientifically untenable. But, basically, these assertions
about God's actions are expressions of a living faith which
has experienced the nearness of an Holy God, e.g., (Isa. 57:
15. R.S.V.) :
"For thus says the high and lofty One
who inhabits eternity, whose name is Holy:
I dwell in the high and holy place,
and also with him who is of a contrite
and humble spirit."
The central dogma of the Christian faith concern the link which
God has established between the temporal and the eternal.
Divine mediation is centred at the heart of the Gospel. In
the New Testament, the Divine and the human meet together in
faith. Men of faith do not doubt that the things seen ©re
determined by the unseen (Heb. 11: 3). Faith lives in the
confidence that present Imperfect knowledge will give place
to full understanding (I Cor. 13: 12), and that there will
come a day when "God may be everything to every one."
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